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ABSTRACT 
 
LISA M. KOONIN: Acceptability of Pharmacies Serving as Primary Dispensers of 
Antiviral Drugs During an Influenza Pandemic: Perspectives of Pharmacy Executives 
(Under the direction of Dr. Sandra Greene) 
 
 
During a future severe influenza pandemic, as much as 30% of the United 
States (U.S.) population could become ill and may need prompt treatment with 
antiviral medicines.  Because antivirals are infrequently used for seasonal influenza 
and are not available in large amounts in supply chains, the federal government has 
stockpiled caches of antivirals in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
(CDC) Strategic National Stockpile for use during a pandemic.  
During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, numerous antiviral distribution and 
dispensing challenges arose for state and local public health officials.  In May 2011, 
the CDC launched an effort to explore a new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing during a future pandemic, based on U.S. pharmacies serving as primary 
dispensers of antiviral drugs.  Key informant interviews with pharmacy executives 
from traditional chain stores, independent pharmacies, as well as pharmacies 
located in mass merchants and grocery stores were conducted, and the resulting 
transcripts were analyzed.  The purpose of the study was to understand the 
executives’ opinions and views about their pharmacies serving as primary 
dispensers of antiviral drugs during a future pandemic.  Participants were asked 
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about their insights on the relative advantages, risks, compatibility with usual 
pharmacy processes, and support that might be needed to execute this function 
successfully.  
 Overall, every interviewed executive expressed support for this new antiviral 
distribution method, and most considered their pharmacies as key community 
stakeholders.  Collectively, these executives proposed that if a new way of 
dispensing antivirals approximates existing pharmacy processes and procedures, it 
will meet patients’ needs and add minimal complexity to pharmacy operations.  The 
informants also identified a number of potential risks but mentioned few 
“showstoppers” that would cause their pharmacies to not participate with this new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing. Findings from this study can help 
CDC design a new way of distributing and dispensing antivirals (and potentially other 
medical countermeasures) in the United States for a future influenza pandemic. By 
leveraging the skills, systems, and willingness of pharmacies to collaborate in a 
pandemic response effort, public health officials may realize improved emergency 
response capability and better population health outcomes.   
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PREFACE 
 
 
 
“Perseverance Furthers”1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
Source:  Wilhelm, R., & Baynes, C. F. (1967). The I Ching; or, Book of Changes (3rd ed.). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
During a future severe influenza pandemic, as much as 30% of the United 
States (U.S.) population could become ill and will need prompt treatment (Reed et 
al., 2013).  With current technologies, it will take about four to six months, after a 
pandemic is recognized, to produce a well-matched vaccine to protect the 
population.  In the meantime, (and even after pandemic vaccine is available) public 
health officials will rely on antiviral influenza medicines to treat ill persons.  The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends two neuraminidase 
inhibitor antiviral drugs (oseltamivir and zanamivir) for use during an influenza 
pandemic (CDC, 2009a).  Oseltamivir is the most commonly used influenza antiviral 
drug used in the United States (Borders-Hemphill & Mosholder, 2012).  When used 
as indicated for treatment during typical influenza seasons, these antiviral drugs can 
reduce the severity of influenza symptoms and shorten the time of illness by 
approximately one or two days.  Also, although questioned by one set of 
researchers, others have found that treatment of hospitalized patients with antiviral 
drugs may reduce the time spent in the hospital, intensive care unit (ICU) 
admissions, and the development of pneumonia and, in high-risk populations, death 
(Jefferson et al., 2012; Muthuri, Myles, Venkatesan, Leonardi-Bee, & Nguyen-Van-
Tam, 2013). For treatment, influenza antiviral drugs work best when started within 
two days after a person becomes ill (Bramley et al., 2012) but have shown 
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effectiveness when used after this time period (Louie et al., 2012; CDC, 2011d).  
Antiviral drugs can also be effective in reducing transmission of disease from ill to 
well persons and can be used for prophylaxis (Pebody et al., 2011). 
Because these antiviral medicines are seldom used during the regular 
influenza season, large quantities of these drugs are not routinely available in 
pharmaceutical supply chains or in pharmacies (approximately 1 to 2 million five-day 
regimens are prescribed for treatment of seasonal influenza each year in the United 
States; IMS Health, 2013).  Therefore, since about 2006, the federal government, 
many state health departments, and some local health departments have stockpiled 
caches of antivirals to use during a pandemic, when it is expected that the 
commercial supply chain will be quickly exhausted and will not have sufficient stocks 
to meet the demand for a large number of ill persons.  
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) was created in 1999 by the U.S. 
Congress to store caches of medications, antidotes, supplies, and equipment that 
can be deployed quickly to state health departments in response to a biological or 
chemical attack, or some other public health emergency, once the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services authorizes release of these items.  The SNS is housed 
at the CDC, part of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).  
Although the primary function of the SNS is to “shore up” state responses to terrorist 
attacks, starting in 2006, the SNS is responsible for procuring, storing, and 
distributing millions of antivirals for use during a pandemic.  State health 
departments have also stockpiled additional supplies of these medicines (largely 
achieved through federal subsidies) and have been funded by CDC to create plans 
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to “administer antiviral drugs for treatment to priority groups when treatment of 
illness is indicated” (U.S. Government, 2008). 
In 2005, a national goal was set by the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2005) to ensure sufficient antiviral 
medication to treat 25% of the U.S. population by establishing a national stockpile of  
81 million regimens of antiviral drugs for use during an influenza pandemic—6 
million for containment of initial cases and 75 million for treatment of symptomatic 
patients (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2006).  Of the total 81 million regimens, 
31 million were targeted for procurement by the Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Project Areas (PHER grantees)—which include 50 states, 4 major 
metropolitan areas,2 and 8 U.S. territories and jurisdictions3— through DHHS-
subsidized contracts, and 50 million were procured and managed by the CDC’s 
SNS.  As of February 2013, the SNS contained over 68 million regimens of 
oseltamivir and zanamivir in both adult and pediatric formulations.  HHS, in 
collaboration with CDC/SNS is currently evaluating the amount of antivirals that may 
be needed for future procurement.  Separately, state and local health departments 
collectively hold approximately 26.5 million usable regimens.4   Although the expiry 
dates have been extended for some of these state-held antivirals, it is highly unlikely 
that additional federal funding will be made available to states for purchase of 
antivirals to replenish these stockpiles.  
                                                 
2
Washington, D.C.; Chicago; Los Angeles County; and New York City   
3
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
Guam, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia 
4
A. Patel (personal communication, April 12, 2013)  
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Currently, the federal plan for antiviral distribution and dispensing relies on 
the SNS to send these drugs to state health departments5 after a pandemic emerges 
and the need for these drugs arises.  Federal planning envisions that state and local 
health departments would serve as primary distributors and, at times, dispensers of 
antivirals during a pandemic.  Each state is responsible for distribution and 
dispensing plans and protocols to ensure that stockpiled antiviral drugs reach its 
population.  Deployment of SNS stockpiles of antiviral drugs is meant to supplement 
commercial availability of these medicines once commercial supplies are dwindling 
or exhausted.  The SNS endeavors to ensure that these materials reach state public 
health officials rapidly, so the medicines can reach the public as quickly as possible.  
State health departments, in turn, have plans to distribute these drugs to local health 
departments, hospitals, pharmacies, and other entities in the state according to their 
pandemic plan. The current federal scheme relies heavily on health departments to 
distribute these medicines and also set up and staff clinics and sites to dispense 
antivirals to the public as specified by the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
Implementation: 
HHS, in coordination with DOD [Department of Defense], VA [Department of 
Veterans Affairs], and in collaboration with State, local, and tribal 
governments and private sector partners, shall assist in the development of 
distribution plans for medical countermeasure stockpiles to ensure that 
delivery and distribution algorithms have been planned for each locality for 
antiviral distribution. Goal is to be able to distribute antiviral medications to 
infected patients within 48 hours of the onset of symptoms. Measure of 
performance: distribution plans developed. (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 
2006, p. 122, item 6.1.13.4)  
 
                                                 
5
For simplicity, these PHER grantees will be henceforth referred to as “states.” 
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Additionally, CDC has set as one of its key public health emergency 
capabilities that state health departments must have “the ability to provide medical 
countermeasures (including vaccines, antiviral drugs, antibiotics, antitoxin, etc.) in 
support of treatment or prophylaxis … to the identified population in accordance with 
public health guidelines and/or recommendations” (CDC, 2011c, p. 12). 
Background and Context: 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic—A Real-Life 
Case Study in Distribution of the Stockpile 
On April 25, 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) recognized the 
potential threat of the emerging and novel H1N1 influenza virus and declared a 
public health emergency of international concern.  The next day, HHS issued a 
nationwide public health emergency to mobilize against an influenza pandemic. On 
that same day, the SNS began releasing 25% of the stockpiled antiviral supplies 
(~12 million regimens) to state health departments for further redistribution to local 
health departments and health care facilities in each state (Figure 1; CDC, 2010b).  
Local health departments were then tasked with sending antivirals to key health care 
facilities (and pharmacies in some states).  Because of the relatively mild-to-
moderate nature of the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak (Shrestha et al., 2011), and 
CDC guidance that recommended antiviral use primarily for those at high risk for 
complications (CDC, 2009a), few public health entities actually opened clinics and 
directly dispensed antivirals to ill persons (ASTHO & NACCHO, 2013).  
In addition, pharmaceutical distributors and pharmacies had some 
(unspecified) amount of antivirals in their supply chains and in pharmacies, and most 
state health departments had stockpiled antivirals for use during a pandemic.  
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Figure 1.  Distribution and dispensing of antiviral drugs by the SNS to 
state health departments during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. SHD = state 
health department; LHD = local health department. 
 
  
CDC recommended prompt antiviral treatment for patients who had confirmed 
or suspected 2009 H1N1 influenza and who were at increased risk for serious 
morbidity and mortality; had severe, complicated, or progressive illness; or were 
hospitalized (CDC, 2009a).  Rapid treatment was especially important for pregnant 
women and young children who had become ill, and persons who were hospitalized 
with complications of influenza. Treatment has been shown to be most effective 
when started in the first 48 hours of illness.  The effectiveness of timely treatment 
has been extensively studied, and a body of published literature from the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic showed significant decreases in morbidity and mortality for ill persons who 
were promptly treated (Bogie, Grant, Hallford, & Anderson, 2011; Falagas et al., 
2010; Jain et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010; Louie et al., 2009; Louie et al., 2012; Siston 
et al., 2010; CDC, 2011b). 
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Although it is impossible to predict when the next influenza pandemic will 
arise, maintaining readiness to respond to a pandemic is a national priority.  The 
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation issued in 2006 called for 
detailed antiviral distribution and dispensing plans for all local areas; the 2009 H1N1 
influenza pandemic was the first time that state and local health departments had to 
implement those plans for an actual public health emergency.  There were anecdotal 
reports shared with CDC of difficulties in distributing and dispensing these 
medications in some communities, and spot shortages occurred, delaying treatment 
of some persons. Given the relatively mild-to-moderate morbidity and mortality 
associated with the 2009 pandemic, these problems, for the most part, did not have 
severe consequences (Shrestha et al., 2011).  However, if the severity and the 
communicability of the influenza virus is greater in a future pandemic, a much larger 
number of people would become ill and need rapid access to these potentially life-
saving drugs.  In addition, delayed treatment may lead to an increased number of 
hospitalizations and deaths. 
There were two waves of pandemic activity during 2009 (the spring wave was 
April – May, 2009, and the fall wave was August 2009 – March 2010), with 
significant heterogeneity in the timing and impact of disease occurrence by 
community.  Some communities had profound outbreaks affecting thousands of 
people at the same time, while other communities had a milder event.  Some 
localities were hardly affected by the disease during the spring wave, while other 
communities were particularly hard-hit. In areas with marked outbreaks of 2009 
H1N1 influenza, state and local public health officials had to rapidly distribute SNS 
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(and perhaps, state-stockpiled) antivirals to hospitals, pharmacies, and other 
medical facilities for dispensing.  Some of these jurisdictions could not keep up with 
the demand for antivirals during the peak of community outbreaks.  In contrast, 
because a commercial supply of antivirals (specifically adult formulations) was 
already available in many pharmacies and in pharmaceutical supply chains, some 
health departments did not have to distribute and dispense antivirals from their 
stockpiles or from antivirals received from the SNS.  
Three important realities have changed since 2006 when the SNS began 
stockpiling antivirals and state and local health departments began planning for their 
distribution.  First, when the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
Implementation Plan was released in 2006, there was limited antiviral production 
capacity worldwide (there were and are only two U.S.-approved antiviral 
manufacturers), and all of the manufacturing facilities were located outside of the 
United States (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2006).  However, by 2009, one of 
the major antiviral manufacturers had built a domestic facility and started to produce 
larger amounts of the drug.  Therefore, the supply uncertainty related to offshore 
production was reduced.   
Second, marked budget cuts in federal, state, and local public health 
programs since 2009 have reduced staffing levels and have further deepened the 
ongoing nationwide shortage of public health workers (Willard, 2010).  The Trust for 
America’s Health (TFAH), in their 2010 report, Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s 
Health From Diseases, Disasters, and Bioterrorism, found that “the H1N1 pandemic 
flu demonstrated ongoing budget and funds distribution challenges for emergency 
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health preparedness” (p. 37) and more specifically, “the public health workforce is in 
crisis.  There are not enough professionals, particularly trained experts, to 
adequately protect Americans during health emergencies.” (TFAH, 2010, p. 38).  In 
the 2011 report from this same organization, the authors warned that although 
significant progress in emergency preparedness had been realized over the past 10 
years, "…local, state and federal cuts to public health budgets and staff are starting 
to erode a decade’s worth of progress.  Health departments are increasingly spread 
thin and programs and core capabilities are being cut” (TFAH, 2011b, p. 3).  The 
executive director of TFAH warned 
We're seeing a decade's worth of progress eroding in front of our eyes… 
Preparedness had been on an upward trajectory, but now some of the most 
elementary capabilities—including the ability to identify and contain 
outbreaks, provide vaccines and medications during emergencies, and treat 
people during mass traumas—are experiencing cuts in every state across the 
country  (TFAH, 2011a, para. 3).  
 
This organization’s most recent report adds more bad news about cuts in state-level 
resources for preparedness as twenty-nine states have cut funding for public health 
from fiscal years (FY) 2010–11 to 2011–12, with 23 of these states cutting funds for 
a second year in a row and 14 for three consecutive years  (TFAH, 2012).  
Third, the 2009 H1N1 pandemic has given an opportunity, for the first time, to 
execute pandemic plans and evaluate the current system of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing (ASTHO & NACCHO, 2013).  Anecdotal descriptions of problems arising 
with dispensing of antiviral medicines during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic were 
reported to CDC. Looking forward and in light of this limited experience during the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic, some state plans for distributing and dispensing antiviral 
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medicines through state and local health departments in time of a severe pandemic 
may not be adequate to ensure timely access to these medicines.  
Several researchers have examined antiviral distribution strategies to suggest 
ways to optimize and speed up this process, especially given that different 
communities were impacted differently.  Dimitrov, Goll, Hupert, Pourbohloul, and 
Meyers (2011) conducted mathematical modeling to examine the number of 
stockpiled antivirals that should be released from the SNS and whether antivirals 
should be distributed on the basis of population (“pro rata,” which is the current 
method) or by using epidemiologic information to target the most affected areas.  
These authors concluded that for an influenza pandemic that is more transmissible 
than the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, “outcomes of antiviral use are more heavily 
impacted by choice of distribution intervals, quantities per shipment, and timing of 
shipments in relation to pandemic spread” (p. e16094).  However, these 
investigators did not suggest how additional staff could be identified and trained, nor 
did they examine other alternatives for dispensing if staffing was not adequate as 
one of their parameters for optimizing this process.  Because of anecdotal reports of 
challenges with antiviral dispensing during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and a need to 
improve emergency response efforts, a careful analysis is needed of what worked 
well and the challenges faced during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  Based on findings 
from that exploration, new solutions can be formulated to improve antiviral 
distribution and dispensing. 
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Overarching and Concomitant Efforts That Will Inform Approach / 
Research Design and Methods  
This dissertation research is linked to a larger CDC exploration that was 
launched in May 2011 to develop new methods of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing for the United States, based on the inherent strengths and capabilities of 
existing systems (Appendix A).  A literature review of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
experience was conducted (see Chapter 2), and the findings were used to initiate 
and inform the CDC project.  This CDC exploration is being conducted in close 
collaboration with key public health partners, the Association of State and Territorial 
Health Officials (ASTHO), and the National Association of County and City Health 
Officials (NACCHO).  The goal of the project is to explore the acceptability and 
feasibility of pharmaceutical distributors and pharmacies serving as the key 
distributors and dispensers of antivirals during a future pandemic.  The researcher of 
this dissertation is directing this work as part of her day-to-day responsibilities as 
CDC’s lead for the Pandemic Medical Care and Countermeasures Task Force.   
Specifically, the CDC project is exploring whether a large proportion of SNS 
stockpiles could be sent to pharmaceutical distributors (and/or other commercial 
entities) rather than to state and local health departments, as called for in the current 
plan.  The distributors would, in turn, send the antivirals to their existing customers 
who are chain, supermarket, mass-merchant, and independent pharmacies, as well 
as hospitals, clinics, and other medical facilities.  Because these entities are already 
established customers of pharmaceutical distributors, the new method would 
leverage a fully functioning system during the time of a pandemic emergency (see 
Figure 1). This new method would provide antivirals to pharmacies (Figure 2), where 
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ill persons could obtain the drug with a valid prescription.  (CDC assumes that 
antivirals would remain a prescription drug in the United States during a future 
pandemic, although other countries have reclassified oseltamivir “off-prescription”; 
Gauld, Jennings, Frampton, & Huang, 2012.)  In the concept under exploration, state 
health departments would still receive an allotment of antivirals for use in public 
health clinics and for distribution to certain entities, but largely the public health role 
would be one of assuring that underserved and vulnerable populations have access 
to antivirals as well as monitoring and evaluation, with hopes that this shift could 
reduce a burden on public health during a pandemic emergency. 
Because this medicine has already been purchased by the federal 
government, the concept assumes that there will be no charge for the product to 
pharmaceutical distributors and pharmacies, and contractually, they will not be able 
to charge patients for it.  However, pharmacies could charge a dispensing fee (that 
will be capped at a benchmark rate).  If patients have insurance or other third party 
coverage, then the dispensing fee will be billed to that entity.  Although it is 
anticipated that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act in 2014 will reduce 
the number of people that do not have insurance,  it is unknown at this time how 
much of the population will remain without coverage for medications (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2012). Therefore, ongoing work by CDC is exploring how to cover 
dispensing fee costs for those who are uninsured (or do not have pharmacy 
coverage) so the dispensing fee does not serve as a barrier to accessing antivirals. 
New methods of distribution of SNS antivirals through commercial entities to clinics, 
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hospitals, and nursing homes will be explored in a separate CDC effort and were not 
included in this dissertation research. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Proposed method of pandemic antiviral distribution 
and dispensing under investigation by CDC. 
 
For this new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing to be considered, 
it must be judged as feasible and acceptable.  During 2011–2012, CDC conducted 
feasibility assessments through (a) mathematical modeling of potential supply and 
demand factors, (b) two full-day simulations conducted at two pharmacies (one was 
an urban location of a chain pharmacy and the other was an independent pharmacy 
in a semi-rural location) to measure throughput and capabilities when faced with a 
surge of patients, and (c) exploration of system capabilities in pharmaceutical 
distribution systems. 
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Acceptability is also a key component for evaluation.  First, distributors must 
be willing to perform this function during a pandemic emergency.  CDC has explored 
their initial willingness to receive SNS-stockpiled antivirals and distribute them during 
a pandemic through their networks, and will engage them again in the future.  
Acceptability to public health officials is a high priority in this project and is being 
explored in depth with project collaborators ASTHO and NACCHO.  If the new 
methods are adopted, there will be a major shift in specific planning parameters and 
response duties expected by CDC of state and local public health entities during a 
pandemic.  Although state (and therefore local) health departments will still receive 
some antiviral drugs for distribution to entities that the distributor cannot reach (e.g., 
public health clinics, tribal health clinics/hospitals, prisons, and homeless clinics), the 
need for public health authorities to further distribute and dispense antivirals will be 
markedly reduced (Hunter, Rodriguez, & Aragon, 2012).   
Pharmacies and pharmacists will also play a central role in this new method 
of antiviral distribution and dispensing and must be willing to perform this function.  
The acceptability of frontline pharmacists as primary antiviral dispensers was 
assessed by a nationally representative poll of over 1,000 pharmacists that was 
conducted from February to April, 2012, by researchers from the Harvard School of 
Public Health (HSPH), who are collaborating with CDC on this effort (Appendix B).  It 
is critical to understand what frontline pharmacists think of this new approach, and 
also to understand what they think may be hurdles or challenges to their 
participation in this new approach to dispensing antivirals during a pandemic.    
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Whereas pharmacists did dispense some antivirals during the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, few of them had to fill a large number of prescriptions within a short 
interval, because the H1N1 pandemic was mild to moderate in severity and antivirals 
were recommended only for those at highest risk for complications from the illness.  
During seasonal influenza, individual pharmacists typically dispense only a small 
number of prescriptions for antivirals, as this medicine is not commonly prescribed.  
Most pharmacies keep only a few packages of antivirals on their shelves at a given 
time.  In contrast, during a severe future pandemic, approximately one third of the 
population could become ill, and CDC would likely recommend that almost all ill 
persons be treated, leading to a potentially much higher burden on pharmacists to 
maintain their usual pharmacy functions and dispense antivirals to a large number of 
patients at the same time. In addition, CDC would likely recommend empiric 
treatment (as it did in 2009), meaning that persons ill with ILI would be treated 
without a confirmatory laboratory test (Greene et al., 2012), which could lead to a 
large number of symptomatic persons seeking this medicine. The results from this 
HSPH poll informed the development of the key informant instrument used in this 
research. 
The decision-makers at retail pharmacy companies (traditional chain 
pharmacies, independent pharmacies, as well as mass-merchant and supermarket 
pharmacies) will also have to deem this new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing as acceptable, as their pharmacies will serve in a primary role for 
dispensing antivirals.  This dissertation research focused on how pharmacy 
executives (decision-makers) view this new method and whether they think this new 
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method of antiviral distribution and dispensing might be acceptable and feasible.  
Pharmacy executives will decide ultimately if their pharmacies will participate, and 
their staff pharmacists will be the final link to patients who need antiviral medications 
during a pandemic.
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A comprehensive and systematic review of the literature for studies and 
reports that examine federal, state, and local public health antiviral drug (oseltamivir 
and zanamivir) distribution and dispensing activities during the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic (April 2009 through April 2010; CDC, 2010b)  was conducted to identify 
strengths and weaknesses of methods used by public health entities:  
What were the strengths and weaknesses of federal, state, and local 
public health antiviral distribution and dispensing programs during the 
2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic in the United States?  
 
The literature review objectives were (a) determine the strengths and 
successes in antiviral distribution and dispensing by federal, state, and local public 
health during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and (b) determine the difficulties and 
challenges of federal, state, and local public health antiviral distribution and 
dispensing efforts during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. 
In particular, the literature was searched to identify the key challenges and 
barriers that state and local health departments faced in dispensing antivirals.  
Staffing, structural, funding, policy, and procedural barriers were examined to see if 
the current system seems adequate, or if improvement is needed.  
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Selection of Literature 
This literature review aimed to comprehensively compile and analyze reports 
and articles published from April 1, 2009, through January 31, 2013, to assess the 
performance of federal, state, and local public health entities regarding antiviral 
distribution and dispensing during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic.  Because it 
was unlikely that clinical trials or controlled studies were conducted to evaluate 
antiviral dispensing efforts during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, this literature review 
included published descriptive analyses, performance evaluation reports, and “after-
action” reports describing federal, state, and local dispensing efforts from credible 
governmental, nongovernmental, and academic sources. 
First, studies were identified from the peer-reviewed literature that described 
antiviral shortages and/or addressed public health dispensing activities for antivirals 
during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic for the treatment of ill persons.  A search was 
made for studies (both controlled and descriptive) that assessed or described 
antiviral dispensing activities by federal, state, and local public health entities.  
Second, the same inclusion/exclusion criteria were applied for screening 
governmental, government-advisory committee, nongovernmental, and academic 
reports of performance evaluation, as well as state-published after-action reports 
about antiviral dispensing activities by public health entities during the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic.  These reports were available through governmental and 
nongovernmental websites and other sources. 
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Sources 
A systematic search was performed using PubMed (which accesses 
MEDLINE) and two other databases: ISI Web of Knowledge, and Google Scholar 
(using the same search terms for all).  Because relevant key words are sometimes 
not included in key articles, and because there is often a time lag in posting the 
latest month’s journal issue to PubMed, the table of contents of four journals—
Emerging Infectious Diseases, Journal of Public Health Management & Practice, 
Clinical Infectious Diseases, and Disaster Medicine and Public Health 
Preparedness—were hand searched for each month from October 2012 to January 
2013 to ensure abstracts from the latest months’ journal issues were included.  
Bibliographies of relevant articles and reports were also searched to identify 
additional applicable studies. 
In addition to the databases and hand-searching methods listed above, 
selected governmental, nongovernmental, and academic websites were also 
searched for reports of “promising practices“ performance evaluations, and for after-
action reports of federal, state, and local public health antiviral-dispensing activities.  
In particular, searches were conducted on the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Lessons Learned Information 
Sharing (LLIS) website (FEMA, n.d.-b), where state and local public health are 
encouraged, as part of the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP), to post after-action reports and synopses of “best practices” using a 
standard format (FEMA, n.d.-a).  Additional state after-action reports that were not 
found on LLIS and were obtained by CDC for programmatic use were also included.  
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All after-action and other reports that were published by state health departments 
and that addressed strengths and weaknesses in their antiviral distribution and 
dispensing activities during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic were carefully reviewed for 
relevant content.  Relevant reports or studies on the following government websites 
were examined: HHS www.flu.gov, CDC www.cdc.gov, and the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) http://www.gao.gov/.  Finally, nongovernmental websites 
were reviewed for relevant articles or reports: Association of State and Territorial 
Health Officials (ASTHO) http://www.astho.org/Programs/Preparedness/, National 
Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) 
http://www.naccho.org/topics/emergency/, and the American Public Health 
Association (APHA) http://www.getreadyforflu.org/preparedness/influenza_main.htm; 
and academic websites that focus on emergency preparedness were searched, 
including  
 Columbia University http://www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu/,  
 Johns Hopkins University http://www.jhsph.edu/preparedness/, 
 Harvard School of Public Health http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/policy-
translation-leadership/emergency-preparedness-and-response/h-perlc-
preparedness-and-emergency-response-learning-center/, 
 University of Pittsburgh http://www.prepare.pitt.edu/,  
 University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) http://cphp.sph.unc.edu/, and 
 Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy (CIDRAP; University 
of Minnesota) http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/index.html  
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Only articles and reports for which a full-text version could be obtained were 
included in the review.  A summary of the literature search strategy used in this 
analysis is included in Appendix C. 
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria Including Quality Assessment 
Seven inclusion criteria were used for this review.  First, the article or report 
must be published in the English language.  Second, the article must describe the 
use of antivirals used for humans (not animals).  Third, the antiviral dispensing 
activities in the article should be those conducted during the 2009 H1N1 influenza 
pandemic (spanning April 2009 through April 2010).  Fourth, the article or report 
should be published between April 2009 and January 2013.  Fifth, the report or study 
must describe only antiviral dispensing activities that occurred in the United States 
and not in any other country.  Sixth, the report or study must focus on antivirals used 
for treatment (not prophylaxis) of 2009 H1N1 influenza.  Finally, seventh, the report 
or study must focus on antivirals used to treat influenza and not any other disease.  
See Table 1 for definitions used in this literature search. 
Studies that focused only on federal distribution of antivirals from the SNS 
(and did not address state and local dispensing activities) were excluded from the 
search.  Also excluded were reports that addressed pandemic planning activities 
rather than actual response during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, those that were 
mathematical modeling or simulation studies, and studies and reports that only 
described antiviral policies but did not include an evaluation of how they were 
implemented during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. 
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The title and abstract of each paper identified through the electronic, web, 
and hand searches were first screened for relevance to inclusion/exclusion criteria.  
If the article was in electronic format, an electronic search for the words antiviral or 
oseltamivir or Tamiflu or zanamivir or Relenza, as well as any mention of antiviral 
shortage or dispensing was used to screen further.  Finally, if the abstract and article 
met the screening criteria, then the full text of the article was examined. 
To ensure a consistent approach, definitions for search terms were developed 
and adhered to throughout the literature review process (Table 1). 
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Table 1.  Definitions Used for Literature Search 
 
 
 
 
Term Definition 
2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic   
A worldwide epidemic caused by the emergence of a new 
influenza strain (2009 H1N1) to which humans had little or 
no immunity and which developed the ability to infect and 
be transmitted efficiently and between humans for a 
sustained period of time in the community.  This virus was 
recognized as having pandemic potential in April 2009.  On 
April 25, 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared a public health emergency of international 
concern, and on April 26, the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services issued a nationwide public health 
emergency to mobilize against an influenza pandemic.  The 
WHO announced the beginning of a pandemic on June 11, 
2009.  WHO Director-General Margaret Chan announced 
that the H1N1 influenza virus moved into the postpandemic  
period on August 10, 2010 (U.S. Government, 2008). 
Influenza antivirals   Prescription medications used to treat influenza.  The two 
types of influenza antiviral medications used during the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic were oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and 
zanamivir (Relenza). 
Distributing/distribution  The activity associated with the delivery of federal SNS 
assets from their original location to the state receiving, 
staging, and storing (RSS) warehouses, as well as from the 
RSS warehouses to local health departments, dispensing 
sites, alternate care facilities, and regional distribution 
sites/nodes. 
Public health  Governmental agencies that routinely provide population 
health services at federal, state, or local levels. 
Shortage Lack of availability of antivirals when needed for treatment 
of ill persons during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic; may also 
include temporary or “spot” shortages of these medications. 
Timely receipt of 
antivirals 
 Antiviral treatment started within the first 48 hours (2 days) 
of illness. 
Delayed treatment   Antiviral treatment started later than 48 hours (2 days) after 
influenza signs and symptoms began. 
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Design for Literature Review 
Descriptive and observational studies as well as program evaluations, 
descriptive analyses, governmental committee reports, and after-action reports 
about public health activities conducted in the United States, written in English, and 
published between April 2009 and January 2013 were included. 
Types of Participants 
Federal, state, or local public health personnel or agencies that distributed and 
dispensed antivirals in any setting for treatment of ill persons during the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic were included. 
Quality Criteria 
Studies were analyzed and assessed for quality on the basis of the following two 
criteria (maximum score could be 10):  
1. Published in peer-reviewed journal or by a credible source 
5: Yes 
3: No, but credible government report or other source 
1: No, only a single person’s opinion or editorial or not published by a 
credible source 
0: score was not assigned 
2. Objective evaluation of dispensing of antivirals during H1N1 
5: Yes, evidence of objective review 
3: Difficult to assess objectivity 
1: No, not objective analysis, opinion or conjecture 
0: score was not assigned. 
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Process for Reviewing Literature 
 Descriptions of the strengths, key challenges, and barriers that state and local 
health departments faced in distributing and dispensing antivirals during the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic were identified.  The researcher searched for mentions of antiviral 
shortages to see if shortages correlated with public health dispensing activities.  
Descriptions of staffing, structural, funding, policy, and procedural barriers were also 
sought to see if the current system seemed adequate, or if improvement was 
needed.  Themes summarized below were derived directly from this review.  All 
relevant articles and reports were noted on a summary sheet. 
Literature Review Results 
 Initially, 568 articles and reports from PubMed were identified for review. An 
additional two studies were identified from ISI Web of Science, and 15 from Google 
Scholar.  Hand searches of specific journals yielded two more articles.  A query of 
the FEMA, Department of Homeland Security’s registered website  (LLIS; FEMA, 
n.d.-b) produced 30 after-action reports that met the search criteria.  Further, 54 
after-action reports submitted directly to CDC (for other programmatic purposes) but 
not posted on LLIS were identified that met the search criteria.  Two additional after-
action reports were found through Internet searches, but were later found to be 
duplicates of two submitted to CDC. From all sources, after-action reports were 
found for all 50 states and the District of Columbia; 30 states had published more 
than one 2009 H1N1 after-action report, usually from differing time periods during 
the pandemic.  Finally, scans of six other governmental and nongovernmental 
websites produced five reports for analysis (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  Literature search results for antiviral dispensing successes 
and challenges during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. 
 
After applying the inclusion criteria, full copies of 230 articles, reports, and 
after-action reports were reviewed in detail and determined eligible for analysis (see 
flowchart in Figure 3).  After review, 19 of the state after-action reports (out of 86 
posted on LLIS or available through CDC) did not meet the inclusion criteria.  
Overall, 82 articles, reports, and after-action reports met the inclusion criteria for this 
literature review (15 published articles or reports and 67 state after-action reports). 
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Quality of Studies Included in This Review 
 All studies and reports were examined for quality using the previously 
described criteria.  The majority of the information used in this comprehensive 
review was from state after-action reports filed on the Department of Homeland 
Security’s FEMA secure website Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) 
(FEMA, n.d.-b) or submitted directly to CDC.  LLIS is a national website that posts 
reports and summaries of disaster responses, exercises, and other efforts for public 
health, emergency response, and homeland security use.  A limited number of peer-
reviewed published reports were also used for this review.  A ranking of quality 
assessment was performed for included studies and reports.   Only studies that were 
from a credible source with objective findings were included (minimum score of 3/5).  
The state-published after-action reports were hard to rank for quality.  Although they 
were produced by reliable state governments, objectivity in the findings was hard to 
assess.  Therefore, quality scores were assigned only to the published studies. 
Characteristics of each published article or report (not including after-action reports) 
and quality scores are summarized in Table 2.  
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Table 2.  Quality Scores of Published Studies Included in Literature Review 
 
Author Type of article, journal 
Quality score (credible 
source/objective evaluation) 
CDC (2010c) Article: CDC’s Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report 
5/5 
GAO Report (2009) Report 5/3 
GAO Report (2011) Report 5/3 
Hanfling (2009) Commentary: Disaster Medicine 
and Public Health Preparedness 
5/1 
Horton (Beyond 
readiness, 2009)  
Congressional Testimony 3/1 
Hunter (2012) Article: BMC Public Health 5/5 
Jain (2009) Article: Journal of the American 
Medical Association 
5/5 
Kumar (2009) Article: Viruses 5/3 
Lautenbach (2010) Article: Clinical Infectious 
Diseases 
5/5 
Lee (2010) Article: Clinical Infectious 
Diseases 
5/5 
Louie (2009) Article: Journal of the American 
Medical Association 
5/5 
NACCHO Think Tank 
Report (2010) 
Report 3/3 
National Biodefense 
Science Board (2010) 
Report 3/3 
Siston (2010) Article: Journal of the American 
Medical Association 
5/5 
Skarbinski (2011) Article: Clinical Infectious 
Diseases 
5/5 
Sugerman (2011) Article: Clinical Infectious 
Diseases 
5/5 
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After reviewing all of the published articles, no studies that were randomized 
controlled trials or that employed any other experimental design were identified.  
However, six peer-reviewed journal articles described hospitalized patients ill with 
2009 H1N1 influenza and mentioned delays in antiviral treatment (but with no reason 
given for the delay).  The most relevant data for this review were obtained from state 
2009 H1N1 pandemic after-action reports; they were the only source that included a 
description of antiviral successes and challenges during 2009 H1N1.  About 35% 
(n=30/86) of the after-action reports were filed on the FEMA secure website (LLIS; 
FEMA, n.d.-b). This website is open for viewing only by government staff. The 
remainder of the after-action reports were submitted by states directly to CDC for 
program review purposes (n=54), and two after-action reports submitted to CDC 
were also posted on the Internet.  Of the 86 after-action reports identified, 19 did not 
mention any success, challenge, or description of their antiviral distribution and/or 
dispensing activities.  Therefore, 67 after-action reports were included in the 
analysis.  
Almost all of the after-action reports submitted to CDC or found on LLIS 
(83%, n=71) were listed as “classified as For Official Use Only (FOUO).”6   Although 
the researcher is authorized to access this website because of the investigator’s 
official CDC duties, the FOUO designation prevents her from citing individual reports 
in a way that the key themes could be linked to a specific state’s after-action report.  
Therefore, a summary of the successes and challenges that emerged following a 
                                                 
6
FEMA defines FOUO as follows: “The term ’For Official Use Only’ applies only to unclassified information which 
is privileged, sensitive, and requires protection from disclosure to the general public, and for which a significant 
reason, statutory requirement, or regulatory instruction exists to preclude general circulation” (FEMA, 2000) 
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review of all of the journal articles and reports, as well as an aggregated summary of 
findings from the after-action reports, is presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
Successes With Antiviral Dispensing 
This comprehensive literature review revealed three areas where state and 
local health departments reported successes with antiviral distribution and 
dispensing during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (Table 3).   
Thirty-seven percent of the states’ after-action reports (n=25) noted that 
antiviral distribution and dispensing “worked well” in regard to timely distribution from 
the state to local health departments.  However, this reference was almost always 
related to the warehouse (RSS) functions, and to transportation and distribution of 
antivirals to other entities (such as hospitals and clinics); very few states reported 
that they directly dispensed the antivirals to ill persons in public health settings.  The 
following two excerpts are representative of the reports in this category:  
 
Distribution worked overall, solid A-. 
 
Receipt, Store, and Stage (RSS) site staffs were able to successfully receive, 
repackage, stage, and distribute SNS assets within 27 hours. RSS staffs were 
able to successfully adapt and develop a “just-in-time” electronic warehouse 
inventory management system. 
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Table 3.  Summary of Successes With Antiviral Dispensing During the 2009 H1N1 
Pandemic From Literature Review 
 
No. Successes 
Number of 
articles or 
reports that 
cited this issue         
(n=15) 
Number of 
state AARs 
that cited this 
issue (n=67) 
1 Antiviral distribution and dispensing 
processes “worked well.”  0 (0%) 25 (37%) 
2 Collaboration with pharmacies for antiviral 
distribution and dispensing worked well 
and was “successful.” 2 (13%) 18 (27%) 
3 Pre-pandemic investments made by the 
federal government for state and local 
pandemic planning, staffing and exercises 
enabled a successful response. 1 (6%) 14 (21%) 
 
 
 
Fourteen after-action reports (21%) mentioned that pre-pandemic 
investments made by the federal government for state and local pandemic planning 
enabled a successful response.  In particular, some states commented that receiving 
previous CDC funding allowed them to focus on pandemic planning, train staff, and 
have a plan available to use during the response.  A large number of states 
mentioned that previous efforts to exercise their plans proved to be beneficial in the 
2009 H1N1 response, as it enabled them to have “worked the plan” before the 
pandemic arrived:  
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and Cities Readiness Initiative planning 
paid off as the RSS Warehouse performed extremely well.  Recent training 
facilitated the building of partnerships with community stakeholders and with 
LHDs [local health departments] throughout the state.  
 
[The state] had existing response plans that could be utilized immediately and 
served as a starting point for the response.  While elements of this plan were 
field adapted during the duration of the response, without the plan to work 
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from as the response began, the initial response would have likely been less 
organized and less effective.  
 
It was obvious that routine training and exercises and previous activation of 
the RSS to support major coastal hurricanes had allowed the staff to 
understand their roles and to implement mission requirements in a 
professional manner.  Additionally, the warehouse and RSS contractor 
cooperated to facilitate a very successful operation.  
 
Multiple-year investments by the federal government in federal and state 
antiviral stockpiling, as well as federal funding and guidance to state and local health 
departments for pandemic planning, had created infrastructure that facilitated the 
response.  CDC has provided significant funding to states to support pandemic 
planning.  A total of $325 million in cooperative agreement emergency supplemental 
funds was given prior to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic to enable state and local health 
departments to hire personnel, and to bolster the development of state and local 
pandemic influenza preparedness plans (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, n.d.). 
Eighteen after-action reports (27%) reported that pharmacies assisted the 
state health department in managing antiviral stocks and provided the public with 
access to antivirals.  These states mentioned that they had developed partnerships 
and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) that enabled them to send antivirals to 
pharmacies for dispensing during the pandemic.  To ensure access to antivirals for 
uninsured patients, some state and local health departments distributed cached 
antivirals to pharmacies and made special efforts to communicate to the public and 
providers that patients could receive antiviral medications at local pharmacies at no 
cost (Santa Clara Public Health Department, 2009, October 5; State of Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals, 2009, October 7).  Eighteen states reported that 
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collaborations with pharmacies and pharmacy boards worked well for antiviral 
distribution and dispensing and were “successful.”  Specifically, states mentioned 
the inherent capabilities that pharmacies had for dispensing antivirals: 
A big hats off to State Bureau of Pharmacy in pushing out the Tamiflu® in an 
orderly fashion.  
 
The retail pharmacy chains are new partners to Public Health and have the 
existing infrastructure in place in [state name redacted] to order, distribute, 
administer and report required data to the state in an efficient, timely, and 
consumer-oriented manner. Overall, the RPCs experiences were positive. 
 
[The state health department] collaborated with the [state] Pharmacy 
Association to effectively distribute antiviral medications to locations 
throughout the state. … This strong partnership allowed for total state 
coverage of all counties in [state] and completely alleviated the burden of 
providing antivirals through the local health departments. 
 
[The state reported] doses of antiviral medications [were] delivered to retail 
pharmacies and Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) … The program 
represented a very unique partnership between public health and private 
industry, and clearly identified a valuable resource for emergency response. 
This model could be duplicated for response to a variety of public health 
emergencies. 
During the pandemic, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials 
(ASTHO) also actively sought to include pharmacies as a venue for administering 
the 2009 H1N1 vaccine (ASTHO, 2009). 
Challenges With Antiviral Dispensing 
During an influenza pandemic, immediate access to antivirals for treatment of 
ill persons is critical to minimize morbidity and mortality, particularly if the pandemic 
is severe.  However, even during a mild- to moderate-level severity pandemic like 
the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, almost all state after-action reports, some of the journal 
articles, and one report, mentioned that problems arose with distribution and 
dispensing of antivirals and/or with shortages of all types of antivirals in some 
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geographic locations, at some time during the pandemic (Table 4).  No correlation 
between difficulty in distributing antivirals and community size were noted.   
There were three sources of antivirals during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic: 
commercially available antivirals that were already in pharmacies or supply chains 
when the pandemic started; stockpiled antivirals that the federal government (SNS) 
released to state health departments (on a pro rata basis) during the early weeks of 
the pandemic; and antivirals that some states (and other jurisdictions) had 
purchased and stockpiled themselves, before the pandemic. Pre-pandemic planning 
parameters had never included scenarios that envisioned any available commercial 
supplies during a pandemic; thus the concomitant availability of commercial supplies 
of antivirals made the distribution and dispensing efforts confusing to state and local 
health departments. 
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Table 4.  Summary of Challenges With Antiviral Dispensing During the 2009 H1N1 
Pandemic From Literature Review 
 
No. Challenges 
Number of 
articles or 
reports that 
cited this issue         
(n=15) 
Number of state 
AARs that cited 
this issue 
(n=67) 
1 Problems with tracking of antivirals (both 
stockpiled antivirals and commercial supplies) 
2 (13%) 38 (57%) 
2 Problems with ability to store and dispense 
antivirals at the state or local level (includes 
staffing issues) 
2 (13%) 35 (52%) 
3 Previous pandemic planning scenarios did not 
match the needs during the H1N1 response 
2 (13%) 28 (42%) 
4 Lack of clear communication between local 
and state HDs and some dispensing partners 
1 (6%) 18 (27%) 
5 Unclear or changing federal guidance about 
use of antivirals 
3 (20%) 18 (27%) 
6 Shortage of some types of antivirals and 
shortages in some locations 
8 (53%) 9 (13%) 
7 Communications between state and local 
health departments about delivery of 
stockpiles and use of medication 
2 (13%) 6 (9%) 
8 Delays in treatment of ill persons (treatment 
given more than 48 hours after symptoms 
arise) 
6 (40%) 4 (6%) 
9 Lack of visibility of commercial supply chain 2 (13%) 3 (4%) 
10 Other (e.g., four states that required local 
health departments to get distributor 
licenses to transport antivirals, two states 
that had concerns / legal issues that slowed 
distribution to pharmacies) 
0 (0%) 10 (15%) 
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Over one half of the state after-action reports (57%) mentioned problems with 
tracking and “visibility” of both state and SNS antivirals during the 2009 H1N1 
response.  Although a robust federal tracking system was used for H1N1 vaccine 
distribution during the response (Tropper et al., 2009), a uniform federal tracking 
system was never developed for antiviral distribution and dispensing, and most state 
health departments had also not developed any tracking system as part of pandemic 
planning.  As one state commented in their after-action report, 
… an efficient and automated system to track antiviral medication utilization 
was not available. 
 
Because no standardized way existed for states to track antivirals, this placed 
an extra burden on health department staff to develop their own methods.   Several 
state health departments created their own tracking systems during the response, 
but reported issues with these improvised systems: 
Due to the increased workload on providers and hospitals, many who had 
access to [state developed electronic tracking system] preferred to fill out the 
paper form regarding administration and inventory of antiviral and vaccines 
rather than taking the time to enter the data into [the state’s electronic 
system]. Those who weren’t registered and trained on the [system] sent in the 
paper forms as well. This created a tremendous backlog of work at the [state 
health department] in order to clarify ambiguities on forms and enter all of the 
data into [the electronic system]. The [state health department] hired 
temporary employees using H1N1 funds received from CDC but still could not 
keep up with workload. 
 
The arrival of the State Cache Antivirals presented a novel problem for the 
[state] … [the state] was forced to quickly devise an in-house strategy for 
tracking these antivirals. As such, although a protocol for reporting usage and 
a database for tracking were developed in a timely fashion; such systems 
only provide a week-old snapshot of antiviral usage in those who actually 
faxed in usage reports. 
 
There were other problems associated with lack of tracking of antivirals during 
the pandemic.  State and local health departments had limited, only periodic, or no 
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visibility on the available commercial supply chain in their jurisdiction and thus could 
not judiciously deploy stockpiles to fill shortages or gaps (ASTHO, 2010).  Also there 
was no way to track and monitor antivirals (Ringel, Moore, Zambrano, & Lurie, 2009) 
after they were distributed to local public health, hospitals, clinics, providers, etc.: 
Although a protocol for reporting antiviral usage at the sites and a database 
for tracking usage were developed, such systems lacked the ability to provide 
situational awareness and relied upon the sites to fax usage [to the state 
health department]. As such, problems with sites misreporting and/or not 
reporting were prevalent and compiling the reports that were received was 
time-consuming. 
 
Because many state and local health departments did not have information 
on the number of antivirals dispensed, some could not substantiate shortages, as 
they did not have data to support sending more antivirals to locations around the 
state or further SNS requests for a resupply of antivirals: 
During the spring 2009 event, the [state health department] did not have an 
accurate procedure to evaluate antiviral and PPE stockpile levels at hospitals, 
clinics and public health offices. It therefore was required to estimate these 
levels when evaluating where to push the SNS supplies from the RSS Site to 
dispensing sites. 
 
There was insufficient data to support resupply requests from the SNS based 
on current Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) criteria. 
 
Importantly, most state and local health departments did not have information 
on utilization of distributed antivirals in their state/locality and could not assess 
uptake and use, nor account for their disposition.  Little information was available to 
ensure that vulnerable or high risk populations received antivirals.  Additionally, the 
absence of antiviral tracking precluded timely efforts to resupply communities that 
had high illness rates and were in need of more supplies. And last, state public 
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health officials reported that they needed more federal guidance to define key data 
elements to track and to identify systems to use for tracking. 
Over half of the state after-action reports (52%) mentioned problems with 
storage, handling, and dispensing antivirals. The issues may have been linked to 
four problems: (a) lack of adequate local public health staffing to manage distribution 
and dispensing, (b) lack of detail in pre-pandemic antiviral dispensing plans, (c) lack 
of plans for lengthy storage of antivirals because pre-pandemic planning scenarios 
envisioned that storage at the local level would not be needed, and (d) a possible 
lack of expertise in pharmaceutical distribution and dispensing.  After antivirals from 
the federal SNS arrived at state health departments, most were then sent to local 
health departments for dispensing.   
Lack of public health staff to manage distribution and dispensing of antivirals 
was clearly an issue for local public health departments in several states.  One state 
commented that local health department staff in their state 
… were busy with epidemiological investigations, outbreak control, and other 
duties related to the response and were not able to dispense medications.   
 
Public health workforce shortages have been a persistent problem over time  
(Perlino, 2006).  The Trust for America’s Health (2009) reported that during the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic “public health departments did not have enough resources to carry 
out plans” (p. 3).  In particular, this report urged that “stopping layoffs at state and 
local health departments and recruiting the next generation of public health 
professionals” (p. 2) were critical elements in being able to respond to a public 
health threat like the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  The National Association of County and 
City Health Officials reported that over a two-year period (January 2008 through 
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December 2009), 23,000 local health department (LHD) jobs were lost, representing 
approximately 15% of the national LHD workforce.  During the last six months of 
2009 (during the 2009 H1N1 response), about 46% of LHDs lost jobs to layoffs or 
attrition (Willard, Leep, & Shah, 2010).  The Association of State and Territorial 
Health Officials reported that over one third of states (36%) expected to lose staff 
through layoffs or attrition in FY11 (ASTHO, 2011).  Finally, TFAH (2011b) reported 
that during 2011, “40 states and Washington, D.C. have cut funds to public health, 
30 states cut their budgets for the second year in a row and 15 of those have cut 
their budget three years in a row” (p. 3). 
Some state and local health departments also lacked expertise in 
pharmaceutical distribution.  One state mentioned that it had evenly divided the 
stockpiled antivirals and sent them to a large number of sites in the state, but were 
unable to redistribute those antivirals and resupply some areas of the state when 
needed.  A number of local public health departments returned unused antivirals to 
the state or distributed them to hospitals because they had no way of dispensing 
them to ill people (Dorian, Rottman, Shoaf, & Tharian, 2009).  Two states reported 
(in their after-action reports) that their legal counsel unexpectedly required that 
pharmaceutical distributor licenses be obtained by local public health agencies in the 
state because they were transporting medications for the pandemic response.  
Antiviral shortages were mentioned by over half (53%) of the published 
articles/reports and 13% of the after-action reports.  Although the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic was milder than expected, shortages occurred, in some part because it 
was difficult for state and local health departments to know which commercial 
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antivirals were available in the supply chain and when to release stockpiled antivirals 
to fill gaps (more on this later in the discussion of tracking antivirals).  Additionally, 
lack of public health expertise in supply chain management was inferred from 
several comments made in the state after-action reports. 
In particular, the after-action reports and published articles noted shortages of 
pediatric formulations of antivirals in most states.  Patel and Gorman (2009) noted in 
a paper published during the pandemic (September 2009) that the federal SNS likely 
needed additional pediatric antiviral formulations.  The prescribing information for 
oseltamivir capsules currently includes instructions for pharmacists for emergency 
compounding of an oral suspension that can be used for children (Roche USA, 
2011).  In addition, CDC (2010a) included messages to parents and providers that 
pharmacies could extemporaneously compound adult oseltamivir capsules into a 
suspension for treatment of ill infants and children.  However, the flavored syrup 
used by pharmacists in compounding adult formulations for pediatric use was also in 
short supply during the pandemic (U.S. Food and Drug Administration [FDA], 2009). 
CDC released Tamiflu (oseltamivir) oral suspension from the CDC Strategic 
National Stockpile in November 2009 to enhance availability at state and local 
levels.  However, some of the lots of suspension had an expired date on the label.  
CDC told providers and pharmacists that under the emergency use authorization for 
Tamiflu, FDA had authorized the use of certain lots of expired Tamiflu (FDA, 2010).  
In several after-action reports, states reported that this CDC advice to use expired 
product was confusing and unclear to public health officials and the public. 
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Pediatric antiviral shortages during a pandemic could have been resolved by 
increasing the available amount of pediatric antiviral suspension in stockpiles, 
improving the distribution method of these medications so they were available to 
those who needed them, and/or by increasing extemporaneous pediatric 
formulations by compounding the capsules into an oral suspension.  However, 
manufacturers produce only a relatively small quantity of pediatric suspension, and 
its shelf life is limited.  Resolution of shortages also may have been accomplished by 
utilizing supply distribution expertise, such as pharmaceutical distributors, which 
during an emergency may be able to leverage their logistics expertise to rapidly 
deliver scarce medical supplies to pharmacies where the medication is most needed 
(Healthcare Distribution Management Association, 2009).  In addition, pharmacists 
are specially qualified to compound adult formulations of medicines into suspensions 
for children.  Therefore, the increased involvement of pharmacies in a pandemic 
response may improve the availability of compounded formulations through 
pharmacies.  It is imperative that solutions be developed to prevent shortages of 
pediatric antivirals in a future pandemic, as children were and will be one of the most 
vulnerable segments of the population when a novel influenza virus emerges.  
Delays in treatment of hospitalized ill persons (treatment given more than 48 
hours after symptoms arise) were mentioned in 40% of the journal articles and 
reports.  Guidelines issued by CDC called for rapid treatment of ill persons whose 
illness required hospitalization or who were at high risk for complications, preferably 
within 48 hours after they became ill (CDC, 2009a).  No explanation for the delays in 
treatments were given in the literature, but these delays may have resulted from a 
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shortage of antivirals, delay in seeking health care after onset of illness, delayed 
diagnosis of influenza while waiting for test results, delay in prescribing antivirals, 
and/or delay in receipt or administration of antivirals after a prescription was written 
(Fiore et al., 2011). 
Forty-two percent of state after-action reports mentioned a “mismatch” 
between pre-2009 planning parameters and the severity of the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic.  Most states (and the federal government) had planned for a severe 
pandemic, where commercial antivirals would likely be unavailable, and where 
stockpiled antivirals would be the only source of the medication.  Because the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic was less severe than those planning parameters, there was some 
availability of antivirals through commercial supply chains (although precise amounts 
and locations were not known), which was confusing to state and local responders in 
determining how to optimally deploy the various antiviral stocks.  Especially 
confusing was the determination of who received commercial supplies of antivirals 
and who received government-stockpiled medication.  Additionally, pre-pandemic 
planning called for antivirals to be used for treatment as well as for prevention 
(prophylaxis).  Although state health departments had planned for a mass 
prophylaxis dispensing model, this type of antiviral dispensing was not appropriate 
for the 2009 H1N1 response (U.S. Government, 2008). 
Finally, three communication issues were included in the state after-action 
reports.  Communication between state and local health departments was frequently 
mentioned as a barrier.  Often local health departments had very short or no notice 
for receiving antiviral shipments from the state, or the time set by the state for 
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delivery of antivirals did not match the actual delivery time, which hampered 
planning and response.  Longstanding communication issues between state and 
local health departments continue to need resolution to remove this barrier, 
particularly during an emergency response.  Clear communication was also lacking 
between state and local health departments and between those health departments 
and providers (e.g., physicians, hospitals, clinics) about the appropriate use of 
antivirals (specifically concerning which populations should receive antivirals for 
treatment, which persons were eligible for government-supplied antivirals versus 
commercially supplied antivirals, and whether to use antivirals for treatment only or 
for prophylaxis too).  States reported that the federal government needed to do a 
better job communicating to public health agencies and clinicians about when SNS 
shipments would arrive at the state depot, and when and how to use antiviral 
medications, including a clear statement about use of antivirals for prophylaxis 
during the 2009 H1N1 response (ASTHO, 2010; National Biodefense Science 
Board, 2010). 
Strengths and Limitations of Literature 
None of the journal articles included in this review described formal program 
evaluations of how state health departments dispensed antivirals during the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic.  Therefore, the primary source of information for this review was 
from state after-action reports that summarized the strengths and weaknesses of 
their 2009 H1N1 response.  Fewer than half of the states (n=24/50) filed an after-
action report with the FEMA LLIS website; the remainder were submitted directly to 
CDC for program use.  Although these reports were a rich source of self-reported 
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and anecdotal data, and are assumed to be credible as they are authored by state 
government officials, it is difficult to verify or validate their findings, understand them 
in quantitative ways, or assess their representativeness for other states.  Some 
states could have overreported successes and/or underreported problems or 
challenges that were associated with lack of planning or difficulties with capability for 
response.  State health departments may not want reports of emergency response 
system weaknesses to be shared with others or CDC because they worry that these 
findings may impact future federal funding or compromise their ability to make 
improvements.  Moreover, state authorities may see release of this information as 
jeopardizing their ability to protect the public.  No reports included external validation 
of the findings presented.  Finally, because the majority of the after-action reports 
were designated “For Official Use Only (FOUO),” they are available to only a limited 
number of government researchers to assess validity of these conclusions. 
Although the after-action reports from all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia have been reviewed, this literature review may be incomplete, and key 
publications may have not been identified.   
Gaps in the Literature and Considerations for Future Research 
A systematic review of the literature allowed this researcher to answer the 
research question “What were the strengths and weaknesses of federal, state, and 
local public health antiviral distribution and dispensing programs during the 2009 
H1N1 influenza pandemic in the United States?”  A number of key challenges and 
successes were identified from the review.  Although infrastructure investments in 
pandemic planning for antiviral distribution and dispensing and partnerships with 
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pharmacies were noted as areas of success during the pandemic, multiple problems 
with the implementation of antiviral dispensing and insufficient personnel to handle 
these operations served as barriers.  
The literature review identified only the problems encountered, but did not 
identify solutions or any new models for testing.  The problems encountered by state 
and local health departments may have had far greater impact if the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic had been more severe and the consequences of untimely receipt of 
antiviral treatment more profound.  Could a new method of antiviral dispensing 
resolve some of the problems faced?  State health departments mentioned that their 
collaborations with pharmacies were successful in dispensing antivirals during the 
pandemic.  Could pharmacies be utilized to dispense antivirals in a future outbreak?  
An exploration should be conducted that focuses on pharmacies and the 
pharmaceutical distribution systems that supply pharmacies as a possible alternative 
method of dispensing antivirals.  In addition, it will be important to qualitatively 
assess private sector entities’ perceptions of acceptability and feasibility of any new 
dispensing strategy.  A careful assessment of feasibility and acceptability may yield 
information to inform the development of a new and more efficient way of dispensing 
lifesaving antiviral medications during a future pandemic.
  
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 
Background and Context to Support Methods 
 
Eighteen state after-action reports mentioned that working with pharmacies 
improved the distribution and dispensing of antivirals in their state. Because the 
severity of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic was mild to moderate, few state or local health 
departments actually dispensed antivirals to ill persons themselves.  Instead they 
distributed these medicines to hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies to dispense per 
their usual methods.  When considering the antiviral dispensing problems faced by 
public health during the 2009 pandemic, the question “Who can do this well?” comes 
to mind.  Moreover, who performs this task every day and has become expert at 
pharmaceutical distribution and dispensing?  The answer is pharmaceutical 
distributors and pharmacies. 
Almost all U.S. pharmacies receive pharmaceutical products shipped by 
licensed distributors at least several times a week.  Most pharmacies (especially in 
urban areas) receive a shipment each day.  There are three major pharmaceutical 
distributors in the United States: Cardinal Health Inc., McKesson Corporation, and 
AmerisourceBergen Corporation.  These companies are experts at distributing 
medications and manage approximately 90%–95% of the products (and market 
value) of the wholesale drug market.  It is estimated that four out of every five 
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prescriptions dispensed in the nation have been handled by one of these top three 
distributors.  Each day, these major pharmaceutical distributors deliver more than 
nine million prescription medicines and health care products to more than 164,000 
pharmacies, hospitals, nursing homes, clinics, government facilities, and other 
providers in all 50 states (Healthcare Distribution Management Association, 2009).  
In addition to these three large distributors, approximately 5,500 other 
pharmaceutical distributors operate nationally or regionally, or specialize in 
distributing some types of pharmaceutical products or distributing to specialized 
pharmacies or institutions (Britt, 2007). 
Is it possible that during a future pandemic these pharmaceutical distributors 
may be able to leverage their logistics expertise to rapidly deliver antivirals to 
pharmacies?  Could pharmaceutical distributors receive SNS stockpiled antivirals 
from CDC and distribute them through their established networks to pharmacies all 
over the country during a pandemic?  In alignment with usual practice, ill persons 
would get a prescription for this medicine from a licensed health care provider, and 
then they (or their family members) would go to a pharmacy to pick up the medicine.  
Although government-held antivirals in the SNS have never been distributed 
through a private-sector entity, a study found that pharmaceutical distributors can 
provide next-day, same-day, or emergency delivery to reallocate scarce inventory 
during crises (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2007).  Pharmaceutical distributors have 
expertise in forecasting, ordering, inventory management, stock rotation, tracking, 
and distribution derived from daily practical experience, to efficiently provide order fill 
rates of 95% and sustain the inventory of pharmaceuticals in drugstores and other 
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pharmacies.  Pharmaceutical distributors also have expertise in electronic inventory-
management systems (e.g., bar coding, stickers, electronic order entry) that may 
provide solutions to tracking antivirals after they have left SNS inventory controls 
(Healthcare Distribution Management Association, 2009). 
At the public level, Americans rely on pharmacies and pharmacists every day 
to obtain needed prescription medications.  Pharmacies offer expertise, familiarity, 
convenience, accessibility, extended hours of operation, and can be integrated as 
key community partners in a public health response.  Pharmacists are highly trusted 
health care professionals with a unique degree of access to the public  (Gallup, 
2012).  There are about 61,000 community pharmacies in the United States 
(National Association of Chain Drug Stores [NACDS], 2011), including:  
 chain drugstores (37% of all pharmacies),  
 independently owned drugstores (34%),  
 supermarket pharmacies (15%), and  
 mass merchants (large stores such as Target and Wal-Mart that have 
an in-store pharmacy; 14%).  
Ninety-three percent of Americans currently live within 5 miles of a community 
pharmacy (NACDS, 2011).  Drugstores are also familiar places to shop and are 
located in most communities.  According to Growth from Knowledge Mediamark 
Research & Intelligence,  in 2010, approximately 11% to 20% of adults aged 18 
years and older had shopped at a drugstore at least one time in the past month 
(Growth from Knowledge, 2011).  Studies have shown that in general, people 
consistently use the same pharmacy in their community and select that pharmacy 
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primarily because the pharmacy accepts their insurance, the pharmacy is 
convenient, the pharmacist is able to answer questions and concerns, and because 
of their perceptions/relationships with the pharmacy staff (NACDS, 2012b).  
The share of prescriptions dispensed in 2010 by the community channel 
includes  
 traditional chain drugstores, 48%;  
 independent drugstores, 20%;  
 supermarket pharmacies, 13%;  
 pharmacies in mass merchandisers, 12%; and  
 mail order, 7% (NACDS, 2011).   
Although there are almost as many independent pharmacies as there are 
chain drugstores in the country, the traditional chain drugstores dispense 2.4 times 
as many prescriptions as independent pharmacies, on average.  The NACDS 
(2012a) reports that currently, these chains “… fill over 2.7 billion prescriptions 
annually, which is more than 72% of annual prescriptions in the United States” (para. 
5). 
Even though independent pharmacies dispense fewer prescriptions overall 
than chain drugstores, they are important providers of pharmaceutical services, 
particularly in some areas of the country (NACDS, 2011).  In North Dakota, for 
example, supermarket and mass merchant pharmacies are not allowed to conduct 
business because only pharmacies with a North Dakota resident as majority owner 
may operate a pharmacy in that state (Haarsager, 2010).  Therefore, independent 
pharmacies provide 75% of all dispensing in North Dakota.  In several other states 
 50 
 
 
(Arkansas, South Dakota, Mississippi, Montana, and Oklahoma), about one half of 
pharmacies are independents (NACDS, 2011).  According to the National 
Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA), independent pharmacies dispense 
about 1.5 billion prescriptions annually (NCPA, 2011b).   
A relatively small number of corporations operate the majority of pharmacies 
in the United States (Table 5). 
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Table 5.  Top Pharmacy Companies by Type of Pharmacy, Number of Pharmacies, 
Percentage of All Community Pharmacy Locations, Percentage of Prescription 
Share, and Pharmacy Sales, United States, 2010 
 
Name of 
pharmacy 
company 
Type of 
pharmacy 
No. of 
pharmacies 
(rank) 
% of all 
U.S. 
community 
pharmacy 
locations 
% of U.S. 
prescription 
share 
(rank) 
Pharmacy 
sales, 
millions of 
dollars 
(rank) 
Walgreens Chain 7,709 (1) 12.6% 21.3% (1) 43,823 (1) 
CVS Caremark Chain 7,108 (2) 11.6% 16.8% (2) 38,994 (2) 
Rite Aid Chain 4,714 (3) 7.7% 8.1% (3) 17,086 (3) 
Wal-Mart 
Stores 
Mass-
Merchant 
3,800 (4) 6.2% 6.1% (4) 15,616 (4) 
The Kroger Co. Grocery 1,969 (5) 3.2% 4.0% (5) 7,886 (5) 
Target 
Corporation 
Mass-
Merchant 
1,584 (6) 2.6% 1.8% (6) 3,033 (8) 
Safeway Grocery 1,362 (7) 2.2% 1.3% (9) 3,695 (6) 
Sears Holding 
Co. (K-Mart) 
Mass-
Merchant 
981 (8) 1.6% 1.1% (11) 2,495 (9) 
SUPERVALU Grocery 805 (9) 1.3% 1.2% (10) 2,313 (10) 
Publix 
Supermarkets 
Grocery 805 (10) 1.3% 1.1% (12) 1,558 (12) 
Royal Ahold 
(Stop & Shop) 
Grocery 665 (11) 1.1% 1.4% (7) 3,465 (7) 
Medicine 
Shoppe Intl 
Independent 657 (12) 1.1% 1.3% (8) 1,436 (14) 
Sam’s Club Mass-
Merchant 
519 (14) 0.9% 0.7% (14) 1,781 (11) 
Costco Whole-
sale Corp. 
Mass-
Merchant 
465 (15) 0.8% 0.9% (13) 1,449 (13) 
H-E-B Grocery 188 (23) 0.3% 0.6% (15) 1,223 (15) 
Note.  In 2010, there were 60,134 community pharmacies (includes all four types of pharmacies) in the 50 states. 
Sam’s Club is owned and operated by Wal-Mart Stores. Adapted from NACDS 2011–2012 Chain Pharmacy 
Industry Profile by the National Association of Chain Drug Stores, 2011, pp. 26–27. 
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However, it is not known if utilizing pharmaceutical distributors and 
pharmacies is a possible solution for improving antiviral distribution and dispensing 
during a future pandemic.  Research should be conducted to explore the feasibility, 
practicality, and acceptability of this new method.  Is this new method of 
government-to-private sector asset distribution workable?  Will it work to improve 
antiviral dispensing?  How will state and local public health officials view a change in 
the way antivirals are distributed and dispensed?  By using pharmaceutical 
distributors, can we minimize antiviral shortages and delays in treatment, and 
improve tracking in the next pandemic?  Will pharmacy companies, pharmacists, 
and pharmaceutical distributors be interested and, most importantly, willing to 
perform this function?  Will this new method of dispensing antivirals resolve many or 
some of the problems encountered during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic?  Will a new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing create new challenges?  What will 
pharmacy companies think about a new method that includes their pharmacies 
serving as primary dispensers of antivirals? 
Dissertation Research Question 
 As the questions listed above imply, the viability of a new way of distributing 
and dispensing antiviral drugs during an influenza pandemic relies on feasibility and 
its acceptability by key stakeholders.  In particular, understanding the opinions of 
corporate-level pharmacy company leaders (decision-makers) regarding conditions 
of acceptability of this new antiviral distribution and dispensing approach is a key 
factor in successful implementation of this new approach.  These executives (and 
other pharmacy executives in similar roles) will likely be the leaders in their 
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companies who will determine if their pharmacies will or will not participate in this 
effort during a pandemic.  It is therefore vital to understand their views as this new 
method of antiviral dispensing is being explored.  Even if state and local public 
health officials, pharmaceutical distributors, and frontline pharmacists identify this 
new antiviral method as acceptable, it will not be feasible unless the decision-
makers in the pharmacy companies also find it acceptable.  Although these 
executives will be able to identify key factors that could make this new approach 
acceptable, and although it may or may not be possible to satisfy these conditions, it 
will be important to know their views in this early stage of planning, to enable future 
action. 
Therefore, the research design and analysis undertaken for this study were 
intended to address the study’s research question:  
What factors do pharmacy executives consider critical if pharmacies are 
to serve as the primary dispensers of antiviral drugs during an influenza 
pandemic?  
 
Data Collection: Planning 
  Acceptability of this proposed new method of large-scale antiviral distribution 
and dispensing will rely heavily on its acceptability by pharmacies and pharmacists.  
Pharmacy executives have the power to approve or disapprove their company’s 
participation in this new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing, so their 
outlooks about any barriers, risks, and relative advantages of this method must be 
clearly understood. A qualitative approach was employed to derive these views, 
issues, and meanings from pharmacy executives (Creswell, 2007). 
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 Although this research did not use a mixed methods approach, findings from 
the poll conducted by the Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) (described 
earlier) from February 24, 2012, to April 23, 2012, among a nationally representative 
sample of 1,076 pharmacists were used to inform an open ended qualitative 
approach (see Appendix B for a summary of findings from this poll; SteelFisher, 
Blendon, & Brule, 2012).  These results about pharmacists’ perceptions of possible 
advantages or risks of this new approach shed light on planning the key informant 
interview questions and indicated possible categories of issues that may also arise 
during interviews with pharmacy executives (Figure 4).  In addition, data gathered 
from the HSPH poll included information on the participants’ pharmacy surge 
capacity for staffing, capability of handling a large number of customers at one time, 
availability of home delivery and drive-through windows, and availability of other 
accommodations that could align with infection control practices during an influenza 
pandemic (by keeping sick people away from well people to reduce the chance of 
disease transmission). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Pharmacist’s poll results informed key informant interviews.  
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Conceptual Model 
This proposed new way of distributing and dispensing antivirals during a 
future pandemic, namely using the capability of the commercial system of 
distributors and pharmacies, represents a radical departure for state and public 
health functions during an emergency (because of many years of previous plans that 
identified public health as shouldering the primary responsibility for this function). 
There is a possibility that, for the most part, this new method of antiviral distribution 
and dispensing may not be perceived as a radically new innovation for pharmacies, 
as the proposed model closely aligns with current pharmacy practices.   
However, this new method is still a departure from “normal’ for pharmacies 
and would probably be seen as something new and would require approval and 
acceptance by pharmacy company executives (as stated above, acceptance will 
also be needed from public health, pharmaceutical distributors, and others).  
Pharmacy company leadership will have to determine if this new method is an 
appropriate “fit’ for their company.  An adapted conceptual framework was applied to 
the design and conduct of this qualitative research.  A conceptual model of diffusion 
of innovation developed by Greenhalgh, Robert, Macfarlane, Bate, & Kyriakidou 
(2004) informed this effort to improve antiviral distribution and dispensing during a 
pandemic and informed the conduct of the key informant interviews  (Appendix D).    
Greenhalgh et al. (2004) define innovation in service delivery and in an 
organization as 
a novel set of behaviors, routines, and ways of working that are directed at 
improving health outcomes, administrative efficiency, cost effectiveness, or 
users’ experience and that are implemented by planned and coordinated 
actions. (p. 582)  
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The notion of dissemination (active and planned efforts to influence target 
groups to adopt a novel way of doing something) and the need for “innovation-
system fit,” which is the relationship between the proposed innovation and the 
context or appropriateness for a given organization, are key concepts from 
Greenhalgh’s model that were extracted to guide the formulation of this dissertation 
research (Greenhalgh et al., 2004).  Further, research conducted with physicians to 
identify why some decisions are easily adopted and which elements cause leaders 
to reject innovation found that innovation adoption was linked to perceptions of low 
cost, simplicity, and compatibility (Shafrin, 2011, September 20).  Similarly, 
Greenhalgh’s model focuses on how  innovation in health services organizations is 
spread and sustained, and includes the concepts of relative advantage, 
compatibility, low complexity, potential risks, and needed support (Greenhalgh et al., 
2004).  These selected concepts are particularly relevant to this dissertation 
research and served as the conceptual framework to inform construction of the 
interview questions that were used with participants.  Although the researcher could 
not predict in advance if pharmacy executives would mention any of these factors or 
consider them relevant in their decision whether to adopt this new role, the 
conceptual framework served as a planning starting point that allowed the 
researcher to draft an approach and interview questions.  
Greenhalgh et al. (2004) elaborates on the concept of relative advantage by 
stating “innovations that have a clear, unambiguous advantage in either 
effectiveness or cost-effectiveness are more easily adopted or implemented” (p. 
594).  Relative advantage is a likely factor that may influence the participants’ view 
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of acceptability of this new way of distributing and dispensing antivirals during a 
future pandemic.  If the pharmacy executives see no advantage for their 
organizations in taking on this task, it is highly unlikely that there will be acceptance 
of this new method.  Therefore, this concept is an important one to explore in depth 
with interview participants.  Relative advantages to the new method of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing may include increased store traffic, financial gain, better 
serving customers (by being able to dispense a needed medicine during an 
emergency), and alignment with a company’s concept of community stakeholder 
responsibility.  However, relative advantage alone will probably not determine 
whether this new way of antiviral distribution and dispensing will be acceptable to 
pharmacy executives.  They will have to understand the relative advantages in 
context with other dimensions to determine how any relative advantages might 
influence acceptability. 
It was also critical to assess what the pharmacy executives identified as 
possible risks related to this new approach.  Greenhalgh et al. (2004) state that if the 
innovation has a high degree of probability of an outcome that the individual 
perceives as adverse, then it is less likely to be adopted.  Possible risks may include 
disruption in the pharmacy, security risks, financial loss, and staff exposure to 
disease.  The interviews were designed to allow plenty of time for any perceptions 
pharmacy executives have of risks to surface.  Probes were used to elicit strategies 
they may mention to mitigate those risks.  Reduction of risk may be a shared 
component of actions taken by local government, public health agencies, and the 
participants’ companies. If participants perceive formidable risks leading to adverse 
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outcomes associated with this new method, they may find it to be unacceptable 
unless certain risks are reduced. The participants may weigh the relative advantages 
against possible risks as they formulate their opinions about acceptability of this new 
approach.  
Other concepts from the Greenhalgh model that affect the diffusion of 
innovation, such as compatibility, low complexity, and any support that will be 
needed, were also included in the interview questions.  Greenhalgh et al. (2004) 
propose that “innovations that are compatible with the intended adopters’ values, 
norms, and perceived needs are more readily adopted” (p. 596).  Compatibility with 
existing pharmacy functions has been a key planning notion for this effort. The 
design of this new system is heavily reliant on leveraging the existing capabilities, 
tasks, and functions of pharmaceutical distributors and pharmacies.   This new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing is likely to be compatible with routine, 
everyday pharmacy functions (managing inventory, receiving prescriptions, 
dispensing medicine, counseling patients, etc.).  A working assumption is that by 
aligning with current practices, the chance for system disruption is minimized, and 
the probability of a successful outcome during an emergency is enhanced.   
Low complexity is also an important component of successful diffusion of 
innovation.  Greenhalgh et al. (2004) assert that “innovations that are perceived by 
key players as simple to use are more easily adopted” (p. 596).  The new method of 
antiviral distribution and dispensing is expected to closely align with current 
pharmacy practices and functions and thus not create a significant number of new 
processes for pharmacists and pharmacies to handle.  The CDC planning team 
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assumes that those new processes that are created will be, for the most part, low in 
complexity for pharmacy staff to manage.   
Finally, Greenhalgh et al. (2004) assert that “successful adoption is more 
likely if the intended adopters have continuing access to information about what the 
innovation does and to sufficient training and support on task issues (i.e., about 
fitting the innovation to daily work)” (p. 600).  Participants were asked about the kind 
of help or support they might need from state and local government, public health, 
and the federal government.  Support may also be needed from corporate offices to 
individual pharmacies to implement this new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing.  CDC may need to convene training, communication, and support 
networks for pharmacies, comprising state boards of pharmacy, public health, and 
not-for-profit chain pharmacy and independent pharmacy associations. 
Therefore, these five conceptual categories were incorporated into a model 
that served as a starting point for this research (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.  Conceptual model of issues that may influence acceptability for 
pharmacy executives of a new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing during an influenza pandemic.  Adapted from “Diffusion of 
Innovations in Service Organizations: Systematic Review and 
Recommendations,” by T. Greenhalgh, G. Robert, F. Macfarlane, P. Bate, 
and O. Kyriakidou, 2004, Milbank Quarterly, 82(4), pp. 594–598. 
 
Using a Qualitative Approach 
To learn about the views and opinions of pharmacy executives, key informant 
interviews were employed using a qualitative approach to data collection and 
analysis.  Because pharmacy executives’ opinions about this new antiviral approach 
were not available from previous studies nor easily elicited using quantitative survey 
methods, interviews were a critical method to learn the key factors affecting these 
executives’ views (Saldaña, 2009).  Using a qualitative approach enabled the 
researcher to hear each interviewee’s “voice” and opinions about the study issues, 
probe the beliefs that these executives held about the proposed new way of 
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distributing and dispensing antivirals during a pandemic, and better understand 
underlying and associated  concerns and issues (Creswell, 2009).  
Institutional Review Board Approval and Protection of Human Subjects 
 Approval was sought and received from the CDC Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) for this research, and an exemption was granted by the CDC IRB on February 
8, 2012 (Appendix E).  Approval for this research was received from the researcher’s 
dissertation committee (March 6, 2012), and from the University of North Carolina 
(UNC) IRB committee (March 27, 2012) before conducting the research (Appendix 
E).  The researcher also received approval from CITI training to conduct research as 
part of her doctoral studies at UNC Chapel Hill (Appendix F).   
Although IRB approval was imperative to conduct the research, the 
researcher also took precautions to protect the privacy of study participants.  First, 
the researcher (and subsequently the IRB committees) concluded that there was not 
substantial or potentially harmful risks associated with participation in this research.  
The primary risk to subjects who participated in this study was breach of 
confidentiality.  Because all study materials were held securely and all audio 
recordings of the interviews have been destroyed, this breach is highly unlikely.  
However, if information concerning the participants and their statements are 
somehow inadvertently released, no embarrassing, legal, or reputational threats 
were anticipated.   
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Selection of Study Participants 
To ensure that the data gathered for this research included a variety of 
perspectives, executives were interviewed from each of the four major types of 
pharmacies in the United States (i.e., traditional chain drugstores, independent 
pharmacies, pharmacies in grocery stores, and pharmacies in mass merchant 
stores). Table 6 describes the key informants and the dates they were interviewed.   
Delimitations: Defining Eligible Pharmacy Executive Participants 
This qualitative research focused on the views of executives of some of the 
largest (and smallest) pharmacy companies in the United States.  To learn about the 
key conditions for participation in a new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing during a pandemic emergency, the participants must have had 
substantial decision-making responsibilities for U.S. pharmacy retail operations in 
their companies.  Therefore, the research excluded both pharmacy executives in 
companies that primarily dispense medicines in inpatient settings or outside of the 
community-pharmacy sector (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory clinics), 
and pharmacy executives who did not have key authority (or significant input) for 
determining their companies’ decisions to adopt new pharmacy programs. 
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Table 6.  Pharmacy Executive Participants in Key Informant Interviews 
 
Participant Type of pharmacy 
Participated 
in company 
response 
during the 
2009 H1N1 
influenza 
pandemic? 
Senior leader 
(decision-
maker) in 
company?  
Date 
interviewed 
1 Traditional chain 
drugstore 
Yes Yes April 5, 2012 
2 Traditional chain 
drugstore 
Yes Yes June 14, 2012 
3 Traditional chain 
drugstore 
Yes Yes April 13, 2012 
4 Grocery store Yes Yes May 1, 2012 
5 Grocery store  Yes Yes April 27, 2012 
6 Mass merchant  Yes Yes April 20, 2012 
7 Mass merchant Yes Yes May 7, 2012 
8 Independent 
pharmacy (not 
affiliated with any 
other company, 
located in a semi-
rural area) 
Yes Yes 
Owns  
pharmacy 
(pharmacist) 
May 10, 2012 
9 Independent 
pharmacy (affiliated 
with a large chain of 
independent 
pharmacies, located 
in a large city) 
Yes Yes 
Co-owns 
pharmacy (not 
a pharmacist) 
May 1, 2012 
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Interview Methods 
Procedures and written information provided to the potential participants were 
approved by both the CDC and the UNC IRB.  Key informants were recruited by e-
mail that included an explanation of the research study.  Prospective participants 
were asked if they would be willing to participate in a telephone interview to discuss 
issues around a new approach to distributing and dispensing antivirals during a 
pandemic (Appendix G).  A copy of the Fact Sheet / Consent Form (Appendix H) was 
included with the invitation.  This form included a description of the study, the 
project’s potential benefits and risks, and methods that the researcher would use to 
ensure their privacy, and asked for their voluntary participation and informed 
consent.  For those who did not respond within a week, a follow-up e-mail was sent, 
and for one participant, a phone call was made, to ask for their participation.  All of 
the companies contacted agreed to participate. Seven of the nine executives 
contacted agreed to participate.  For two companies, the person originally contacted 
referred the investigator to another senior colleague in their company who had 
responsibility for pharmacy operations, and they in turn agreed to participate.  After 
participants agreed to be interviewed for the study, appointments were scheduled for 
the telephone interview, usually within two weeks of the initial contact.  Each 
participant was informed that this research was for the researcher’s dissertation (as 
part of doctoral studies at the UNC Gillings School of Global Public Health) and also 
was a key part of the researcher’s work at CDC in this area.    
Interviews were conducted by telephone with each participant between April 
5, 2012, and June 14, 2012.  After introductions were made and the purpose of the 
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study explained, verbal informed consent was requested over the telephone at the 
start of the interview, prior to data collection (Appendix I); all consented to be 
interviewed and participate in the study.  
The interviews began with an explanation of the purpose of the study. The 
executives were informed that their participation in the study was completely 
voluntary, and the researcher explained to them that they could stop the interview at 
any time or opt to not answer any of the questions asked.  All participants had 
received a written description of the study prior to the key informant interviews and 
had an opportunity to ask questions and/or express concerns prior to scheduling the 
initial interview as well as at the start of the interview.  
The provisions for confidentiality were then described, and participants were 
assured that their name and their company name would not be associated with 
specific comments or answers, nor would their name or company name be included 
in any report or presentation of the findings.  Participants were asked for their 
permission to audio record the discussion; all consented to have the interview 
recorded.   
The researcher explained that quotations from their interview may be used in 
the dissertation, but no quotations would be attributed to participants by name or 
company name.  Rather, the quotation would be noted as one given by a “pharmacy 
executive.”  The researcher also explained that answers to interview questions 
would be grouped together in any report or presentation, and the aggregated 
information would be used in the researcher’s dissertation and by CDC to determine 
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how to better plan for a future pandemic. Other procedures for assurance of privacy 
included the following: 
• At the time of the interview, participants were asked for permission to record 
the interview for transcription.  All interviews were recorded, and a written 
transcript was made and stored securely.  Each transcript was assigned a 
code, and all mentions of the participant, their company, or their geographic 
location were removed from the transcript. All interview recordings have 
since been destroyed after each transcript was validated against its 
recording. 
• The principal investigator was the only person who had access to 
information that linked individual participants to the responses from their 
interviews, and the hard copy of the code sheet was kept in a secure, locked 
cabinet. 
• Transcripts from each interview were stored electronically in protected files.  
Electronic copies of interview notes and other data were stored on a 
password-protected laptop kept in a secure location.  All notes and 
transcripts will be destroyed upon completion of the study and after the 
dissertation is approved by the researcher’s dissertation committee.   
There were no offers of a monetary or nonmonetary incentive to the 
participants in this study, other than the offer to provide a copy of a completed 
summary of this research after committee approval.  In addition, there were no costs 
to be borne by subjects, other than their time. 
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Participants were informed that there were no “right answers” to the 
researcher’s questions; the purpose of the interview was to learn as much detail as 
possible about their views and opinions.  The researcher also let them know that 
although she was leading this exploratory effort at CDC, it was not yet known if this 
approach would be feasible or acceptable by CDC, and she did not know if it would 
be implemented. 
Each interview was started by asking participants about their position in the 
company to confirm that they met the study inclusion definition of a “pharmacy 
executive decision-maker.”  For context, each participant was asked to explain his or 
her role during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  A scenario was then read that described 
a future pandemic and the proposed new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing by engaging pharmaceutical distributors and pharmacies.  A 
semistructured approach was used by leading the interview with specific questions, 
but allowing the interviewee to talk about whatever they wanted in response to the 
question.  Using the conceptual model developed for this research as a guide 
(Figure 5), a series of questions were asked to understand their views on each 
element of the model.  The questions were posed to each participant in the same 
order, except when replies from participants warranted rearrangement of the 
question sequence. 
 In alignment with the study conceptual framework, the specific questions 
asked directly related to each of the study’s conceptual framework’s concepts 
(relative advantages, compatibility with usual pharmacy processes, level of 
complexity, support needed for implementation, and any risks or disadvantages to 
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the approach).  After each initial question was posed, the researcher used open-
ended probes to encourage clarification and gather more detail about each issue 
that was raised.  Participants were encouraged to explain their ideas in detail and to 
elaborate on what they had said, as needed to get clarity on their views.  Finally, the 
researcher repeated back to them what was heard regarding any major concepts or 
areas that they emphasized to ensure that their beliefs and views were understood. 
Data Analysis 
Each interview was recorded, transcribed, and printed for analysis.  To 
ensure the transcripts were accurate and reflected the exact wording of the 
participants, each transcript was verified by listening to the recording and 
simultaneously checking the transcript.  The transcripts were then reviewed and 
manually coded.  Manual coding techniques were used (rather than employing 
coding software) because the number of interviews conducted was felt to be 
manageable for manual coding, and the researcher determined that using a manual 
technique would allow the investigator “to communicate and connect with the data” 
(Basit, 2003, p. 152).  Data codes derived from the study’s conceptual framework 
served as a starting point for codes, but other codes were used on the basis of 
information provided by the participants.  After coding each transcript, common 
patterns, categories, and themes were identified from the conceptual model, which 
includes key factors that influence adopting innovation (Creswell, 2009).   After all 
transcripts were coded, the codes that were mentioned consistently across 
participants were clustered and identified as themes.  Frequency of mention and the 
importance of the issue as stated by the participants were two factors in the 
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identification of themes.  A color-coded notation method was used to provided a 
consistent approach to coding and clustering codes as key themes (MacQueen, 
McLellan, Kay, & Milstein, 1998; Ryan & Bernard, 2003).
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
The primary purpose of this study was to identify the opinions and views of 
key pharmacy executive informants about use of a new antiviral method during a 
future influenza pandemic that would rely primarily on pharmaceutical distributors 
and pharmacies to distribute and dispense antivirals.  Although this new method will 
increase the pharmacy’s and pharmacist’s roles as compared with the current 
response plans, these pharmacy executives had a favorable reaction to this idea 
and believed that it would closely align with everyday pharmacy processes.  
Numerous participants’ direct quotations7 are used in this chapter as they best 
illustrate these findings.  
Key Findings and Major Themes 
Study responses from pharmacy executives representing traditional chain 
stores, mass merchants, and grocery stores (collectively referred to as “large 
pharmacy companies” henceforth) were very similar to one another.  In contrast, for 
a few topics, there were differences in findings between the views of executives from 
large pharmacy companies and those from independent pharmacies.  Therefore 
study results are presented separately for these two groups when differences in 
responses occurred.  
                                                 
7
Each set of quotations includes remarks made by different participants to illustrate the variety of 
comments on a certain topic. 
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Overall Reaction 
The first question asked of the executives after providing them with a short 
scenario and explanation of the new antiviral methods was designed to elicit their 
overall reaction:  
What do you think about this proposed method of having pharmacies 
serving as the primary dispensers of antivirals during a future pandemic?8 
 
Overall, each interviewed executive expressed consistent support for this new 
method of dispensing antiviral medications during a pandemic.  Some were 
enthusiastic in their response even before they heard the details of this proposed 
plan: 
Several pharmacy executives contrasted the method used for antiviral 
distribution during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic with the proposed method under study.  
Many of these pharmacy companies operated pharmacies that received antivirals 
from state and local health departments during the pandemic and mentioned that the 
various and heterogeneous state reporting requirements and methods for 
distributing antivirals to pharmacies were not aligned with usual pharmacy processes 
                                                 
8
See Figure 2 for a depiction of the new model of antiviral distribution and dispensing that was 
described to the participants and Appendix I for an explanation of the new method given to 
participants during the key informant interviews. 
“I think it’s a great idea.” 
 
“So as far as I’m concerned it’s a fantastic plan.”  
 
“I think the proposed process you have is a huge step in the right direction of solving a 
pandemic problem.”  
 
“… so I’m a firm supporter of what you’re trying to accomplish with getting the 
medication to the pharmacies, then getting it out to the public from there.” 
 
“I applaud the proactive interactive approach to it” 
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and added complexity for their companies.  Several executives stated that the 
proposed method likely would improve efficiency: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two executives mentioned that if pharmacies were largely responsible for 
antiviral dispensing during a pandemic, they could reduce the burden on public 
health and extend the public health’s “reach” to the community.  Another executive 
reinforced this point by mentioning that public health officials have different expertise 
than pharmaceutical distributors and that it would work best to utilize the expertise 
inherent in the pharmaceutical distributors:   
 
 
 
 
“…  [public health is] good at the ‘let’s figure out how we want to do things,’ but when it 
comes down to how do we actually do it, that’s where you need the operators, and if you 
think through the wholesalers, this is what they’re built to do, if you think through the retail 
industry, that’s what they’re built to do.  The ability of what they actually bring to the table 
is very tremendous not only from the record keeping, not only from the speed to get 
product moved throughout the country, but also from the speed of communication alone.  
 
“…  So I think that you’re really letting the people that are experts in the logistics 
operations take over that part of it so I think it’s the right thing to do.  I think it’s fantastic.” 
“Well, certainly I think it sounds like it would be an improvement from a logistics 
perspective of trying to get pandemic product to patients as opposed to going individually 
through the states.  Certainly, the challenges that we faced at the time which was a very 
narrow window of trying to respond very rapidly to patients, and the challenges of trying 
to do that on a 50-state individual protocol individual requirement is nearly impossible to 
do.  So I think from the perspective of saying that [previous method] is not an effective 
method to manage, then it’s certainly worthy of discussion on what are the alternatives.”  
 
“ I think this provides the opportunity to do the pull model to where if a store needs more, 
they don’t have to pick up the phone and have 18 different people say please send out 
more dosages to this store; they can actually just order it as they would order a normal 
product.”   
 
“So it seemed like it was kind of cumbersome when it was coming through the health 
department where you called the health department and then you have to send somebody 
to go get it and all that.”  
 
 “Again, I do think that it—I do believe that the county health departments and the city 
health departments and the varying state health departments are excellent in what they do, 
but this process in essence kind of removes the middle man and can actually, …  I think 
this can probably cut out 24-48 hours of that supply chain process getting it into the 
ultimate consumer.”   
 
“Well, certainly I think it sounds like it would be an improvement from a logistics 
perspective of trying to get pandemic product to patients as opposed to going individually 
through the states.” 
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To gauge overall reaction to this proposed method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing, executives were asked about the key factors that would influence their 
decisions or their companies’ leaders’ decisions to participate with the proposed 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing.  Several executives (from both large 
and independent pharmacy companies) responded:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Themes Identified from Interviews of Pharmacy Executives 
Many issues were raised, and numerous advantages and risks related to the 
new method were discussed during these interviews.  However, five major themes 
emerged from the interviews that describe the factors that pharmacy executives 
considered critical if pharmacies are to serve as the primary dispensers of antiviral 
drugs during an influenza pandemic (Table 7). Each theme will be discussed 
separately, and examples of the comments made by the executives are provided to 
illustrate the key findings for each topic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I could say if this type of solution was available right now we would certainly want to sign 
up.”  
 
“I mean I’d sign the dotted line right now that I’d do it.”  
 
“… right now if you’re saying do you want to participate in being able to distribute 
medicines, yes, the answer is yes.”  
 
“Oh, absolutely just no issues at all.  Just fantastic.” 
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Table 7.  Major Themes Identified From Key Informant Interviews of Pharmacy 
Executives if Pharmacies are to Serve as the Primary Dispensers of Antiviral Drugs 
During an Influenza Pandemic 
 
Theme No. Major Theme 
 
1 The new way of dispensing antivirals during a pandemic is 
largely compatible with existing pharmacy processes and 
procedures and will add minimal complexity if aligned with 
usual distributor and pharmacy systems. 
 
2 Each pharmacy executive believes that pharmacies are 
critical community stakeholders and his or her company has 
a commitment to participate in a community emergency 
response. 
 
3 Pharmacy executives believe that the new way of dispensing 
antivirals during a pandemic will likely meet patient needs. 
 
4 There are a number of potential risks, but few “showstoppers” 
that would cause pharmacies to not participate with this new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing. 
 
5 Timely information, training, and collaborative planning are 
needed to ensure this new method operates optimally. 
 
 
THEME 1: Compatibility With Existing Practices 
The new way of dispensing antivirals during a pandemic is largely compatible 
with existing pharmacy processes and procedures and will add minimal 
complexity if aligned with usual distributor and pharmacy systems. 
 
One of the major reasons the executives voiced their support for this 
proposed method of antiviral dispensing was the similarity of the proposed method 
of antiviral distribution and dispensing with established current pharmacy practices. 
Several executives mentioned that this new method of antiviral distribution aligned 
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with the methods efficiently used every day by their pharmacies.  The executives 
had numerous comments about this alignment:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Every executive mentioned that the new method would work best if it 
remained consistent with routine, everyday pharmacy functions as much as possible 
(e.g., receiving medications from their usual distributors, reordering through existing 
computer systems, filling prescriptions, billing patients the usual way, and counseling 
patients).  By staying consistent with everyday practices, these executives believed 
that the new method of antiviral distribution would add little complexity to their 
“I think that it leverages the capacity of the pharmacies to different communities and it 
would be a fast and efficient way of reacting to such a pandemic and being able to provide 
medication at the right time.”   
 
“I think it’s very reflective of how medications are distributed for other reasons throughout 
the nation anyway so I like the proposed model a lot.”   
 
“There’s distribution models that are out there today that are designed to handle just this 
very problem and logistics are already put into place so you might as well use them.”   
 
“I see it as among the most ‘stablest’ ways to get the product to the health care providers 
[referring to pharmacists] that in my opinion should probably be the ones dispensing it 
anyway.  I see it as a very, very simple solution.”  
 
“I think it’s very important to use what we currently have out in the communities, to use 
the current processes that are out there.”  
 
“We really need to utilize the current delivery methods that we have in place because one, 
they’re efficient and we know that they operate well.”  
 
“I would say significant from my standpoint is that it fits within our normal process and we 
don’t have to create something new.  The pharmacists don’t have to think of a new 
procedure to be able to get the product.  It just folds into how operations work day-to-day.”  
 
“Yes, it’s totally compatible… It’s compatible because it’s really the service model that we 
currently have and where we bring in the product from wholesalers or wholesale 
distributors and do the dispensing for the patient, so that it’s like the service model that 
we utilize.”  
 
“It would not be complex at all.  It’s really the way that we conduct business now.”   
 
 “I’m a strong supporter of having pharmacies serve as the distributor of the antivirals to 
the public.  This is what we do on a daily basis for our patients, so you’re actually putting 
the responsibility into the right ownership in my opinion.”  
  
“I like the fact that it’s coming from [the] normal distribution system, that works well.” 
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operations.  The participants emphasized the importance of utilizing and leveraging 
existing processes: 
Several participants mentioned that inventory control, tracking, and reordering 
would be simplified if current systems were used for this new method: 
Executives also mentioned that because their companies have an existing 
infrastructure for dispensing medications, their pharmacies could adapt to an 
emerging pandemic emergency and ramp up quickly to serve the public.  
“I think it’s very important to use what we currently have out in the communities, to use 
the current processes that are out there.”   
 
 “So I see it being something that will fit in the workflow without, you know, hardly any 
modification at all … I think this fits in nicely and exactly with … the role and 
responsibilities of a pharmacy.”  
 
“It’s within normal distribution models so it’s not something that [staff] have to learn.”  
 
“Certainly [this method is compatible], just kind of at the fundamental level of receiving 
our medications from one of the large national wholesalers.  We receive daily orders of 
medications you know, every day before we open so how we would receive [these] 
medications is consistent with our operations.”  
 
“Honestly, truly, it is our normal process … The great part of putting it through a 
wholesaler then into a pharmacy is you already have a very well documented process 
that’s there, plus you have tremendous abilities of record keeping.” 
“One hundred percent of the drugs that we get into our pharmacy is ordered through [a 
single large pharmaceutical distributor], you know, one of these large distributors out 
there and they have order numbers set up, our computer system is constantly monitoring 
on-hand inventory in the store and as soon as the inventory gets down to a certain level it 
places an order automatically and the next day in comes the order with the products that 
the pharmacy needs.” 
 
“The pharmacists don’t have to think of a new procedure to be able to get the product.  It 
just folds into how operations work day-to-day.” 
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In particular, one executive from an independent pharmacy emphasized that 
smaller, independent pharmacies may be especially nimble during emergencies: 
The executives mentioned that the new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing (as currently envisioned) is not expected to create a significant number of 
new processes for pharmacies to handle.  These interviewees stated repeatedly that 
if the new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing aligns with the way their 
stores usually receive, manage, and dispense medications, their staff would 
probably not have to learn and adapt to multiple new processes during an 
emergency, and it shouldn’t add too much complexity: 
 
“We have the ability to scale up quickly to react to a pandemic like we did for H1N1.”  
 
“… the infrastructure [of pharmacies] is better than it is anywhere else in the whole system 
to support the volume of patients.”  
 
“The most significant really is the already-built framework for being in the community.  So 
it really is the fact that we have so many sites, we’re able to process so many people for 
our buildings.  That infrastructure is already stood up.  We can react much faster than 
trying to figure out how to stand something up.” 
“And I think our pharmacy would be a good choice and we’d do a good job because we’re 
accustomed to handling things that are different.  We’re able to make policy at the store 
level.  We don’t have to go through any huge rigmarole to adapt and adopt a plan to go 
with something that happens maybe suddenly and where we have to change our workflow 
or make adaptations with more help or do something differently.  We’re able to do that and 
our employees are used to taking up a charge and going with something new.” 
“This is why I think this is such a smart move.  So I think it removes the complexity, it 
uses the current processes that are out there in place today to make the most of that.”  
 
“It really doesn’t sound complex at all.  As I see it, you have the issue of your supply 
which is coming from your wholesaler which is normal.  You have people coming into 
your pharmacy to fill a prescription which is normal.”  
 
“I think it takes a lot of the complexity out of it.  I think this is probably the most 
streamlined approach you could take.”   
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THEME 2: Pharmacies as Critical Community Stakeholders 
Pharmacy executives believe that pharmacies are critical community 
stakeholders and their company has a commitment to participate in a 
community emergency response. 
 
One of the most important findings from this study was the participants’ 
consistent mention of the role of their pharmacies as integral stakeholders in the 
communities where they are located.  Almost every executive stated that his or her 
company’s participation in this new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing 
during a future influenza pandemic would be a very important role because of the 
company’s established commitment to the community.  Note that this response was 
unsolicited by the principal investigator.  Each executive who mentioned this role 
emphasized its importance.  These remarks provided insights into the executives’ 
beliefs that pharmacies are an integral part of the communities where they are 
located.  A few comments from large pharmacy companies emphasize that notion: 
“[We would participate because of our commitment to] the community or the better good, 
the need. You know, our role in helping solve the problem.”  
 
“I would tell you our company, first and foremost, has the strong connection to making 
sure the public is taken care of.  We have a very long reputation of being first responders 
when it comes to emergency response or disaster recovery.”  
 
“[Our] pharmacies have a relationship with the community.  They are members of the 
community and they already have a relationship with many of the patients, [we are] 
constituents of that community.”  
 
“… certainly the biggest advantage I think would be able to service the community, so you 
can participate in helping the community in a pandemic situation, being able to take care 
of those patients.”  
 
“… the store [is a] part of that community, being a resource within that community.”  
 
“… probably the most important [advantage of participating] … is the fact that we want to 
be a good community citizen and a good community partner … I want us to be a 
community leader and a good community partner so I think that’s probably the biggest 
win.” 
 79 
 
 
In particular, the executives from independent pharmacies also expressed 
these views and emphasized their pharmacies’ community stakeholder roles: 
 
These remarks convey an underlying feeling of community responsibility and 
community connectedness that the executives felt was important to emphasize 
during the interviews, and that feeling was a strong driver of the acceptability of this 
proposed antiviral distribution method. 
One executive summed up this strong belief of pharmacies as community 
citizens: 
 
THEME 3: Meeting Patient Needs 
Pharmacy executives believe that the new way of dispensing antivirals during 
a pandemic will likely meet patient needs. 
 
 Almost all of the pharmacy executives commented about how the new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing would meet their patients’9 
expectations and needs.  In particular, several executives believed that this new 
method would resonate with their company’s mission to serve their patients: 
                                                 
9
Note that all of these executives referred to the people they served as their “patients” rather than calling them 
“customers.” 
“A pharmacy isn’t a business that just operates in the community, but it’s a business 
that’s part of the community.”   
 
“I feel that we are morally and ethically bound to assist during a pandemic like this and I 
think that it would be of benefit to our community if we were to participate.” 
“So I think it’s just what pharmacists are supposed to do is help their neighbors.” 
“[This new method would allow us to] serve our current patients in the time of their need.  
They depend on us and we’re there for them.”  
 
“It fits squarely in our strategy to be a neighborhood health care provider.”  
 
“And it falls consistent with the company mission, to be able to help people move along 
the path to a better life.  So it’s consistent with everything that we do in the business of 
pharmacy.”  
 
“I see the advantages in being able to provide services that our constituents require.” 
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 The executives from large pharmacy companies emphasized that they could 
efficiently serve many people during a pandemic because they have multiple 
pharmacies located in many communities across the country and already are 
integrated into those communities: 
Several of the executives from large pharmacy companies also stated that in 
addition to multiple geographic locations in communities of all sizes, their companies 
also have colocated walk-in medical clinics staffed by nurse practitioners (or 
physician’s assistants) that could assist in providing access to prescription antiviral 
medicines in some locations. 
Many participants discussed that continuity with current patients would be 
important during a pandemic emergency and that they would like to be able to serve 
their existing patients to meet their expectations.  One executive explained the point 
as follows: 
 
Most executives mentioned that pharmacies would also be convenient for 
patients and would speed up the process of obtaining antivirals during a pandemic: 
“There’s 50,000 plus community pharmacies in the U.S. and they’re in basically every 
community in America, so you get deep penetration across a broad area very, very 
quickly.”  
 
“Well, the fact that we have so many locations and these pharmacies have a relationship 
with the community.  They are members of the community and they already have a 
relationship with many of the patients, constituents of that community.”  
 
“We have [thousands] of pharmacies and [hundreds] of clinics, so we can reach a lot of 
people.”  
 
“We are in [thousands of] pharmacy locations in [more than half of] states.” 
“It’s important that if a patient already has a relationship [with a pharmacy], they need to 
be able to at least be allowed that opportunity to go get their medicine wherever they’re 
getting it today.” 
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Pharmacy executives from mass merchant and grocery store companies also 
mentioned the potential for convenience for their patients because their stores afford 
“one-stop shopping” during a pandemic: 
 
All of the executives emphasized that pharmacies are the right place for the 
public to obtain medications, as pharmacies are designed to expertly perform that 
function every day, have the trained staff and systems to ensure medication safety, 
and align with the public’s expectation and experience of getting medications at 
pharmacies.  
Many of the executives emphasized that pharmacies and pharmacists are 
trusted and recognized by the public, and in particular, pharmacists are known as 
medication experts.  These executives believed that their pharmacies and 
“We could ramp our stores to be open 24 by 7.  We have safe, lighted parking, we’re in 
convenient areas and bus lines and (subway) lines, we are well-known in the community 
as a safe place to go, and we have the ability to scale up quickly to react to a pandemic 
like we did for H1N1.”  
 
“I think that it leverages the capacity of the pharmacies to different communities, and it 
would be a fast and efficient way of reacting to such a pandemic and being able to provide 
medication at the right time.”  
 
“I think it provides the broadest, quickest access in the pandemic that could possibly be 
given.”  
 
“… it’s so much more convenient to know that I need to get this antiviral … and I know that 
I can just walk into the pharmacy when it’s convenient for me and get the antiviral that I 
need.”  
 
“I think this can probably cut out 24–48 hours of that supply chain process getting it into 
the ultimate consumer.”  
 
“[This method] will actually deliver the medicine to the patient quicker in the event that an 
outbreak occurs.” 
“… it’s also a huge benefit that people can get other items, not just for antivirals so they’re 
not necessarily being forced to go from one site to another site to another site to pick up 
items.  That’s one of the big advantages you get from having retailers involved is you can 
pick up additional supplies, whether it’s water, food, other medical supplies, clothing.  So 
we have the ability of reaching out much more broadly than just a distribution site of 
antivirals.” 
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pharmacists currently serve as important community health care providers and that 
their pharmacists should serve in this role of antiviral dispensers during a future 
pandemic.  Several of the executives mentioned that if pharmacies and pharmacists 
could serve their patients and communities during a pandemic emergency, it would 
meet their patients’ needs and benefit their pharmacies by reinforcing their role as 
community health care providers: 
A few of the pharmacy executives also mentioned the unique role that 
pharmacists could play in providing additional access to antivirals for patients during 
a pandemic, by not requiring them to see a physician for an antiviral prescription.  
This method, they explained, allows a pharmacist, working under specific written 
protocols from a physician, to provide patient access to certain prescription 
medications if the patients’ conditions meet the criteria of an authorized protocol.  
The executives who mentioned this strategy offered it as an added advantage of 
pharmacists dispensing antivirals during a pandemic, especially if doctors’ offices 
“I think pharmacists are the most underutilized health care professional.  I think that they 
would be a great source for assistance in any type of event like that.”  
 
“But we’re certainly in a position to provide health care, we’re the most accessible at 
providing health care …”  
 
“I think what it does for our company is it reinforces with our consumers, our patients 
each day, that we are a health care provider with them or our profession extends the view 
of the pharmacist as a primary place to go to receive these services particularly in critical 
time of need.”  
 
“I think that we are always looking to have our pharmacists be seen in the light of health 
care professionals that can provide solutions and we are the medication experts.  So 
putting those in the hands of the pharmacists and our pharmacy teams can expand that 
professional view and image.”  
 
“I think it really may help shift the mindset of some consumers that you know, pharmacies 
and pharmacists just put pills in bottles, whereas under a pandemic, they’re actually 
visiting pharmacies and pharmacists for health care to save their lives.” 
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and emergency rooms are very crowded and people are experiencing delays in 
seeing a health care provider: 
 
 
THEME 4: Potential Risks 
There are a number of potential risks, but few “showstoppers” that would 
cause pharmacies to not participate with this new method of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing. 
 
In addition to the possible advantages that may be associated with the new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing, the interviewees identified multiple 
risks that may result.  However, few “showstoppers” were mentioned that would 
cause these pharmacies to not participate with this method of antiviral distribution 
and dispensing.  Each of these potential risks are summarized in Table 8 and 
discussed separately below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I would offer though in the case of a pandemic, I think a process like this should be under 
protocol so if a patient presents with certain things, there's a protocol where the 
pharmacist just could dispense to them and we don't need to chase a piece of paper or 
wait for an electronic something to come.  It's going to be a crazy time so we should 
empower our health care professionals on the frontline to make good decisions and take 
care of people quickly.”  
 
“So in a time of a pandemic or an emergency it’s gonna be hard for the patient to actually 
go see a doctor to get the antiviral.  So the question I think we might want to explore is can 
we do it from a standing order or something like that.” 
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Table 8.  Key Informants’ Views of Potential Risks, Adverse Consequences, or 
Disadvantages of New Antiviral Distribution and Dispensing Method 
 
Most frequently mentioned 
 Adds complexity/risks if markedly deviates from usual pharmacy processes 
 Uneven/unfair distribution of product among pharmacies 
 Financial risk / complex billing issues 
 Potential for disruption in stores / crowd control 
 Risk of illness for staff/disease transmission 
Occasionally mentioned Rarely mentioned 
 Problems if new method too 
complex or bureaucratic 
 Legal risks 
 Confusion about commercial and 
government product (same NDC) 
 Proposed method deviates from 
usual processes in a few ways 
“Showstoppers”a 
No showstoppers (mentioned by        
most of the participants) 
Likely showstoppers                          
(rarely mentioned) 
 No issues that would prevent 
participation  
 Unresolved legal risks  
  No medication available  
a 
The issues that were categorized as “showstoppers” were mentioned as critical issues, that if 
unresolved, may influence a company to not participate in the new antiviral method during a future 
pandemic 
 
Added complexity/risks if new method differs from usual processes 
The risk of participating in this new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing that was mentioned most often by all of the executives (from both large 
and independent pharmacies) was the possibility that the new method of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing might deviate too much from their usual pharmacy 
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processes.  This was the converse of the issues discussed as part of the description 
of Theme 1, and has already been described in that section. 
Specifically, several executives cautioned that if the new method was too 
bureaucratic or if pharmacists had to learn to conduct business in a very different 
way, then it would create problems for the dispensing pharmacist: 
Several executives from large pharmacy companies noted that the new 
method as described deviated somewhat from their current operations.  A few of 
these large pharmacies serve as their own distributor—their company purchases 
(some or many) medications directly from manufacturers and distributes them to 
their stores using their own logistics and systems.  One executive explained the 
concern:  
An executive from one large pharmacy company that serves as its own 
distributor for almost all of its medications, questioned if the new method would be 
efficient for them: 
“Our frontline pharmacists [would say] I have a patient in front of me, I need to take care of 
him, so do whatever you have to do but I need to take care of this patient.  They care very 
much and should care very much and it’s their profession about taking care of the patient.  
So they don’t want barriers, they don’t want red tape, they don’t want to not hear that they 
can’t take care of that patient.” 
“I think the only concern that I’ve got is that large drugstore-only companies don’t really 
exclusively use these commercially available distributors.  They’ll use them as a backup 
but they warehouse themselves so they have their own warehouses and their own 
distribution method and system that goes out to all their stores.  So I think that would just 
need to be addressed as a way so that they have equal access to it.  But you’re only 
talking a few chains.” 
“So in fact what you're proposing to us would seem slower than what we could produce if 
it were just sent to us directly, and in the time of pandemic I would say that would be our 
preferred way to support such an activity.” 
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This executive was concerned that the proposed process may add too many steps 
and may make it cumbersome for their company because their company does not 
usually engage with a pharmaceutical distributor.  Although the new method did not 
align with their usual processes, this pharmacy executive mentioned that they could 
shift to using a distributor for antivirals during a pandemic emergency.  This 
executive and all of the other large pharmacy company executives reported their 
companies currently have business relationships with one or more large 
pharmaceutical distributors, so no new business relationships would be needed to 
participate.   
Inequity in antiviral distribution among U.S. pharmacies 
Another risk mentioned by almost all interviewees was related to a possible 
inequity or maldistribution of the antivirals among pharmacy companies.  Most 
participants mentioned that it would be important for all of the pharmacies in the 
United States to get their “fair share”: 
Executives were especially concerned about the impact that would have on 
their brand and image if antivirals were not made available to their pharmacy (but 
were available to their competitor).  They were concerned about the potential for an 
unfair business advantage if not all pharmacies are able to participate. Executives 
also expressed concerns that relationships with existing patients would be 
“So we want our fair share … How do you make sure that you have equal distribution of a 
limited distribution product?  Undoubtedly there will be shortages and somebody has to 
make some tough decisions about who gets what and how much they get.”   
 
“Things that come to my mind pretty quickly would be fair share distribution.  So one of 
the challenges I think we’re gonna face is when you’re talking about the total retail 
population, making sure that companies are going to be able to get the right amount of 
antivirals that they’re going to be able to serve the public for.” 
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jeopardized if they were unable to fill a prescription because of uneven availability of 
supplies.  
Almost all of the executives also discussed the potential negative impact of a 
possible antiviral shortage during a future, severe pandemic.  However, several 
executives said that their reputation would be harmed less if there was equitable 
distribution of antivirals, even if every pharmacy had fewer regimens than they 
needed because of an overall short supply of the drug.  They asked for messaging 
from the government to explain to the public about any medication shortages so 
patients would not perceive that it was the “fault” of a pharmacy that did not have 
sufficient supplies of antivirals.  Several executives also mentioned that public 
messaging would be helpful if the pharmacy had to follow CDC guidelines to provide 
antivirals only to high risk persons during a shortage: 
 Several of the large pharmacy executives were concerned that independent 
pharmacies may not receive their “fair share”: 
 
 
“Well, a disruption of supplies would be a risk because patients would be depending on 
us, not from the government for the medications and that would be a liability to our 
image.”   
 
“The most significant [risk] would be unfair advantages.  To us, it would be unfair 
advantages for competitors because it would harm our image and relationship with our 
patients.” 
“If it were in short supply, I would like to be able to say, these are the guidelines and we 
have to go by the guidelines.  I’d like to have something that was medically sound and 
based on CDC protocol.” 
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Moreover, the independent pharmacy executives were especially concerned 
that smaller pharmacies that are not part of a chain or other large pharmacy 
distributor networks might be “left out.”  Executives from the independent 
pharmacies often have different distributors than the larger pharmacies.  These 
executives also had particular concerns about rural pharmacies being able to access 
antivirals: 
 
Financial risks / concerns about billing 
Almost all of the interviewed executives expressed some concern about 
possible financial and billing issues.  Although one model of this new method 
assumes there would be no product costs to pharmacies (because the government 
has already purchased the product and it would likely be provided free to distributors 
and then to pharmacies), pharmacies would be allowed to bill a fee for dispensing 
“So making sure that whether it’s an independent pharmacy, whether it’s a big retailer 
such as XXXX that has [thousands of] stores, so we get the right amount of product going 
to the right locations.  I think that’s going to be one of the biggest challenges that we 
face.”  
 
“[We need to make sure that] none of the different layers that are in the market have the 
advantage, so that we’re all in the same level playing field with the rest of the pharmacies 
that provide services to the community, both the large and independent chains … so that 
all of them receive products at the same time and that there is sufficient quantities to be 
able to take care of their needs.” 
“… It’s a smaller more independent distributor and that’s something that concerns me, 
you know, if they do this through normal supply chains, are they going to focus on the big 
[distributors] … our primary supplier is a small wholesaler.  So my concern there would 
be, would they make sure that entities like that are included in the plan so that 
[pharmacies like ours] would still be able to have access and be a part of that … ” I 
 
“One of the bigger concerns is not that it would be from participating but it would be from 
being shut out from participating almost; that we wouldn’t have the opportunity because 
we have a smaller wholesaler.”  
 
“Two thirds of our state is rural; I think that the primary concern about how a wholesaler 
allocates inventory is among the only real concerns I really had.” 
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the medication as is typical for other prescription medicines (NCPA, 2011a).  Some 
executives mentioned concerns about a financial burden or how they would collect 
the dispensing fee from patients: 
Patients with third party coverage would probably have some or the entire 
dispensing fee paid by insurance, while other solutions are still needed (unresolved 
to date) for those who are uninsured, those who are insured but do not have 
prescription medication coverage, or those whose pharmacy coverage would be 
insufficient.  Specific financial concerns expressed by a few of the interviewees 
included a need for clarity on third party billing procedures: 
One pharmacy executive recognized these financial issues may be expected 
and cautioned that his or her company would be willing to “write-off” uncompensated 
expenses but needed to estimate how large this burden would be: 
“It would make it not acceptable if we have to incur [a large amount of] costs that are not a 
part of our normal structure but I don’t foresee this as having that.”  
 
“I mean if [the antiviral] cost us, if we were paying $100 you can’t [just give it away to 
everyone] but if what we’re out is our time and effort, sometimes you just have to say that 
was my good deed for the day.  But if that goes on a hundred times a day, then you can’t 
afford to do it.” 
“We just need to make sure that we get the third party billing piece spelled out.”  
 
“… if there’s something in Medicare or Medicaid or some other third party contract that 
causes an issue with how we would bill for this particular medication, that would be 
problematic … particularly if something could [be] a violation of some of our contract as it 
relates to Medicaid or Medicare.” 
“I think there’s going to be just the regular risk of compensation.  That has to be there.  So 
while you want to make sure you’re there to help the general public, you have to be able to 
understand the size of the write-off if there’s going to be a write-off.  So if there’s a way of 
being compensated, making sure that’s ironed out, making sure that we understand it, and 
making sure that you’re not just overrun with giving away product.” 
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Another executive mentioned additional financial concerns about how 
pharmacies were to account for the government-supplied antiviral drug inventory in 
their possession: 
 
Several executives said that during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the 
concomitant commercial supply of antivirals and SNS/state-provided antivirals in 
pharmacies caused a great deal of confusion for pharmacists, e.g., which patients 
should receive the billable commercial product and which patients should be offered 
the free government-provided product?  
A few executives also commented that having both types of antivirals in their 
pharmacies (that were marked with the same NDC code10) in a future pandemic 
would add complexity for the pharmacy staff as they tracked inventory on both 
almost-identical products. 
                                                 
10
The National Drug Code (NDC) is a unique numeric code that is assigned to each medication listed 
under Section 510 of the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  The segments identify the 
labeler or vendor, the product (within the scope of the labeler), and the trade package of the product 
(FDA, 2013). 
 
“But how does a pharmacy, you know, because we actually all have to adjust the dollar 
value of our pharmacy like inventory for taxes and things … And then  also in the event of 
a fire or just any kind of natural disaster or robbery, we also have to properly insure our 
inventory in case, you know, we use that insurance policy … how would I make sure my 
insurance policy covers these drugs that I did not buy?” 
“But if you have inventory coming from  one group and inventory coming from a different 
location from another group, now you’re putting the pharmacist in the middle of a difficult 
situation with that interaction that happens at store level, and we do not want to do that.”  
 
“… how do you determine free goods versus I’m paying for it with a third party insurance, 
and how do you deal with patients that say, well I heard you had it but you actually don’t, 
as it relates to product that someone wants to pay for insurance, and how do you handle 
that patient that comes in with that scenario.  In other words, I come in, I have Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield and I heard you had this medicine but I only have the free product.  How do 
you handle that interaction?  I think that’s a risk.” 
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Safety risks for pharmacy staff: Crowd control  
Executives expressed concern that there may be safety risks for their 
pharmacy staff related to two issues: (a) the potential for disruption in stores / crowd 
control and managing surge of large numbers of patients, and (b) the risk of illness 
for staff.  Almost all of the participants mentioned one of these issues as a potential 
risk. 
A few executives mentioned that large crowds would need to be managed, 
but the risk of surge is not a new issue to many of the large pharmacy executives; 
their pharmacies have familiarity with periodic large crowds: 
 
 One pharmacy executive mentioned physical safety concerns if patients 
become physically threatening to staff if there is a drug shortage: 
Safety risks for pharmacy staff: Risks of illness 
Concerns about protecting the health of the staff and infection control 
practices that might be needed in pharmacies during a severe pandemic was 
mentioned as a risk by most of the participants.  One executive mentioned that his or 
her company’s stores may become a gathering place for sick people, which could 
expose the staff to disease and could also be perceived by the public as a place that 
they do not want to go: 
“… you realize you’re gonna have a certain amount of disruption because you are in 
operation in an emergency.  But for us we have a lot of already built-in processes and 
plans for how to handle those situations.  One of the best examples would be if you take 
Black Friday.  That’s a yearly ongoing basis.  … we have those types of best practices in 
place already so that we can keep the public safe and out of harm’s way.” 
“I guess one negative thing about being one of these maybe partner sites for the CDC is if 
people perceive that we have these items on hand but that for whatever reason we’re not 
providing it to them.” 
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 Several mentioned that they recognized new strategies would be needed to 
protect their workforce, and they would take measures to protect staff: 
However, unlike the safety concern of store crowding described above, many 
of the executives who mentioned this risk stated that they did not currently have a 
plan to mitigate these risks and would be dependent on CDC and public health to 
advise them how to reduce these types of risks. 
Several executives also mentioned ways to minimize the risk of illness in their 
stores: ask well family members to pick up prescriptions for ill patients, encourage 
use of drive-through windows, and provide home delivery, if feasible. 
A few executives also mentioned that they were committed to keeping their 
pharmacy staff protected during a future pandemic.  A few voiced concerns about 
staff not reporting to work if they felt unsafe at the workplace because of exposure to 
disease during a pandemic.  Although the risk of illness in pharmacies was possible 
during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, one executive indicated that his or her pharmacy 
staff stayed on the job: 
“Something to always be considered is you have a general population that you’re now 
introducing a sick population into so to speak, that antivirals are to prevent, so hopefully 
we’re on the preventative side, but the truth of the matter is you’re now becoming a 
destination for essentially sick people walking in your building.” 
 
“… people having the perception that you now have the illness or the problem inside your 
location.  So there’s going to be a percentage of the population that will avoid those 
locations.” 
“We still have to maintain a workforce so that’s a challenge to the general workforce inside 
the company when they think that they’re now introducing a disease inside the building, 
yet they have to come in and work there. …  it’s the motivation of making sure that our 
population of team members is still feeling comfortable enough that they can work and 
being able to give them the adequate reassurances whether it comes in supplies of masks 
or gloves or things like that that they can still perform their job duties.” 
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Legal risks 
 Only a few executives voiced concerns about possible legal risks related to 
the new method.  A particular remark was made about possible product liability risks 
related to new antivirals that might be used in a future pandemic: 
Although a number of risks were mentioned (see Table 8), few true 
“showstoppers” were stated by the pharmacy executives.  After a discussion of 
potential risks was concluded, each executive was asked the following question:  
Most of the executives stated that they could not identify any major issues 
that would prevent their participation: 
“During the 2009 pandemic, we [were concerned that we] may not have staff that wants to 
come to work because they’re afraid of acquiring the virus or whatever it might be.  And 
overwhelmingly, and again I think this probably speaks a little bit to the type of people that 
work in health care, we had very few if—I mean I don’t remember hardly any incidents 
where our pharmacists said, I’m not gonna dispense these products or I’m not gonna—I’m 
gonna get the blue flu, I’m not gonna come into work until this passes because I’m afraid 
of getting sick myself.  Again, it may have been the fact that H1N1 was milder than future 
pandemics might be but that would be a concern as well making sure that we had the staff 
and the resources to accommodate that.” 
“… that’s always gonna be one of the concerns, especially if [the drug is] new and don’t 
have experience and people get kind of nervous, what happens if a whole bunch of people 
get sick and what if we get sued because we were the providers of that service or that 
product.  So I think it’s always gonna be around that legal liability side of things is where 
most of the concerns would come from.” 
Are any of these risks (you mentioned) “showstoppers”—meaning that if 
this risk could not be reduced, then your company would not likely 
participate? 
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One executive cautioned that specific “showstoppers” could not be identified 
until more details are known about how the new method would work; this executive 
said his or her company could determine if there was an issue that would prevent 
their participation once the details are known: 
Although concern with unspecified risks was identified, this pharmacy 
executive also mentioned support for the new method:  
One executive stated definitively that an unresolved legal risk or liability could 
prevent their participation: 
 
“No, I don’t see any of these as showstoppers.  I think that our company has a pretty 
realistic approach to what’s there and that is one of the better parts of being in retail is 
we’re used to dealing with adversity on a daily basis and making plans on the fly and 
counteracting those adversities.  So I don’t see any showstoppers to this.”  
 
“Not at all.  I think what you’re proposing is a great strategic shift in how these items are 
distributed and actually, I think, really where it should have always been.”  
 
“No, I really can’t think of anything that would stop me from participating.  All other things 
being equal I can’t think of anything that would stop us from participating.  That sounds 
like—I don’t see the downside.”  
 
“I don’t believe that it would be critical so that we would back off of participating.  I think 
that it would be workable.”  
 
“[Even if there were risks] I mean I think we would [participate]—our mission would pull us 
to participate with those because it's the right thing to do.” 
“I think the best way to do that is to say, lay that out [details of the program] and then 
come back with here are our questions and concerns around things that would have to be 
worked through or issues and concerns and be able to answer that.  From there, there may 
be something I would say this would be a make or break and can you solve it or not.  I 
imagine anything can be solved.” 
“Listen, I think at the end what I’m hearing is a very good intent and a very noble intent to 
try and improve upon something that we’ve found was challenging and needed to have it 
improved if we are faced with this type of situation.  So I’m with you from the perspective 
of what we did before and saying, boy everyone wanted to do the right thing and there 
were a lot of barriers in trying to do the right thing.” 
“… I think that [the showstopper] would be the legal concerns, that if we couldn’t get 
comfortable with protection against legal concerns, that would be a showstopper.” 
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However, this interviewee also offered that legal risks for his or her company 
could be reduced if there was a plan to “make sure that providers aren’t going to be 
liable for damages.”  
Another executive mentioned that a shortage of medication could be a 
showstopper: 
When asked for clarification (Investigator: So if there’s not enough medications, 
that’s a showstopper?), this executive replied: 
THEME 5: Information, Training, and Planning 
Timely information, training, and collaborative planning are needed to ensure 
this new method operates optimally.  
 
The final theme identified from these executives was about the kind of help or 
support their pharmacies might need from their company as well as from 
government (state and/or local public health and the federal government) to plan for 
and implement this new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing. The 
executives outlined three areas in which they would need support and information: 
(a) pre-event training, (b) just-in-time training tools and information for their staff, and 
(c) a method of receiving timely and accurate information from their local and state 
health departments and CDC during the event.  
“Hold on.  Actually, there is a showstopper.  If the manufacturer can’t produce to meet the 
demand.” 
“Well, it is.  I mean because we really need to think that thing through because sometimes 
they’re [the manufacturer] just not able to produce it.  So really good analysis on the front 
side about the predictability of the event and being able to kind of help them through that 
process and almost overdo it with the support and guarantees and the funding to back it 
up.” 
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Pre-event engagement, mentioned by several executives, focused on their 
desire to receive pre-event plans and optimally, collaborate with government to plan 
for this new antiviral distribution method.  One executive also mentioned the need to 
conduct exercises or drills to test the plan:   
Connected and Interrelated Themes 
After reviewing and visually arraying all of the major themes that emerged 
from this research, it became apparent that several thematic areas overlapped and 
were related to one another.  Figure 6 depicts each of the themes identified, sub-
themes, and areas of overlap.  In particular, this array depicts the importance that 
the fewer new processes introduced to current pharmacy processes and practices 
by a new antiviral distribution and dispensing method, the less the complexity and 
risk.  Conversely, the more the new method deviates from everyday pharmacy 
processes, the greater the challenges that will arise. 
 
 
“We like to be very well documented and very well planned out.  [We want] as much up-
front planning information, practice drills, things like that.  We like to put our teams 
through the course of action so that when the time to jump into action is that they’re not 
really reading it and trying to understand it; this is part of their daily operations.  So we’d 
like to get proactive plans to share, you know, here’s what we do in the event of this 
emergency, and we do a couple of in-house practices, but it would be great to see some 
national practices as well.”   
 97 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Connecting and interrelated themes  
 
Additional Results  
 To ascertain the applicability of this potential method of antiviral distribution 
and dispensing to other public health emergencies, all of the executives were also 
asked one more question: 
Almost all of the pharmacy executives replied that they would be willing to 
consider this role for their pharmacies. Several restated that medication dispensing 
fits squarely in their pharmacies’ expertise; their pharmacies are critical parts of a 
What do you think about pharmacies serving as the primary dispensers of 
other medical countermeasures (for example, antibiotics) for mass 
prophylaxis during other types of emergencies, such as an anthrax attack? 
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community emergency response; pharmacists play an important role as health care 
providers during emergencies; and serving the needs of their patients is a priority: 
 
 However, risks similar to those identified for antiviral dispensing (e.g., 
maldistribution of the medication, drug shortages, crowd control, safety for pharmacy 
staff, and disruption in stores) were also mentioned.  Several executives believed 
that the urgency related to providing countermeasures during an anthrax attack and 
increased community-level anxiety would result in more challenges for pharmacies 
than would be expected during a pandemic: 
“I think we’re a great first choice because, again, we’re in the communities, we’re 
accessible, we  have convenient places for people to go, we can scale, we’ve got 
locations, again, 24 by 7, it makes a lot of sense, they’re everywhere and everybody knows 
how to find them.  So I would leverage [pharmacies] for whatever first responder program 
you have because I think we can deliver for you.”  
 
“I think from an access perspective I think the pharmacies certainly are a critical point in 
the distribution channel and they’re the best equipped to handle large volumes, so 
patients in large volumes of product transactions.  So it certainly makes more sense from 
a health care perspective to utilize the channel that’s out there and that does that today, 
and the retail channel being a part of that.  From a distribution outlet it makes sense.  So I 
think that’s a very logical thing to do.”  
 
“Absolutely.  I think when it comes to any of those kind of rapid distribution of 
pharmaceuticals it’s the natural place to go.”  
 
“I think pharmacists are the most underutilized health care professional.  I think that they 
would be a great source for assistance in any type of event like that.”   
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In conclusion, all of the pharmacy executives reacted positively to the new 
method of antivirals distribution and dispensing and believed that dispensing 
antivirals during a future pandemic would be a natural fit for their pharmacies.  
Nonetheless, the participants very clearly pointed out multiple potential risks. Most of 
the participants offered suggestions to reduce those risks.  This pharmacy executive 
summed it up very well: 
 
“All the responses and things I [said to you before] would be exactly the same.  But I only 
say that because of my experience in 2001 with … and again, we were clearly not as close 
to things as people on the East Coast but we certainly experienced some behavior 
exhibited by groups with respect to kind of the shift in mindset with respect to all of a 
sudden that drug Cipro did not just become a tool to help people stay well, but it became 
like some type of like insurance against illness and death, and people’s mindset really 
shifted with respect to that drug.  And so, again, the safety related concerns might go up a 
little bit for pharmacy staff, but beyond that the same types of roles and responsibilities, 
the same positives and negatives from my perspective, those responses would all be the 
same.”  
 
“… the thing that really concerns me a little bit with that, and it's not as much as H1N1 but 
the level of angst that you can create in a community; there are other issues at play when 
you have something along those lines, meaning what kind of hysteria may be going on, 
and what kind of environment you would be … going on inside of a retail location.”  
 
“So for instance, you had an anthrax attack in Springfield, Missouri, and you say, well, you 
can go get “X” at your local pharmacy, CVS, Walgreens, Wal-Mart, Target, whatever.  If you 
really don’t have the product flowing in, it can create a situation where you have a lot of—a 
crowd develop pretty quickly in front of your pharmacy and then you start having your 
pharmacy, store staff, etc.—kind of putting them in a bad situation.”  
 
“I believe when you’re working with countermeasures because I think it’s more time 
critical, I think you run into more possibilities of security crowd control, traffic control, 
getting those other groups involved, but then again, legal too.  I mean would you have 
access to city police officers or highway patrol or county sheriffs, how does that all work, 
because I think that the urgency is a little bit different in some of those circumstances, 
don’t you think?” 
“I think it makes the most logical sense. People go to pharmacies for medication and that 
part has been happening for decades. So I think when it comes time to react whether it’s 
anthrax, whether it’s potassium iodide, whether it’s a pandemic, I think the best spot to 
always tell people to go is the pharmacy.  You have an expert back there [pharmacist] in 
terms of medical knowledge or medicine knowledge, drug knowledge, and this is what 
they do on a day-in and day-out basis; they dispense products to people to help them in 
their time of need.  So it doesn’t really matter to me what the situation is, I’m always a 
proponent that our pharmacies should be the ones that are dispensing medications.” 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
. 
The interviews with pharmacy executives identified five predominant themes 
that must be considered and/or addressed if pharmacies are to serve as the primary 
dispensers of antiviral drugs during an influenza pandemic.  Overall, the participants 
were very supportive of this new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing, 
primarily because the new method was likely to be compatible with day-to-day 
pharmacy operations and methods and align with the mission of pharmacies.   
Compatibility With Existing Pharmacy Practices 
The participants identified several advantages to this new method of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing and repeatedly stated their companies’ commitment to 
serving their patients every day as well as during a public health emergency.  Almost 
all of the executives believed that this new method would improve the way antivirals 
could be distributed and dispensed (compared with the methods used during the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic); provide convenient access to the medication; meet patient 
needs and expectations (going to a pharmacy to pick up a prescription); afford 
access to electronic systems that can track and report antivirals dispensed to public 
health officials; and allow everyday systems to efficiently manage inventories and 
reorder medication.   
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Pharmacy executives mentioned that by performing this function during a 
pandemic, their pharmacies would be able to “lessen the burden on public health.”  
The literature review conducted for this dissertation research (Chapter 2) identified a 
number of problems that state public health officials encountered distributing and 
dispensing antivirals during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.  Several of the state “after-
action” reports (AARs) identified a “structural mismatch” between the inherent 
capabilities of public health and the task of antiviral distribution and dispensing.  
Some AARs stated that their public health agency did not have the expertise to 
perform this task.  
Moreover, public health departments have experienced state and federal 
budget cuts and reductions in staff since 2009 and have fewer resources to manage 
the next pandemic.  The profound federal (and state) government economic 
challenges of 2013 continue to threaten resources available to states for pandemic 
planning (Schnirring, 2013, January 2).  
Public health officials are expert at emergency response functions such as 
surveillance, epidemiology, command and control, preparedness planning and 
training, and communications to the public.  Those functions are unique to state and 
local government during a public health emergency and cannot be transferred to a 
private sector entity for execution. However, pharmacies manage and distribute 
pharmaceuticals every day and are proficient in this function.  There is a possibility, 
on the basis of findings from this research, that pharmacy companies may be willing 
to serve as primary dispensers of antivirals during a future pandemic and that the 
inherent strengths of pharmacies, such as their widespread locations, familiarity and 
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trust of pharmacists and pharmacies with communities, and expertise with ordering, 
managing, and dispensing medications, can be leveraged to improve a pandemic 
response.   
Pharmacies as Key Community Stakeholders 
One of the most important findings from this research is the strong belief 
expressed by pharmacy executives regarding the role of pharmacies as community 
stakeholders.  The principal investigator was not surprised, but very gratified, to 
learn that all participants in the study emphasized (without prompting from the 
researcher) the role of their pharmacies as key community stakeholders, especially 
during an emergency response.   
Pharmacists have been involved in public health efforts for many years.  In 
addition, pharmacists and pharmacies have previously been integrated into 
community emergency responses (Hogue, Hogue, Lander, Avent, & Fleenor, 2009), 
including significant roles assisting communities in natural disasters (Woodard, Bray, 
Williams, & Terriff, 2010) and providing vaccinations during the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic (Koonin et al., 2011; Rosenfeld, Etkind, Grasso, Adams, & Rothholz, 
2011).  Corporate citizenship benefits both communities and corporations (Center for 
Corporate Citizenship, 2012).  
Although these research findings may not be generalizable to other pharmacy 
companies, the participants’ companies constitute almost one half (approximately 
46%) of all U.S. pharmacies.  Therefore, these findings may be pivotal for public 
health officials to know as planning for this new method proceeds.  If public health 
officials can envision an alignment of their agency’s emergency response mission to 
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serve the public with that of pharmacies in their community, then collaboration 
needed to implement this new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing may be 
enhanced. 
Alternative Method of Antiviral Distribution and Dispensing Likely to 
Meet Patient Needs:  Expanding Roles of Pharmacists and Pharmacies 
Almost all of the executives said this new method reinforces the role of the 
pharmacist as a health care provider and pharmacies’ role as an essential part of a 
community emergency response.  A recent report from the Office of the Chief 
Pharmacist, U.S. Public Health Service, to the U.S. Surgeon General stated that 
pharmacists are “remarkably underutilized in the U.S. health care delivery system 
given their level of education, training, and access to the community” (Giberson, 
Yoder, & Lee, 2011, p. 10).     
Over the past decade or more, pharmacists’ roles have been expanding to 
include prevention activities (such as immunizations), laboratory testing, chronic 
disease medication management, and selected primary care services under 
protocols and supervision from physicians (Chisholm-Burns et al., 2010; Hogue, 
Grabenstein, Foster, & Rothholz, 2006; Ross, 2011; Smith, 2012).  Pharmacies are 
becoming an accepted place for people to get vaccinations for influenza; during the 
2010–2011 influenza season, approximately 18% of adults of all ages and 
approximately 24% of adults older than 65 years were vaccinated at a pharmacy 
(Kennedy et al., 2011).  Expanding pharmacists’  scope of practice is also being 
currently discussed in light of national health care reform (Landro, 2012, November 
19).   
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Several executives interviewed for this dissertation research suggested that 
during a future pandemic, CDC should encourage public health officials to engage 
with community pharmacists for providing access to prescription medication under 
written protocol with a physician.  The Chief Pharmacist’s report mentioned 
previously reinforces this view by stating that “Pharmacists’ formal education 
appropriately prepares them to successfully perform clinical services related to the 
prevention and control of disease through medications” (Giberson et al., 2011, p. 
12).  This practice, known as a collaborative practice agreement (CPA) or a 
collaborative drug therapy agreement (CDTA), is an “agreement between 
pharmacists and authorized prescribers (e.g., doctors, physician assistants, nurse 
practitioners) that allows pharmacists to prescribe, modify, or discontinue medication 
therapy for a patient, without the patient having to be seen by a physician” (Public 
Health Practices, 2011, para. 2).  
Use of CPA/CDTA strategies suggested by pharmacy executives could be 
used to improve access to antivirals during a severe pandemic, especially if doctors’ 
offices and clinics are flooded with patients resulting in long waits to see a provider.  
During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, a few jurisdictions focused on these approaches 
to improve antiviral dispensing in case the pandemic severity increased.  In 
particular, Seattle-King County Public Health Department created partnerships with 
the Northwest Center for Public Health Practice, the Washington State Pharmacy 
Association, and the Washington State Board of Pharmacy to formulate a CDTA with 
a number of community pharmacists.  They also produced a toolkit that other local 
health departments can use to develop their own agreements between pharmacists 
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and physicians (Advanced Practice Centers, 2010; Northwest Center for Public 
Health Practice, 2013).  Currently 44 states have some written mention in their state 
pharmacy laws and regulations of collaborative practice and/or protocols between 
physicians and pharmacists (National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, 2010).  In 
2012, the Institute of Medicine asked members of the public in three communities 
about how they would react to pharmacists as “prescribers” and found that these 
participants favored this approach, as they were already familiar with pharmacists 
performing other clinical tasks, such as administering flu vaccines (Fain, 
Viswanathan, & Altevogt, 2012).  
Pharmacies have other resources that could be leveraged to significantly 
serve ill persons during a pandemic. Several executives mentioned that their 
pharmacy companies also have primary care clinics colocated in their pharmacies 
that could serve ill persons.  Many national drugstore chains and several mass-
merchant pharmacies have opened their own "walk-in" or “convenient care” clinics, 
staffed by nurse practitioners or physician’s assistants, that are designed to 
diagnose and treat minor ailments, offer vaccinations, and prescribe and dispense 
some medications.  As of 2012, there were approximately 1,400 retail clinics in 39 
states in the United States, most of them affiliated with pharmacies (Cassell, 2012; 
Mehrotra & Lave, 2012; Merchant Medicine, 2013).  These clinics have experienced 
rapid growth over the past five years and continue to increase in number.  However, 
new protocols may be needed for these clinics to serve ill persons during a 
pandemic, including procedures for infection control to protect others in the store 
setting. 
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Risks Identified by Pharmacy Executives Must be Addressed 
In addition to the potential advantages, pharmacy executives identified 
multiple, potential risks that may be associated with this new method of antivirals 
distribution and dispensing.  However, few “showstoppers” were mentioned that 
would cause these pharmacies to not participate with this method of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing.   The risk of participating in this new method of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing that was mentioned most often by all of the executives 
was the possibility that the new method might deviate too much from their usual 
pharmacy processes.  If pharmacists and pharmacy companies have to change their 
usual practices and systems in ways that are very different from usual and add 
complexity or increased bureaucracy, then delays in execution, difficulty in training 
staff, and a chance of increased errors can result. This issue closely aligns with the 
key principles of compatibility and low complexity as enablers for innovation system-
fit from the conceptual framework for this research adapted from Greenhalgh, et al. 
(2004). CDC needs to strongly consider issues of compatibility and complexity with 
existing pharmacy processes when planning a new method of antiviral distribution 
and dispensing, even though a pandemic emergency may, unavoidably, present the 
need for some modification in systems or procedures.  
Another risk mentioned by almost all interviewees was the possibility of 
uneven distribution of antivirals to pharmacy companies.  Unequal distribution of a 
scarce and valued countermeasure during a severe pandemic creates both access 
problems for sick persons who need to take the drug soon after becoming ill, and 
risks to the pharmacies and pharmacy companies because they cannot serve their 
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patients.  The executives were more concerned with maldistribution related to CDC 
selecting only a subset of distributors and pharmacies to receive this drug rather 
than with an overall drug shortage (where all entities would be affected).  
Maldistribution of antivirals in a community (if some pharmacies have the medicine 
and others do not) may jeopardize the pharmacy’s image and brand if they cannot 
provide the medicine when a patient needs it.  Aside from an unavoidable national 
shortage (where every pharmacy has little of the medication), CDC planners need to 
develop strategies to maximize widespread and equitable distribution of antivirals to 
pharmacies if this new method is adopted.  Strategies to accomplish this goal may 
include the Strategic National Stockpile providing antivirals as high up in the 
distribution chain as possible so that most pharmacies will have access to the drug 
through their usual customer relationships with manufacturers and distributors. 
Almost all of the interviewed executives expressed some concern about 
possible financial and billing issues.  If billing methods are very different from 
standard practices, this may pose a barrier to implementation. Even though these 
pharmacy executives had strong allegiance to their communities, some of them 
expressed limits to the financial burden that their companies would accept. Clearly 
these issues can present challenges for both pharmacies and patients.  Patients with 
health insurance that includes pharmacy coverage would theoretically have some or 
all of pharmacy fees offset by their coverage. However, patients who are uninsured 
may not have another means to pay for the dispensing fees.  Dispensing fees vary in 
the United States; the average co-pay for patients for 75% of all prescriptions was 
$10 or less in 2011 but can be as high as $40 on average for some name-branded 
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drugs covered by some health plans (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2012).  
One set of researchers found a link between low socioeconomic status and 
increased severity of illness during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, possibly related to 
delayed care-seeking because of financial barriers (Levy, Nguyen, Westheimer, & 
Layton, 2013).  CDC needs to work with HHS and others to develop a method to 
reduce financial barriers for patients and pharmacies in any new antiviral distribution 
method so that the pharmacy dispensing fee is not an impediment to timely receipt 
of medication for patients.   
Key informants identified the risk of illness for staff as a concern if pharmacies 
serve as primary dispensers of antivirals.  This finding was similar to that found 
when pharmacists were polled regarding a new method, except pharmacists also 
identified the risk of bringing disease home to family members as a key concern 
(Appendix B).  The executives mentioned that they are confident methods could be 
devised to protect their staff from getting ill, but stated no specific methods for 
protecting them.  Instead they said they would rely on CDC and public health 
authorities for infection control recommendations.  
Pharmacy executives explained that they could visualize a large number of ill 
persons congregating in their stores.  Several participants stated their concern that ill 
people may congregate in their stores. During a pandemic, CDC’s likely guidance to 
the public will be that sick people “should stay home and avoid contact with other 
people except to get medical care,” if at all possible (CDC, 2009b, para. 2).  Public 
health officials in the United Kingdom advised, during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, that 
ill persons identify a well “flu buddy” (who had the patient's identification details) to 
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pick up their antivirals at the pharmacy (Boseley, 2009, January 8).  The practice of 
having someone else pick up prescription medicine for a sick person (for most types 
of medicine) is an established practice in the United States (Privacy of Individually 
Identifiable Health Information, 2002).  However, some ill people will not be able to 
identify another person to perform this task, and there will likely be ill persons in 
pharmacies during a pandemic.  Several executives mentioned that they had drive-
through and walk-up windows in some of their stores that could be used to dispense 
antivirals to ill persons without the need to enter the pharmacy.  Some pharmacies 
may be able to define separate waiting areas for those who are symptomatic.  CDC 
will need to distribute clear and detailed guidance to pharmacies about specific 
infection control practices that they may need to use during a severe pandemic to 
minimize disease transmission. 
Despite the risk of disease, several executives mentioned that their pharmacy 
staff would likely be willing to come to work during a future pandemic.  In one study 
that surveyed health care workers, researchers found that 93% of pharmacists 
reported that they would be willing and able to come to work during a future  
pandemic (Stergachis et al., 2011).  An interesting finding was that the most 
frequently cited strategy that would encourage clinicians (from all disciplines) to 
report to work was the availability of antiviral drugs for prophylaxis.  Pharmacy 
executives interviewed for this dissertation research did not mention the use of 
antivirals for prophylaxis of pharmacy staff.  However, when pharmacists were asked 
in the recent Harvard poll “How likely is it that you would come to work for your 
regular hours for all 12 WEEKS of the outbreak?  (Assuming you are not sick 
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yourself),” 91% responded “very likely” (SteelFisher et al., 2012, slide 48; see also 
Appendix B).  In that same poll, however, many pharmacists were worried about 
their own exposure to the influenza virus (59%), and almost three quarters (71%) of 
pharmacists were concerned about the risk of carrying the influenza virus back to 
their families.  CDC should consider what it would recommend to protect 
pharmacists and pharmacy staff if this new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing is used. 
Pharmacy executives also identified potential legal issues that might place 
their pharmacies at risk.  Fortunately, the Public Readiness Emergency 
Preparedness (PREP) Act affords protection to reduce liability and legal risks to 
dispensing pharmacies.  A PREP Act declaration is issued by the Secretary of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in response to a public health 
emergency like an influenza pandemic.  This Act provides immunity from tort liability 
claims (except willful misconduct) to individuals or organizations involved in the 
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of medical countermeasures.11  For both 
planning and responding to a future pandemic, it will be important that HHS 
communicate the availability of protection through the PREP Act to private sector 
entities that engage in antiviral distribution and dispensing.  
Research Findings Indicate That Some Challenges Experienced During 
the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Could be Reduced 
 
On the basis of the findings from pharmacy executive interviews, a new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing may be able to resolve a number of 
                                                 
11
See section 319F-3 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d) 
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the problems encountered during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (Table 9).   
Improvements such as faster drug distribution, reducing burden on public health, 
improving visibility and tracking antivirals, minimization of medication shortages, and 
reduction of other challenges could lead to an improved emergency response.  
Table 9.  Potential for New Method of Antiviral (AV) Distribution and Dispensing to 
Solve or Reduce Key Antiviral Distribution and Dispensing Problems Encountered 
During the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
 
Key AV dispensing 
problems faced during the 
2009 H1N1 pandemica 
On the basis of key informant interviews, 
could the new method of AV distribution and 
dispensing solve or reduce the problem? 
Tracking AVs Yes. The system used today by pharmaceutical 
distributors and pharmacies will be likely able to capture 
almost real-time data about inventory and antivirals 
regimens dispensed. Receipt of this information could 
be negotiated with manufacturers and distributors as 
part of the new method of distribution and dispensing to 
assure that federal, state and local public health 
authorities can monitor antiviral inventories and 
dispensing. 
State & local health department 
storage/dispensing issues and 
state & local health department 
staffing problems to manage 
antivirals 
Yes. This new method minimizes the burden on public 
health for antiviral distribution and dispensing and will 
reduce the number of antivirals that state and local 
health departments have to manage. Also, fewer public 
health staff will be needed to manage antivirals for this 
new method. 
Lack of visibility of commercial 
supply chain 
Yes. The system used today by pharmaceutical 
distributors and pharmacies will be able to provide data 
regarding inventory of commercial supplies of antivirals. 
This reporting could be negotiated with distributors as 
part of the new method of distribution and dispensing. 
Legal concerns about transporting 
antivirals and providing antivirals 
from state health departments to 
pharmacies
b
   
Likely. States will not be tasked with distributing 
antivirals to pharmacies.  Under the new system, 
pharmacies will receive antivirals as they usually do, 
from distributors and/or through their company 
warehouses. 
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Key AV dispensing 
problems faced during the 
2009 H1N1 pandemica 
On the basis of key informant interviews, 
could the new method of AV distribution and 
dispensing solve or reduce the problem? 
Pandemic scenario used for 
planning did not match that 
experienced during actual 2009 
H1N1 response 
Uncertain. Current planning needs to be flexible for a 
variety of future pandemic scenarios. 
Shortage of some types of AVs 
and “spot” shortages in some 
locations 
Uncertain. The new system is likely to minimize 
shortages as it will run on a reliable supply/demand 
model that has been used for years by pharmacies and 
distributors. However, this new method cannot prevent 
shortages of antivirals from government stockpiles. 
Communications between state 
and local health departments 
about logistics of antiviral 
stockpile delivery and distribution 
plans 
Uncertain. Clear communication about antiviral 
deliveries between different levels of public health may 
not be affected by a new method of distribution and 
dispensing, but this new method minimizes the load on 
public health for antiviral distribution and dispensing and 
may reduce the number of antivirals that state and local 
health departments have to manage. 
Delays in treatment of ill persons 
related to availability of medication 
Uncertain. This method may improve availability of 
antivirals but delays in treatment due to unavailability of 
the medication could arise. 
Lack of clear communication 
between state and local health 
departments and between public 
health and dispensing partners 
about protocols for antiviral use  
No. Clear communication about antiviral use between 
different levels of public health may not be affected by a 
new method of distribution and dispensing. 
Unclear/changing federal 
guidance about use of AVs 
No. Changing Federal guidance is likely in the next 
pandemic as key information will not be known when 
decisions for deploying antivirals need to be made. 
Note.  AV = antiviral 
a
These are the challenges that emerged from the literature review conducted for this dissertation; 
please see Chapter 2, Table 4.  
b
Four states required local health departments to obtain distributor 
licenses to transport antivirals during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and two states had concerns  or 
potential  legal issues that slowed distribution to pharmacies. 
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Limitations of Methods and Findings 
There are potential limitations related to the methods employed and the 
findings derived from this research.  Experts in qualitative research caution that the 
methods used for ensuring validity and reliability for quantitative research do not 
apply to qualitative research (Creswell, 2009).  In alignment with the principles of 
qualitative research, participants for this study were purposefully selected from a list 
of the largest U.S. pharmacy companies and from a list of independent pharmacies 
(Creswell, 2009).  These executives were intentionally invited to participate because 
their views were judged to be the best in addressing the research question.  
Qualitative research is not designed to be representative of a larger population, and 
generalizability is not typically a goal of qualitative research, as every case is 
thought to be unique.  The unique views of these particular executives from large 
companies were sought for this research because participation of their pharmacies 
would likely be needed to implement this new method.  Experts advise that 
interviewees should have “a variety of perspectives”  and “should be experienced 
and knowledgeable” in the interview content area (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, pp. 67, 64).  
However, the reader will appreciate that the views of these participants may differ 
from those of other pharmacy executives in other companies.   
Additionally, the number of participants for this study was small (n=9).  The 
data collected from the participants nevertheless reached “saturation” on all areas of 
inquiry (e.g., no further new concepts or ideas were emerging), and there were few 
differences between the perspectives of pharmacy executives from large companies 
and those of independent pharmacies (Creswell, 2007).  As previously mentioned, 
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the participants’ companies constitute almost one half (approximately 46%) of all 
U.S. pharmacies.   
The principal researcher took several steps to ensure that consistent 
interviewing, data collection, and analytic approaches were used.  First, the 
investigator printed out an interview guide to use for each interview and was 
consistent in the wording for each question posed to the participants.  After the data 
were collected, the researcher created notes for each interview.  Both Gibbs (2007) 
and Yin (2003) describe procedures to enhance “qualitative reliability,” including (a) 
reviewing transcripts for errors (this was accomplished after listening to the audio 
recording of each interview and ensuring that the written transcript documented the 
interview verbatim), and (b) ensuring consistency in coding each transcript (this was 
accomplished by developing and adhering to a colored text coding scheme and by 
iteratively comparing coded data for all transcripts on each key issue to ensure 
consistency).  To assure the reader that the researcher interpreted the findings 
correctly (and to add richness to the summary of findings), numerous direct 
quotations were used in the Results section of this dissertation to provide the reader 
with the participants’ actual responses. 
Credibility (“believability”) of the findings was enhanced by triangulation 
(Creswell, 2009; Rubin & Rubin, 2005); that is, the information given by the 
interviewees was assumed to be truthful because the findings of this research 
closely aligned with the findings of similar work (with different participants) on the 
same topic (SteelFisher et al., 2012, unpublished findings from the HSPH 
pharmacist’s poll).  Angen (2000) describes validation of qualitative findings as a 
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“judgment of the trustworthiness” (p. 387) of the research, meaning the veracity of 
the findings can be enhanced by careful consideration and articulation of the 
research question, by carrying out inquiry in a respectful manner, and by having a 
dialogue of the findings with participants.  The principal researcher often repeated 
statements the participants made and summarized key findings provided by each 
participant to make sure that what was heard by the researcher was what was 
meant by the participant.  Finally, the researcher understood that qualitative 
research relies on the researcher’s ability to listen carefully to the participant’s 
perspectives—to be able to capture their views, feelings, and perceptions—rather 
than “…imposing the researcher’s views that might distort the ideas of the 
participants” (Holloway & Wheeler, 2010, p. 6). 
Other authors describe the importance of “self-reflection” as a key method of 
qualitative research validation (Creswell, 2007, 2009; Rubin & Rubin, 2005; Saldaña, 
2009).  In qualitative research, the meaning that results from interaction with 
participants is derived through the lens of the researcher; therefore, explication of 
researcher bias concerning how interpretation of findings may influence the results is 
needed.  
Admittedly, the principal researcher has a vested interest in the outcome of 
this study, as it is part of her work portfolio at CDC.  In addition, the investigator had 
met and previously worked with five of the nine participants (all of these were from 
large pharmacy companies).  Therefore, most of the participants knew the 
researcher, and this familiarity could have affected their responses.  The researcher 
took precautions to curb her feelings and interests during the interviews, specifically 
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telling participants that she did not know if this new method would be acceptable or 
eventually implemented, and she diligently let participants talk without “coaching” 
their answers.  The researcher reported the research findings honestly (without 
consciously inserting the researcher’s opinion) to minimize bias.  However, there is 
always a possibility that the investigator subconsciously inserted findings that were 
not expressed, misinterpreted what the executives said, and/or used incorrect 
coding to analyze and interpret the data.   
In defense of using a qualitative approach, one of the most important findings 
from this research (i.e., the overwhelming view of pharmacies as community 
stakeholders) could not have been predicted in advance of these interviews and may 
not have emerged if a quantitative design had been employed.  Qualitative research 
is founded on the “emic perspective,” that is, a focus on learning about a 
participant’s perspectives in how they see the world and the notion that participants 
can best describe their perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs in their own words (Harris, 
1976).  Through use of a qualitative approach, the “voice” of these influential 
pharmacy executives was heard and their views recorded so that their concerns can 
be meaningfully considered as the research findings inform future planning and 
implementation of a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing. 
There may also be limitations regarding the data collected from the 
participants.  First, the executives may not have been candid about their opinions.  
They may have said what they thought the researcher wanted to hear instead of 
their true feelings.  Although the participants could not see the researcher’s facial 
expressions and body language in these telephone interviews, the researcher 
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carefully modulated her tone of voice and reactions to the executives’ statements to 
encourage the participants to fully share their perspectives. Second, the participants 
may have not fully disclosed their views of the possible risks with this new method of 
antiviral distribution and dispensing, leaving out critical information that would be 
needed by planners.  Third, there may be a difference between what the executives 
say they will do in the interview and future actions they may take.  Finally, the views 
of these executives may not accurately reflect decisions that other leaders in their 
companies may take during a future pandemic, and therefore, may not reflect the 
ultimate decisions that their companies will make for participation in this new method 
of antiviral distribution and dispensing during a pandemic.
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS AND PLAN FOR 
CHANGE 
 
No one can predict when the next influenza pandemic will occur. However, a 
future pandemic, particularly a severe one, would likely affect most populations in 
the United States and around the world, and many people could become ill and die.  
Fortunately, there is no influenza pandemic anywhere in the world at the time of the 
writing of this dissertation.  As federal emergency planners, CDC and HHS have the 
opportunity and obligation now to look back to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, identify 
problems and issues with the response, develop solutions to improve future 
responses, and take actions to do so.  Rapid and efficient distribution and 
dispensing of antiviral drugs to ill people will be a critical component of a future 
pandemic response.  According to a recently published report by HHS, “challenges 
associated with antiviral drug utilization, allocation, and dispensing” (DHHS, 2012, p. 
19) were noted during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, as well as the inability to monitor 
the distribution, inventory, and utilization of these drugs.  Therefore, HHS has 
identified improving the distribution and dispensing of antivirals drugs as a priority for 
CDC action (DHHS, 2012).12  
                                                 
12
The broad concept for an improved antiviral distribution and dispensing model met the December 
2012 timeframe included in the HHS document for this task.  However, HHS has extended the 
deadline for the overall project to June 2013 to allow for development of an operational plan. 
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This dissertation research is part of a larger effort started by CDC in 2011 to 
assess the acceptability and feasibility of a new antiviral distribution and dispensing 
approach (see Appendix A for a timeline and list of project activities).  As part of her 
job responsibilities at CDC, the researcher initiated this project and serves as the co-
lead for this effort.  CDC and HHS leaders are aware of this dissertation research, 
and the findings will be used to inform operational planning that will begin in early 
2013.  The needs and priorities articulated by the pharmacy executives will be 
carefully considered; at the same time, the needs and priorities articulated by state 
and local public health authorities, pharmacists, and the public (ascertained through 
separate investigations) will also be incorporated into an action plan.  This chapter 
describes the next steps toward the development of an operations plan.  If that 
proposed antiviral distribution and dispensing plan is found to be acceptable and 
feasible by CDC/HHS leaders, then it will be vetted for adoption in summer / early 
fall,  2013 (Figure 7).   
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Figure 7.  Change in pandemic antiviral distribution and dispensing 
operations will be dependent on acceptability and feasibility of this new 
approach.  
 
Potential Impact of Research Findings 
 The findings from this research have immediate potential utility to influence 
U.S. government pandemic preparedness operations (and perhaps changes in 
policy) in three ways: 
First, these dissertation findings will influence a redesign of the method of 
SNS antiviral distribution and dispensing for the nation during a future pandemic. 
The new method will include a larger role for pharmacies as primary dispensers of 
antivirals.  Some SNS antivirals will also be sent to state health departments during 
a future pandemic, but it is probable that far fewer antiviral regimens will be sent to 
public health locations compared to distributors and pharmacies.  
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 Second, a redesign of the way antivirals are distributed and dispensed may 
reduce the burden on public health and reduce some of the challenges faced by 
public health officials during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (see Table 9).  It is likely that 
ongoing state and local budget cuts and ongoing economic challenges will continue 
to constrain public health department resources and staff.  If pharmacies can serve 
as primary dispensers of antivirals, state and local public health may have less strain 
on their resources during a pandemic response, and this method may be more 
effective in ensuring that the population has timely access to these medicines. 
 Third, this new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing may inform 
models for countermeasure distribution and dispensing for other public health 
emergencies (e.g., an anthrax attack).  If this new approach is deemed to be 
acceptable and feasible, then it could be considered by CDC as a model for other 
public health emergencies that require the targeted treatment of ill persons.  
However, further research and exploration would be needed to assess if this method 
would be suitable for other public health emergencies that require mass prophylaxis 
of a large proportion of a community. 
Next Steps: Plan for Change 
 A number of steps must be undertaken to create a new method of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing, incorporating this dissertation’s research findings into 
the process.  First, several information gaps need to be filled.  Second, several 
options for the new model will be developed.  These options will be carefully 
evaluated for feasibility and acceptability, and the pros and cons of each approach 
will be identified.  Ongoing discussions with state and local health departments need 
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to continue as options are explored.  Each model will also be examined for needed 
policy changes, if that model is adopted.  Finally, an operational plan will be 
developed by a CDC cross-functional team for stakeholder vetting and CDC/HHS 
leadership approval.  Leadership principles and strategies for change will be 
employed to optimize the work of this team toward bringing about an acceptable and 
feasible operational plan and stakeholder engagement plan. 
Filling Information Gaps  
 Findings from this dissertation research suggest at least three areas for 
further study that will be needed (within a short period of time) to inform 
development of an operational plan.  First, to ensure that the voices of independent 
pharmacies are well understood; further discussions with executives of these less-
networked and/or smaller pharmacies may be warranted.  Although the views of 
executives from large and independent pharmacy companies gathered in this 
dissertation research were closely aligned, other executives from independent 
pharmacies in other parts of the country may have different views of a new method.  
Because independent pharmacies represent a substantial proportion of U.S. 
community pharmacies and in some states, are the predominant type of pharmacy, 
their voices need to be heard to inform planning (NCPA, 2012).  This can be 
accomplished by communicating with key executives (and members) of 
organizations that represent independent pharmacies. 
 Second, more information is needed from pharmaceutical distributors and 
antiviral manufacturers regarding their views of potential new methods of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing.  Although CDC released a Request for Information (RFI) 
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to pharmaceutical distributors in summer of 2011 to gather their feedback on this 
idea (CDC, 2011a), and several positive responses were received, no further 
discussions with pharmaceutical distributors have taken place since that time.  
Moreover, CDC has not yet engaged with antiviral manufacturers about potential 
models for a new method and would benefit from their views. 
 Finally, a cost analysis should be conducted to compare the government’s 
costs related to the current plans for pandemic antiviral distribution and dispensing 
with any new method.  The direct and indirect costs and any potential cost-savings 
and efficiencies gained from a new model will likely influence decisions made about 
adopting a new process in this era of governmental cost constraints. 
 All three of these further investigations to fill information gaps will be 
incorporated into an action plan going forward (Table 10, p. 134). 
Exploring Options for a New Method of Antiviral Dispensing and 
Distribution 
Before an operational plan can be developed, decisions must be made and 
approved by CDC leadership regarding which model to pursue.  Two concepts have 
emerged for a new antiviral distribution and dispensing method.  Information given to 
the participants during the interviews included that there would be no costs to the 
pharmacy for antivirals, based on the working concept of the new method at the time 
of the interviews (April – June, 2012).  To summarize this method, SNS-stockpiled 
antivirals would be provided to a selected number of distributors (the method for 
determining which distributors has not been developed), who would then distribute to 
their usual pharmacy customers by their usual methods (see Figure 2).  If this model 
is used, there is a risk that smaller, independent pharmacies may not be included in 
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the distribution scheme.  Since over half of independent pharmacies are located in 
rural areas, these communities may be underserved if only distributors that serve 
large pharmacies are selected for inclusion (NCPA, 2012).  Because the antivirals 
have already been purchased by the federal government, there would be no charge 
for the product to pharmaceutical distributors, and they could not charge pharmacies 
for the medicine.  Likewise, pharmacies would not charge patients who had a 
prescription for the drug.  However, pharmacies could charge a usual dispensing fee 
(that will probably be capped at some benchmark level).  If patients have insurance 
or other third party coverage for prescription drugs, then the dispensing fee could be 
(theoretically) billed to that entity.   
However, after data from the pharmacy executives were collected, in 
November 2012, another concept was proposed for exploration.  This model 
includes SNS providing antivirals directly to the antiviral manufacturers, similar to the 
way the U.S. government’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) operates (DOE, 
2012).  As background, the SPR was established in the aftermath of the 1973–1974 
Arab oil embargo and serves as an emergency response tool for the U.S. 
government to ensure the availability of oil and gas in the United States in the event 
of disruptions in commercial petroleum supplies.  During a shortfall in commercial 
petroleum supplies, the U.S. president or the secretary of the Department of Energy 
can authorize "loans" from the SPR to commercial firms experiencing shortages.  
After the event that created the shortfall has resolved, these companies repay SPR 
for the loan by providing replacement petroleum that is of a similar quality to that 
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which was loaned, along with additional barrels of oil (paid in lieu of interest), within 
a specified time.  
As previously stated, antiviral medicines are seldom used during the regular 
influenza seasons; hence, large quantities of these drugs are not routinely available 
in pharmaceutical supply chains or in pharmacies.  During the 2009 H1N1 
pandemic, commercial supplies of adult dosage antivirals remained available 
throughout the year-long outbreak and were never exhausted.  However, during a 
future pandemic that is more severe than the 2009 pandemic (as severe as the 1957 
pandemic, or worse), it is probable that the commercial supply of antivirals would be 
exhausted very quickly, and that stockpiled antivirals would be needed to treat ill 
persons.  
Analogous to  the way the SPR operates, under a pandemic scenario, SNS 
antivirals would be “loaned” to manufacturers (whose supplies of antivirals are 
exhausted or are likely to be depleted within a short period of time) who in turn, 
would sell those antivirals to distributors that are their usual customers (and perhaps 
to new distributor customers as well).13  These distributors would in turn, sell the 
antivirals to their usual pharmacy customers, and patients would purchase the 
medication at pharmacies the same way that they obtain other prescription 
medicines.  Patients would then pay a product cost as well as a dispensing fee to 
the pharmacy.  Patients with health insurance that includes pharmacy coverage 
would theoretically have some or all of these fees offset by third party coverage. 
Figure 8 illustrates how this “strategic stockpile” concept might work. 
                                                 
13
Theoretically the antiviral manufacturers would then replace the “loaned” antivirals back to the SNS 
at some future point in time along with an additional quantity of antivirals that would serve as interest. 
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Figure 8.  Strategic Petroleum Reserve concept applied to SNS-stockpiled 
antivirals for a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing during an 
influenza pandemic.  
 
This alternative concept merits further exploration for feasibility and 
acceptability for CDC and affected stakeholders, particularly with state and local 
public health.  It replicates the usual way that pharmaceutical products are 
distributed and dispensed every day in the United States.  Therefore, this new 
concept may resonate with pharmacy executives, as it could resolve the three top 
risks identified by interviewees. The process (a) would not add complexity, as it 
won’t deviate from usual pharmacy processes; (b) would not limit the number of 
pharmacies that receive antivirals (and thus may minimize the potential for 
uneven/unfair distribution of product among pharmacies); and (c) would involve no 
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new billing processes, as patient billing would be identical to that of everyday 
pharmacy practice.  It will be important to engage pharmacy executives to learn their 
views about this model if it is considered for a new method of antiviral distribution 
and dispensing,   
Notwithstanding the alignment of the SPR model with usual pharmacy 
practices and the possible reduction of risks for pharmacy companies, it has the 
potential for creating a significant risk for patients.  This model would entail charging 
patients both a fee for the antiviral14  and a pharmacy dispensing fee, which could 
create a barrier for some ill or indigent persons.  Although more people will be 
covered under some form of health insurance in the near future through the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act in 2014,  it is unknown at this time how 
much of the population will remain without insurance for medications (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2012).  In conformity with ethical guidelines specifically developed for 
a pandemic influenza response by CDC’s Ethics Subcommittee of the Advisory 
Committee to the Director (Kinlaw, Barrett, & Levine, 2009), the distribution of goods 
during a pandemic should be conducted in a way that is fair, refrains from harming 
or injuring people and communities, and ensures equal opportunity to access the 
resources (within specified at-risk groups if needed).  Distribution should not follow 
the principle “to each according to purchasing power” (Kinlaw et al., 2009, p. S189).  
It will be crucial to discuss these concepts with state and local public health 
colleagues to solicit their input, suggestions and concerns. Ongoing work by CDC, 
informed by its partners and stakeholders, is needed to define the best model and to 
                                                 
14
In 2013, the retail costs for oseltamivir are over $100 per regimen, and the retail costs for zanamivir 
range from $60 to $70 per inhaler. Source: http://www.goodrx.com/  
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explore how to minimize cost barriers for those who are uninsured or underinsured.  
The findings from this dissertation research will inform the assessment of these 
models. 
Potential Implications for Policy Change 
Although a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing (if adopted) 
would be a change in operations for CDC and state/local public health officials, it is 
still uncertain if it will create the need for a change in HHS/CDC’s pandemic 
preparedness and response policies.  Policy changes that may be needed include 
approval to utilize SNS stockpiled antivirals as a “strategic reserve” for 
manufacturers during a pandemic, as the SNS product would be bought and sold on 
the marketplace. Currently, CDC states on its website that “the medicine in the SNS 
is FREE for everyone” (CDC, 2012, para. 2).  It is unknown if this type of policy 
change would be acceptable and feasible.  In addition, the statute that authorizes 
SNS must be examined to see if this method would be allowable (Federal-State 
Cooperation, 2009). 
Another policy change could be required if this new method necessitates a 
different way of antiviral allocation to the states.  At this time, SNS assets are 
simultaneously allocated to states on the basis of population size (i.e., pro rata).  It is 
unknown if a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing would require a 
different allocation model.  Policy changes of these types would require senior level 
CDC, HHS, and interagency approval. 
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Plan for Change: Developing an Operational Plan 
To establish a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing during a 
future pandemic, a detailed operational plan is needed.  After that plan is developed, 
it will go through an approval process by CDC and HHS leadership. After a final 
model is approved, a number of strategies must be brought to bear to make a 
change in national, state, and local antiviral distribution and dispensing pandemic 
plans.  CDC leaders are aware that the process of change must be carefully planned 
and deliberately executed to optimize the chances for success.   
Leadership Principles 
A number of leadership principles must be employed for the successful 
development and implementation of an operational plan for a new method of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing.  The National Public Health Leadership Network’s 
“Public Health Leadership Competency Framework” (Wright et al., 2000) outlines 
several competencies  that will be needed by CDC leaders as they endeavor to 
promulgate a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing (including skills in 
team leadership, negotiation, marketing and education, and the use of ethical 
influence to bring about change).  
The immediate next step in this effort is to assemble a cross-functional CDC 
project team to take these dissertation research findings (and the results of other 
project exploratory efforts) and create a path forward.  The team will comprise 
representatives from several offices at CDC and will be tasked with creating an 
operational plan for a new method of pandemic antiviral distribution and dispensing.  
This cross-functional project team will be assembled for a specific, time-limited 
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purpose (Cohen & Bailey, 1997) and will “require the efforts of multiple leaders” 
(Yukl, 2010, p. 345).  Although the researcher will co-lead this team, she will not 
have direct line authority over the members.  Therefore, the team members’ usual 
leaders will also need to be engaged to reinforce the process of the team.  In 
addition, the researcher will “…seek to influence and activate change well above and 
beyond established lines of [her formal role in] decision-making and control” 
(Marcus, Ashkenazi, Dorn, & Henderson, 2007, p. 3) and use principles of “meta-
leadership” to ensure team functionality and productivity (Marcus et al., 2007; 
Marcus, Dorn, Ashkenazi, Henderson, & McNulty, 2012).  Because altering the way 
that the SNS operates regarding the distribution and dispensing of antivirals is a 
pivotal change, the principles of “transformational leadership” will also be needed to 
accomplish this goal.  As Bass and Aviolio (1994) explain, a transformational leader 
offers followers something more than just working for self gain; he or she provides 
followers with an inspiring mission and vision, encourages them to see their work 
from a new perspective, and motivates followers to look beyond their self-interests 
and focus on the goals and priorities of the group.  This theory is applicable, as the 
CDC team that will develop the operational plan will be selected from several offices 
at CDC, each with its own priorities and work style.   
Finally, several leadership strategies for optimizing cross-functional teams as 
articulated by Barry (1991) and Yukl (2010) will need to be employed, namely 
envisioning, organizing, social integrating, and external spanning.  
Envisioning entails articulating a vision for the team’s work that will inspire 
team members’ commitment.  Most of the team members are aware of the problems 
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encountered during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and have some “skin in the game” (as 
part of their ongoing job duties) to improving the process.  The researcher and the 
team co-lead (who is the direct supervisor of several team members) will need to 
engage team members in a participatory goal-setting process and create an 
environment to allow “safe” discussion of assumptions and mental models, and 
promote brainstorming and dialogue so that innovative ideas can emerge (Sagie, 
1996).  In particular, details of the two models under exploration need to be fleshed 
out and presented to CDC leadership for approval before an operational plan can be 
developed. 
Organizing the team’s schedule and function will need to occur in rapid 
fashion.  Because of the short time frame for producing an operational plan, the 
leaders should use a highly directive team leadership style and incorporate a 
participative-focused approach to maximize team productivity and minimize conflicts 
between team member values (Klein, Knight, Ziegert, Lim, & Saltz, 2011). 
The team leaders will use a facilitating approach to ensure that team 
members are socially integrated.  The co-leads for this team will need to 
encourage mutual trust, open communication, and team cohesion.  As the 
“personality” of the group emerges, the leaders may need to use a flexible approach 
and shift leadership behavior to align accordingly (Barry, 1991). 
Finally, an external spanning approach will be critical to ensure that the 
team’s decisions and processes are compatible with that of external stakeholders.  
Although CDC (with concurrence from HHS) has both the legitimate power and 
authority (Yukl, 2010) to make these changes in SNS operations and pandemic 
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policy, it would be unwise to unilaterally change the method of antiviral distribution 
and dispensing without incorporating the feedback and participation from key 
stakeholders.  
Stakeholder Engagement 
The principles of stakeholder engagement serve as a critical underpinning for 
this dissertation research.  Identifying and including participation from “key players, 
power brokers, and stakeholders” will be essential to the successful implementation 
of a new antiviral distribution and dispensing process (Kotter, 1995; Wright et al., 
2000).  Establishing public/private partnerships at all levels (local, state, and 
national) will likely enhance a future pandemic response (Paige et al., 2010).  
Stakeholders’ beliefs, values, perceptions, needs, trust of the change agent, and 
motivation for action will meaningfully influence the outcome of a change process 
that directly affects them (Straker, 2010).  In alignment with these leadership and 
change theory principles, CDC planners have engaged multiple stakeholders from 
the beginning of this exploratory effort to ensure widespread support, particularly 
with state and local public health organizations and their members (Kotter, 1995).  
Because the new method envisions pharmacies serving as the predominant frontline 
dispensers of antivirals during a pandemic, this dissertation research focused on the 
views of pharmacy executives.  However, additional stakeholder feedback and buy-
in are also critical for success.  Public health officials and key public health 
organizations such as ASTHO and NACCHO play pivotal roles in pandemic 
response, and they and their members (state and local public health authorities) will 
be affected by a change in the method of distributing and dispensing antivirals.  
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Therefore, they have been involved as collaborators with CDC in the exploration of 
this new method from the beginning of the effort and have provided ongoing input 
and feedback on the pros and cons of new approaches.  Pharmacist and pharmacy 
company support for a new method are paramount to the success of this effort.  
Discussions with state boards of pharmacy will be needed as part of planning as 
well. These and other stakeholders will be affected by a change in the way that 
antivirals are distributed and dispensed during a pandemic, and their overlapping 
and sometimes conflicting needs must be considered as a change in operations is 
evaluated.  
Principles of Change 
Although Kotter’s work (1995) refers largely to organizational change, his 
advice that change is a “process” and not a singular outcome, is relevant to changes 
in important multi-stakeholder operations.  Leadership principles must be used along 
with change strategies, as Kotter advises “change, by definition, requires creating a 
new system, which in turn always demands leadership” (p. 60).  The next steps for 
this process are outlined in Table 10 and are guided by applicable principles from 
leadership theories, (primarily from the Public Health Leadership Competency 
Framework developed by the National Public Health Leadership Network [Wright et 
al., 2000]) and change strategies (primarily from Kotter, 1995). 
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Table 10.  Developing a New Method of Antiviral Distribution and Dispensing During an Influenza Pandemic: Plan for 
Change and Action Steps Informed by Selected Leadership Principles and Kotter’s Steps for Leading Change  
 
Kotter’s
a
 steps 
for leading 
change  
Applicable principles 
from leadership theories 
Action steps for proposed                          
change in pandemic antiviral              
distribution and dispensing 
Timeframe for action 
 
Establish a 
sense of 
urgency 
 
 
 
Literature review findings 
of problems during 2009 
H1N1 pandemic 
 
HHS 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Improvement Plan.   
 
Interorganizational 
collaborating mechanisms 
(Wright et al., 2000) 
 
 Engage senior leaders at CDC as project 
champions to share the urgency of creating a 
new antiviral distribution and dispensing model 
(per HHS tasking). 
 Ensure that key CDC leaders in operational 
divisions are committed to exploring a new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing. 
 Provide multiple opportunities for external 
stakeholder engagement in identification of the 
problem and need for solutions. 
 Conduct multiple activities to explore the 
feasibility and acceptability of using 
pharmacies as primary dispensers of antivirals 
during a pandemic (including this dissertation 
research). 
 
 
 
DONE (April 2011 to present) 
 
Form a 
powerful 
guiding 
coalition  
 
 
Network Theory 
(Granovetter, 1973) 
 
Empower “central 
connectors” that can 
provide support to key 
concepts of planning with 
critical internal stakeholders 
(Cross & Prusak, 2002) 
 
 
 
 Rapidly establish a multidisciplinary CDC 
operational development team. 
 Select team members with content expertise, 
experience with formulating and executing 
operational plans, who have connections to 
plan influencers, and who will directly be 
responsible for execution of the plan. 
 
 
 
1st Quarter, 2013 
 
CDC team will be identified, assembled, 
and will explore the feasibility, 
acceptability, and pros and cons of 
potential new models. 
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Kotter’s
a
 steps 
for leading 
change  
Applicable principles 
from leadership theories 
Action steps for proposed                          
change in pandemic antiviral              
distribution and dispensing 
Timeframe for action 
 
Team building 
competencies (Wright et 
al., 2000) 
 
Yukl’s principles of leading 
a functional team (2010) 
 
Meta-leadership principle 
of “extending one's 
influence and 
accomplishment beyond 
one's formal bounds of 
authority to create 
productive connectivity.” 
(Marcus et al., 2007) 
 
 
 Ensure responsive, connected, and proactive 
team leadership. 
 Establish defined team goals, processes, and 
milestones. 
 Immediately explore the pros and cons of 
potential new antiviral distribution and 
dispensing models. 
 CDC leaders will delegate authority to team to 
work across the organization. 
 In collaboration with ASTHO and NACCHO, 
continue to discuss key issues with public 
health officials and provide periodic input and 
feedback to team outputs. 
 Continue to engage other key stakeholders.  
 Provide updates of team accomplishments and 
milestones to CDC leadership 
 
 
 
CDC will engage stakeholders that have 
not yet provided extensive input in a 
discussion of operational plan options to  
assess feasibility of execution (e.g., state 
boards of pharmacy, pharmacy 
distributors, and antiviral manufacturers). 
 
CDC will engage pharmacy partners in 
discussions of feasibility of various 
options under consideration. 
 
CDC will discuss team progress and key 
findings with ASTHO and NACCHO. 
 
 
Creating a 
vision 
(creating a 
strategy) 
 
Sense of mission (Wright 
et al., 2000) 
 
Visionary leadership 
(Wright et al., 2000) 
 
 
 Alternative models/options for a new method of 
antiviral dispensing and distribution will be 
identified. 
 Models developed for consideration going 
forward will balance the needs of key 
stakeholders. 
 CDC leadership will determine best model for 
which to build an operational plan. 
 Operational plan development aligns with the 
vision and goals set for the process. 
 
 
 
2nd Quarter, 2013 
 
CDC team will explore the advantages, 
risks, and barriers of models under 
investigation; ascertain resources needed 
for implementation of each method; 
complete a cost analysis; identify any 
relevant policy changes that may be 
associated with each model; and share 
the findings with CDC leaders. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1
3
6
 
Kotter’s
a
 steps 
for leading 
change  
Applicable principles 
from leadership theories 
Action steps for proposed                          
change in pandemic antiviral              
distribution and dispensing 
Timeframe for action 
 Continued stakeholder engagement. 
 Provide updates of team accomplishments and 
milestones to CDC leadership. 
 
CDC team will make its recommendation 
to CDC leaders regarding the best 
approach for a new method of antiviral 
distribution and dispensing, and a 
decision about which model to pursue will 
be made. 
 
CDC leaders will present operational 
team findings and CDC decision to HHS 
leaders and plan for any policy changes 
that may result from this new model.  
 
 
 
 
Communicating 
the vision 
 
 
Effective change agent 
(Wright et al., 2000) 
 
Communicate effectively 
to translate mission and 
vision into action (Wright 
et al., 2000) 
 
Leading cross-agency 
connectivity/meta-
leadership principle of 
strategically and 
intentionally devising 
cross-silo linkages 
(Marcus et al., 2007) 
 
 
 
 Continued and iterative stakeholder 
engagement will enable CDC to “tell the story” 
and articulate rationale for new approach 
including a thorough discussion of the pros 
and cons. 
 Use multiple strategies to “get the word out”.  
 Key clinical influencers (such as ASTHO, 
NACCHO, and pharmacy organizations) will 
be briefed and will be asked to communicate 
their endorsement of this strategy to their 
members. 
 
 
3rd Quarter, 2013 
CDC will brief other HHS and interagency 
leaders to engender their support for this 
new approach. 
 
CDC will brief ASTHO, NACCHO, and 
pharmacy organization partners and their 
members about new model of antiviral 
dispensing and distribution through the 
use of face-to-face meetings, webinars, 
conference calls, and conference 
presentations. 
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Kotter’s
a
 steps 
for leading 
change  
Applicable principles 
from leadership theories 
Action steps for proposed                          
change in pandemic antiviral              
distribution and dispensing 
Timeframe for action 
 
Empowering 
others to act on 
the vision 
 
Use principles of social 
marketing and incentives 
(Wright et al., 2000) 
 
Encourage nontraditional 
ideas, activities, and 
actions for implementation 
(Kotter, 1995) 
 
 CDC leaders will attempt to reduce obstacles 
for change including identifying perverse or 
unintended outcomes that may result from this 
new antiviral distribution and dispensing 
strategy.   
 Stakeholders will be encouraged to contribute 
“best practices” in developing pandemic plans 
that incorporate this new approach. 
 
3rd Quarter, 2013 
CDC will develop new recommendations 
for state and local public health 
departments as they adapt their pandemic 
plans to the new approach. 
 
ASTHO, NACCHO, and pharmacy 
organizations will communicate with 
members their support for this approach 
and provide tools for use in adopting this 
new model. 
 
 
 
 
Plan for and 
create short-
term wins 
 
Understanding of 
organizational 
dynamics (Wright et al., 
2000) 
 
Recognize and reward 
actions towards 
implementation (Kotter, 
1995)  
 
 
 CDC leaders will develop relevant incentives 
to encourage uptake for this new strategy. 
 CDC leaders will be open to midcourse 
corrections if needed. 
 CDC, in collaboration with ASTHO and 
NACCHO, will provide templates for tabletop 
exercises using the new approach. 
 
4th Quarter, 2013 
CDC will develop incentives for state and 
local public health agencies to develop 
tabletop exercises that incorporate this 
new approach.  
 
CDC will work with ASTHO and NACCHO 
as they develop “just-in-time” training 
modules for the new approach. 
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Kotter’s
a
 steps 
for leading 
change  
Applicable principles 
from leadership theories 
Action steps for proposed                          
change in pandemic antiviral              
distribution and dispensing 
Timeframe for action 
 
Consolidate 
improvements 
and produce 
more change 
 
Sustaining change 
(Goodfellow, 1985) 
 
 CDC leaders will continue to engage 
stakeholders and use change strategies to 
reinforce this new approach and ensure its 
adoption at all levels. 
 CDC leaders will plan for resistance and 
develop strategies to overcome resistance 
 CDC leaders will fully incorporate this new 
approach in CDC pandemic preparedness 
plans 
 
 
 
1st Quarter, 2014 
CDC will incorporate this new approach in 
CDC’s pandemic “operational plan” and 
include this method in its internal full-
scale pandemic exercises to be held in 
March 2014.   
 
 
Institutionalize 
new 
approaches 
 
Articulating 
connections between 
new approach and 
planning going forward 
(Kotter, 1995) 
 
 CDC will expect that this new antiviral 
approach will be incorporated into state 
pandemic plans. 
 
2nd Quarter, 2014 
CDC will fully institute this new method of 
antivirals distribution and dispensing into 
guidance to state and local public health 
agencies and will monitor the uptake in 
this strategy. 
 
a 
Kotter’s steps for leading change are found in “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” by J. P. Kotter, 1995, Harvard Business 
Review Onpoint, pp. 1–10. 
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Resources Needed  
 Certainly personnel, and probably financial resources, will be needed to both 
develop and execute a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing.  CDC 
staff time will be needed to develop an operational plan, vet it with stakeholders, and 
present it to CDC leadership for decision-making.  Once decisions have been made 
for the model to pursue, a dedicated workforce in several offices at CDC will need to 
work together to integrate the new plan into CDC’s and state and local public health 
pandemic planning.  It is uncertain if any monetary resources will be needed in the 
short-term to support engagement with commercial partners.  Discussions with 
pharmaceutical distributors and antiviral manufacturers can explore how much, if 
any, additional financial resources would be needed at the time of a pandemic to 
facilitate the operations of this new method.  In addition, just-in-time funds may be 
needed during a future pandemic to support this effort and should be incorporated 
into ongoing planning. 
Evaluation of the Plan for Change 
 As part of the development of the operational plan for a new method of 
antiviral distribution and dispensing, an evaluation plan will be created that can 
measure whether milestones have been reached in the development process of the 
operational plan.  Acceptability and feasibility remain as key components for 
evaluation.  This may be accomplished by reengaging stakeholders, conducting 
exercises or simulations to test plans, executing contractual arrangements with 
commercial entities, and resolving key outstanding issues, such as methods of 
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financing the new method and assuring that financial barriers to the public are 
reduced. 
Ultimately, a plan will need to be developed to measure the effectiveness of 
this model during a future pandemic.  The list of challenges experienced during the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic can serve as a basis for this evaluation plan, e.g., does the 
new method reduce these challenges?  An evaluation of any potential negative 
impacts and/or unintended consequences should also be undertaken. 
Final Thoughts 
 A future severe influenza pandemic will present challenges to public health 
officials in many ways.  One priority will be to ensure that ill people receive needed 
antiviral medicines in a timely fashion.  The favorable reactions to and key 
information about the advantages and risks of using pharmacies as the primary 
dispensers of antivirals from pharmacy executives in this dissertation research are 
promising and can inform national pandemic planning efforts going forward.  
To ensure that the views and discoveries from this research will inform 
planning for a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing, the findings of this 
study must be shared and understood by all the relevant stakeholders. Therefore, in 
addition to co-leading the CDC team that will develop a plan of action, the 
researcher will endeavor to work closely with key stakeholders to engage them in 
continued discussions about a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing.  
By leveraging the skills, systems, and willingness of pharmacies to collaborate in a 
pandemic response effort, public health may realize improved emergency response 
capability and better population health outcomes.    
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APPENDIX A: CDC Antiviral Distribution and Dispensing Project 
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APPENDIX B: Harvard School of Public Health Pharmacists Poll 
Results 
 
 
THE VOICE OF PHARMACISTS:  
A POLL ABOUT ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR ANTIVIRAL DISTRIBUTION DURING A 
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
 
Gillian K. SteelFisher, Robert J. Blendon and Amanda S. Brulé 
Harvard Opinion Research Program, Harvard School of Public Health 
 
Executive Summary 
Background and Methods 
The aim of this study was to assess acceptability among pharmacists in regard to an alternative 
method for antiviral distribution during a pandemic influenza.  In this alternative method, the 
government would distribute a sizable share of stockpile antivirals to pharmaceutical distributors in 
order that retail pharmacies could dispense them to the public.  In the description of this alternative 
method, pharmacists were told that the antivirals would be in unit-of-dose packaging and 
pharmacies would be able to charge a dispensing fee, though the medication itself would be free to 
the public.  Pharmacists were also assured that “depending on the severity of the pandemic, 
measures will be recommended to protect you and pharmacy staff from the virus that will reduce 
the chance you will get ill and thereby reduce the chance you will infect others.”   The poll 
addressed three areas of acceptability including: 1) pharmacists’ overall assessment of the idea, 2) 
their predictions about participation, and 3) possible barriers to and facilitators of participation 
based on their own perceptions and experience as well as on the characteristics of the pharmacies 
in which they work. 
Through a cooperative agreement with the National Public Health Information Coalition (NPHIC) and 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), researchers at the Harvard School of Public 
Health conducted the poll among a nationally-representative sample of 1,076 community 
pharmacists between February 24 and April 23, 2012.  All of the participating pharmacists currently 
dispense medications directly to customers in at least one pharmacy, and work in a traditional chain 
drug store, a supermarket-based pharmacy, a mass-merchandise or large “big-box” store-based 
pharmacy or an independent pharmacy (stand-alone or chain). The margin of error for total 
respondents is +/- 3.00% at the 95% confidence level.  This poll was conducted for the Harvard 
School of Public Health using an online and mail approach (mailed to home addresses) by SSRS/ICR, 
an independent research company.   
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Key Take-Aways 
Among community pharmacists, there is widespread appeal of the idea of the alternative delivery 
system as described and a willingness to participate in the case of a pandemic.  These factors are 
supported by pharmacists’ high predictions of their pharmacies’ participation; their own experience 
with aspects of the process, such as compounding medications; and their comfort with challenging 
aspects of the process, like focusing dispensing on high-risk populations during antiviral shortages.   
 
Nonetheless, pharmacists did have worries about the alternative delivery mechanism that could 
pose challenges for operations.  These include worries about antiviral shortages or bringing the virus 
back to their family.  Further, pharmacists have concerns about their pharmacies’ abilities to 
dispense prescriptions at the levels needed in a pandemic, and they note structural limits to their 
pharmacies’ abilities to provide for features like home delivery.  Finally, relatively few pharmacists 
had experience with the administrative and operational structures that might facilitate the 
alternative delivery system, such as collaborative practice agreements and recent contact with state 
or local public health agencies.    
Key Findings 
Overall receptivity.  Overall, pharmacists were highly receptive to this alternative mode of antiviral 
distribution as described.  The vast majority thought it was a good idea generally (85%) and a good 
thing for the pharmacist profession (84%).  Nearly all agreed it would strengthen the role of 
pharmacists during a pandemic (96%) and their relationships with patients (93%).  More than three-
quarters agreed it would strengthen relationships with their local public health department, their 
state public health department and physicians (84%, 78% and 76% respectively). 
Participation predictions.  Predictions about participation were also high.  Most pharmacists 
predicted that they would personally participate in the effort if their own pharmacy were involved 
(81%), and 91% thought they would come to work for all 12 weeks of an outbreak, as long as they 
weren’t sick themselves.   Nearly three-quarters (79%) thought it would be likely that they would 
come for additional shifts at routine pay in order to help address the likely increase in prescription 
volume.  That fraction rose to 91% if those who initially declined were offered higher wages or comp 
time for those shifts.   
Possible personal facilitators.  Most pharmacists (79%) were comfortable with what might be 
considered a more challenging aspect of dispensing in an outbreak - distributing antivirals to high-
risk groups (as defined by the CDC) in the case of a shortage, though only 39% were “very 
comfortable”.   Further, many had compounding experiences in the last 5 years that might support 
the idea of their participation; more than three-quarters (78%) had compounded medications for 
children or adults with swallowing problems or special dosing needs.   
Possible pharmacy facilitators.  Pharmacists’ predictions about their own participation were 
supported by relatively high predictions about their pharmacies’ reactions.  Most (82%) thought 
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their own pharmacy would participate in such an effort, though 16% did not know whether they 
would.   
Possible personal barriers.  Despite overall support for the idea, sizable shares of pharmacists said 
they had worries about the alternative delivery mechanism.  More than three-quarters said they 
were worried about a shortage of the antiviral (81%) and the risk of carrying the influenza virus back 
to their family (71%).  Most were worried about their own exposure to the influenza virus (59%), 
managing their usual patients under these circumstances (59%), keeping order in the pharmacy 
(58%), and their personal legal liability (57%).   
Further, relatively few pharmacists had recent experience with the administrative and operational 
structures that might facilitate the alternative delivery system.  For example, about a third (37%) 
had experience with a collaborative practice agreement and a quarter had any contact with their 
local or state health department in the past year.  
Possible pharmacy barriers.  Pharmacists did have some concerns about the pharmacies’ abilities to 
meet the need for higher dispensing volumes.  More than a quarter (27%) thought their own 
pharmacy could not handle a prescription increase of 20% for 12 weeks, while much greater 
fractions did not think their pharmacies could handle a 50% or 100% surge for 2 weeks (53% and 
72% respectively).   
A sizable share of pharmacists identified structural limitations at the pharmacy level that could pose 
challenges for operations in a pandemic flu if they were not addressed up front.  For example, only 
35% of pharmacists have full access to the Internet while they work, which could impinge on their 
access to needed government-based websites, though this feature might be able to be changed 
relatively easily at the pharmacies of an additional 31% who have restricted access to the Internet.  
Further, only a third (34%) thought the pharmacy would be able to deliver prescriptions to people’s 
homes, including 8% who said their pharmacy does not normally do this but would be willing to in a 
pandemic. 
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APPENDIX C: Literature Search Strategy 
 
 
 
Search topic Search terms 
All searches were limited to English language, publication dates of 
04/01/2009 through 1/31/2013, antiviral distribution and dispensing 
activities in the United States only, and the following: 
 
Antiviral medicines Antiviral OR antivirals, OR oseltamivir (MeSH 
term) OR zanamivir (MeSH term) OR Tamiflu 
OR Relenza 
AND 
Federal, state, or local        public 
health 
Public health [MeSH term] OR local public 
health OR state public health OR federal public 
health 
AND 
2009 H1N1 pandemic H1N1 OR pandemic (MeSH term)  
                                      Other search terms used with above 
Dispensing Dispense OR dispensing (all fields) OR 
distribution 
Delay in treatment Delay in treatment OR treatment delay 
Program evaluation Program evaluation OR ("program"[all fields] 
AND "evaluation"[all fields]) OR "program 
evaluation"[all fields] OR evaluation OR 
performance evaluation 
Shortage of antivirals Shortage OR “inadequate supply” 
After-action report “After action” report 
Antiviral treatment Treatment 
Disaster planning Disaster planning/methods 
Strategic National Stockpile Strategic national stockpile OR SNS 
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APPENDIX D: Conceptual Model Adapted From Greenhalgh et al., 
With Relevant Section Highlighted 
 
 
From “Diffusion of Innovations in Service Organizations: Systematic Review 
and Recommendations,” by T. Greenhalgh, G. Robert, F. Macfarlane, P. 
Bate, & O. Kyriakidou, 2004, The Milbank Quarterly, 82(4), p. 595. Copyright 
2004 by Wiley-Blackwell. Reprinted with permission.      
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APPENDIX E: IRB Exemptions 
 
CDC approves IRB exemption February 8, 2012 
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UNC approves IRB exemption March 27, 2012 
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APPENDIX F: Confirmation of CITI Training 
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APPENDIX G: Participant Recruitment Letter and E-mail 
 
 
Dear [insert participant’s name],     
 
Greetings!   I am Lisa Koonin, a doctoral student (DrPH) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill in the Gillings School of Global Public Health.  I am requesting your participation in a doctoral 
research study I am conducting on a new way that the Federal government might distribute and 
dispense antiviral medicines during a future influenza pandemic.  I also work at the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and as part of my CDC duties, I coordinate efforts to improve 
national emergency response efforts during a future pandemic.   
 
I would like to talk with you via telephone for about 45-60 minutes at a time convenient to you.  Your 
voluntary participation would involve discussing your opinions about the advantages and 
disadvantages of this new antiviral distribution and dispensing method that could be used during a 
pandemic.  
 
Background:  During the next severe influenza pandemic, as many people as 30% of the United 
States (US) population are likely to become ill and need rapid treatment with antiviral medicines.  If 
given promptly after influenza symptoms appear, antiviral drugs can reduce the severity of symptoms, 
shorten the time of illness, reduce the need for hospitalization, and reduce the chance of death.  The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has stockpiled caches of antivirals for pandemic 
use in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).  
 
During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, numerous challenges arose in antiviral dispensing.  There is 
concern, based on this experience, that some state plans might not be adequate to ensure timely 
access to these medicines during a future pandemic.  In May 2011, the CDC launched an effort to 
explore a new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing for the US. 
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Request for Your Opinions:  To learn how you company might view this proposed dispensing method, 
I am interviewing key pharmacy executives like yourself.  If you choose to participate, I am the only 
person who will have access to your individual responses. Your name and your company’s name will 
not be disclosed and will not be used in any report or summary that results from this project.  I would 
like to record the interview, so that I can analyze your opinions in detail.  All records and notes will be 
safeguarded, as described in the enclosed study description.   
 
Thank you for considering my request to discuss your opinions about a new way to distribute and 
dispense antiviral medicines during a pandemic.  If you have any questions, please contact me at 
koonin@live.unc.edu or lmk1@cdc.gov or 404 921-7955.  I will follow-up with a call to schedule an 
interview in the next week or so.  I know that you are very busy, and I greatly appreciate your time 
and help with this effort.                   
 
Sincerely,  
 
Lisa M. Koonin, MN, MPH 
UNC DrPH Doctoral Student 
and  
Senior Advisor and Lead, Pandemic Medical Care and Countermeasures 
Influenza Coordination Unit/ Office of Infectious Diseases 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Enclosure: Fact Sheet  
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APPENDIX H: Fact Sheet for Adult Participants in a Research Study 
and Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
 
University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill 
________________________________________________________________ 
Title of Study: Acceptability of Pharmacies Serving as Primary Dispensers of 
Antiviral Drugs during a Pandemic: Perspectives of Pharmacy Executives 
Principal Investigator: Lisa M. Koonin, MN. MPH 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department: School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy 
and Management 
Faculty Advisor: Sandra B. Greene, DrPH 
Study Contact telephone number: 404-921-7955 
Study Contact email: koonin@live.unc.edu 
________________________________________________________________ 
What are some general things you should know about research studies? 
You are being asked to take part in a research study. To join the study is voluntary. You 
may refuse to join, or you may withdraw your consent to be in the study, for any reason, 
without penalty.  Research studies are designed to obtain new knowledge. This new 
information may help people in the future during an influenza pandemic. You may not 
receive any direct benefit from being in the research study. There also may be risks to being 
in research studies. 
 
Details about this study are discussed below. It is important that you understand this 
information so that you can make an informed choice about being in this research study.  
You will be given a copy of this consent form. You should ask the researchers named 
 153 
 
above, or staff members who may assist them, any questions you have about this study at 
any time. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this research study is to learn about the views and opinions of pharmacy 
company executives about a proposed Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
plan to distribute antiviral medicine from Federal stockpiles to pharmaceutical distributors 
and then to pharmacies.  Under this proposed plan, pharmacies would serve as the primary 
dispensers.  You are being asked to be in the study because you have professional 
responsibilities related to decision-making and implementation of new protocols within your 
company. Currently, no decisions have been made whether to adopt or not adopt this plan. 
How many people will be interviewed for this study? 
If you decide to be interviewed for this study, you will be one of approximately 9 people 
interviewed for this research study.  
How long will your part in this study last? 
If you decide to be interviewed for this study, you will be asked to meet by telephone for a 
45-60 minute interview. If you agree, you may also be contacted by e-mail or telephone by 
me to address follow up questions or clarifications if needed. 
What will happen if you take part in the study? 
Participation in interviews for this study will involve the following steps: 
• Read this fact sheet and letter of invitation to determine your interest in participating in this 
study 
• Contact the researcher listed on the first page of this form with any questions or concerns 
regarding your participation 
• Schedule a time to participate in a 45-60 minute interview (interviews will be conducted 
over the telephone) 
• Provide your consent for participation in this study over the phone. 
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• Participate in a interview over the telephone 
• Address follow up questions or clarifications if needed after the interview 
What are the possible benefits from being in this study? 
Your participation will benefit by assisting public health planning for a new way to distribute 
and dispense antiviral medicines during an influenza pandemic.  This research is designed 
to benefit society by gaining new knowledge, however, you may not benefit personally from 
being in this research study. 
What are the possible risks or discomforts involved from being in this study? 
There are no known or expected risks to participating in this study. 
How will your privacy be protected? 
The researcher listed on the first page of this form is the only person who will have access to 
information that links individual participants to the responses from their interviews. The 
names of the participants and their company will not be shared with anyone. 
• Participants will not be identified in any report or publication about this study. 
• Records of the interview will be stored electronically in password-protected files. 
• At the time of the interview, participants will be asked for permission to audio-record the 
interview for transcription. If an interview is recorded, a transcript will be made and the 
audiotape will then be destroyed. Transcripts will be destroyed after the project is 
completed. 
• Any hardcopy information linked to an individual’s responses to interview questions will be 
stored in a locked file cabinet. 
 
Although every effort will be made to keep research records private, there may be times 
when federal or state law requires the disclosure of such records, including personal 
information. This is very unlikely, but if disclosure is ever required, UNC-Chapel Hill will take 
steps allowable by law to protect the privacy of personal information. In some cases, your 
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information in this research study could be reviewed by representatives of the University or 
government agencies for purposes such as quality control or safety. 
Will you receive anything for being in this study? 
You will not receive anything for taking part in this study, but your opinions will be valuable 
to assess a new way of distributing and dispensing antiviral medicine during a pandemic. 
Will it cost you anything to be in this study? 
Other than your time, there will be no costs for participating in the study. 
What if you have questions about this study? 
You have the right to ask, and have answered, any questions you may have about this 
research. If you have questions, or concerns, you should contact the researcher listed on 
the first page of this form. 
What if you have questions about your rights as a research participant? 
All research with human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your 
rights and welfare. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research 
participant you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board at 
919/966-3113 or by email to IRB_subjects@unc.edu . 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
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Title of Study: Acceptability of Pharmacies Serving as Primary Dispensers of Antiviral 
Drugs during a Pandemic: Perspectives of Pharmacy Executives 
 
Principal Investigator: Lisa M. Koonin, MN. MPH 
 
Participant’s Agreement:  
I have read the information provided above.  I have asked all the questions I have at this 
time.  I voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. 
 
 
__________________________________________          _________________ 
Signature of Research Participant      Date 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Printed Name of Research Participant 
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APPENDIX I: Key Informant Interview Guide – Questions for 
Pharmacy Executives    
 
Hello (Participant) 
I am Lisa Koonin, a doctoral student in the University of North Carolina’s 
Gillings School of Global Public Health. I also work at the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention in the area of pandemic preparedness. Thank you for 
agreeing to participate in this interview to discuss your opinions about a proposed 
new way to distribute and dispense antiviral medicines during a future influenza 
pandemic. As I indicated in the introductory letter, the information I collect as a part 
of this study is for my dissertation research and is also related to my work at CDC 
 
For this new method, the Federal government would send antiviral drugs from 
Federal stockpiles to pharmaceutical distributors and then they would be sent to 
pharmacies.  Pharmacies would then serve as the primary dispensers of antiviral 
drugs during a future influenza pandemic. Antiviral medicines would still need to be 
authorized by prescription from a licensed health care provider. 
 
Although I am leading this effort, I do not yet know if this new way of 
distributing or dispensing antivirals is feasible or acceptable.  I want to interview you 
to learn about your perspectives. I attached a form explaining this research with the 
letter of invitation.  I would like to review a few key issues about your participation in 
this research study.  First of all, to participate in the study is voluntary. You may 
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refuse to join, or you may withdraw your consent to be in the study, for any reason, 
without penalty.   
 
I will not share any details about you as a participant in this interview or 
associate your answers from this interview with your name or company name with 
colleagues at CDC or with any other organization.  I will be interviewing about 9 
pharmacy executives for this study. When I finish with all the interviews, I will group 
all the answers together in any report or presentation. I will not include your name or 
company name in any oral presentation or written report.  The aggregated 
information will be used in my dissertation.  The aggregated findings will also be 
used by CDC to determine how to better plan for a future pandemic.  
 
In order to fully capture your responses today, I would like to record our 
conversation. Please know that, if you wish, I can turn the audio recording off at 
anytime.  I will destroy the recording after I incorporate the information into the larger 
study.   
 
And finally, please know as we go through the questions in this interview, that 
there is no “right answers” to the questions, rather I want to learn in as much detail 
as possible about your views and opinions. Also, please know that you don’t have to 
answer any question that you choose not to answer.  We will just skip that question 
and go on to the next one. 
Do you have any questions? 
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If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject you 
may contact, anonymously if you wish, the Institutional Review Board at 919-966-
3113 or by email to IRB_subjects@unc.edu  
 
Do I have your permission to record our conversation?  
 
Do I have your permission to begin asking you questions? 
 
Interview Questions 
1. Please describe your role/position in your company. 
a. How many years have you had this role? 
2. Do you make or inform decisions about whether the pharmacies in your 
company adopt new large scale policies or procedures? [IF NO—
DISCONTINUE INTERVIEW] 
 
I am going to read you a scenario now that will serve as a frame of reference 
for our discussion.   
Scenario:  During a future severe, influenza pandemic, it will be important to 
rapidly distribute and dispense antiviral medicines to ill persons. 
 Please note; I do not have any current information about an impending 
pandemic, I am just using this as a scenario so we can discuss a new method of 
distribution and dispensing that is being explored by CDC.   
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This new method includes utilizing pharmacies as the primary dispensing 
locations for antivirals. The proposed plan includes sending antiviral medicines that 
are stockpiled by the Federal Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) to pharmaceutical 
distributors during a future influenza pandemic.  These distributors will in turn, 
distribute the antivirals to pharmacies in their networks. Because this medicine 
would still only available by prescription, patients will bring a prescription in, or it will 
be transmitted electronically or by telephone to pharmacies.  The antiviral products 
themselves will be provided to pharmacies for free from the government, but your 
pharmacies might choose to charge patients a dispensing fee.  In order to ensure 
reimbursement to pharmacies from those without insurance, the government is 
exploring a way to allow pharmacies to be reimbursed even if a patient does not 
have insurance.  
An influenza pandemic is likely to last a long time, as outbreaks occur in 
different parts of the country over the course of a year or more.  In a given 
community, however, it is likely that an outbreak could last anywhere from 8 to 12 
weeks.  During this time, pharmacies will probably have more patients than usual, 
some of them would be existing patients, but there could also be a large number of 
new patients who are seeking this medicine. 
Now I would like to ask you a few questions about your view of how you and 
your company would react to this proposed new method of antiviral distribution and 
dispensing.  
 
Is it okay for me to proceed? 
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3. What do you think about this proposed method of having pharmacies serving 
as the primary dispensers of antivirals during a future pandemic? PROBE: 
Do you see any advantages of your company’s participation with this new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing?  (PROBE: how about 
increased store traffic, serving customers, community stakeholder in 
emergency response?) 
a. Which of the advantages that you mentioned would you say is most 
significant?   
 
4. Are any parts of this new method of antiviral distribution/dispensing 
compatible with your company’s normal processes and mission? In what 
way? 
5. What do you think about this proposed approach in terms of complexity?  
 
6. What are the key factors that would influence you and your company’s 
decision to participate in this kind of antiviral dispensing during a pandemic? 
a. What do you think your company’s top leadership will think about this 
new method of antiviral distribution and dispensing?  
 
7. What conditions would make this new approach unacceptable?  
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PROBE: 
a. Are there any risks or adverse outcomes that you think might arise? 
(PROBE: disruptions, increased complexity, security risk, financial 
loss, risk of disease transmission in the store and threat to health of 
employees?)     
b. Which of the risks or adverse outcomes that you mentioned would you 
say is most significant?   
c. Are any of these risks “show-stoppers”?  Meaning if this risk could not 
be reduced, then your company would not likely participate in this new 
method of antiviral distribution and dispensing. 
d. Are there things that can be done to reduce these risks or make some 
of these risks more acceptable? If so, what would they be? 
(EXAMPLE---PROBE: if concerned about increased disease 
transmission in the pharmacy is there a way to serve customers by 
home delivery or drive thru window?  Asking friends and family to pick 
up medicines for sick persons?) (EXAMPLE--PROBE: If concerned 
about security risk, is there a way that private security firms or local 
government can help?) 
8. What effect would decisions about participation made by others have on your 
company’s decision to participate? For example:  
a. Competitors 
b. Front-line pharmacists in the company 
c. Others? 
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9. What type of information, training, or support would your company and your 
pharmacies need to be able to perform this role during a pandemic? 
 
10. What else is important to you if pharmacies serve as primary dispensers of 
antivirals during a pandemic?   
a. What else would you like to tell me about this issue? 
 
11.  What do you think about pharmacies serving as the primary dispensers of 
other medical countermeasures during other types of emergencies, such as 
an anthrax attack? 
 
12. May I contact you again with follow up questions or for clarifications?  What 
is the best way to contact you, if needed? 
 
Conclusion:  Thank you for your time today to discuss a new way to distribute and 
dispense antivirals during an influenza pandemic. The opinions and insights that you 
shared will be valuable to my study and for national planning for a future pandemic. I 
really appreciate your time and interest in this emergency preparedness topic.  
Please feel free to contact me if you think of anything else that could inform this 
exploration. 
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